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The liberalisation of domestic telecommunication (telecom) markets has become a 
worldwide trend. As a result, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
evolving from deliberations within the World Trade Organisation (WTO), has been 
heralded as the mechanism with which to effect telecom liberalisation domestically. For 
countries in Africa, the GATS instruments have been translated as a means to establish 
the principles required for an effective telecom industry supported by key institutions in 
policy, regulation and implementation. However, the analysis of relevant literature on 
telecom in Africa has tended to focus on technological developments based on current 
observable outcomes. This methodology is inadequate because it fails to account for the 
context-specific nature of the policy arena and framework shaping telecom outcomes. 
I argue that we must consider telecom outcomes by understanding the nature of political 
institutions domestically and their interaction with the international arena. To explicate 
this intersection of ideas, I draw on two seemingly independent theories, Neo-
patrimonialism and New Institutional Economics (NIE) with reference to the works of 
van de Walle (2001) and North (1990) respectively, to shed light on the nature of the 
Kenyan political context and the value of the GATS as an instrument that facilitates 
credibility and reduces opportunistic ex-post behaviour. It is contended in this study, that 
for the Kenyan Government, the value of the GATS accession lies in the legitimising role 
that it facilitates in accessing funds from the international community. This study thus 
highlights the inevitable tension that arises when domestic policy-reform goals are 
juxtaposed with international trade obligations undertaken through treaty accession and 
informed by a liberalisation agenda. 
A qualitative approach was used to collect the data and involved interviews and 
documentary analysis. The findings suggest that Kenya is partially in compliance with its 





tendencies in Kenya and is exacerbated by the need to attract hard currency through aid 
packages that dictate the nature of the policy process and the relationship between Kenya 
and the international community. 
In conclusion, even with policy reforms, state agents always find ways to maintain or 
create clientelist practises. Unless such reform is accompanied by political changes that 
provide checks and balances on institutions and state agents, reform policies on their own 
will not create an effective telecom sector. To truly evaluate telecom reform therefore, we 






Some of the analyses in this thesis have previously been published. A paper describing the 
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PART ONE: THEORY, 





1  C h a p t e r  o n e  
THE STUDY OF TELECOM POLICY IN KENYA 
A world order is a stool on three legs: the political, the normative, and the institutional 
Samuel K. Murumba 
(1993 p.867) 
It is not claimed here that globalisation has touched every person, location and sphere of activity on the 
planet, or each to the same extent; nor that globalisation is a linear and irreversible process, even if 
has often appeared to have a juggernaut quality; nor, in reductionist fashion, that globalisation 
constitutes the sole and primary significance; nor that state and geopolitical boundaries have ceased to 
be important; nor that everyone enjoys equal access to, and equal voice in, and equal benefits from 
the supraterritorial realm; nor that globalisation entails homogenisation and an erasure of cultural 
differences; nor that it heralds the birth of a world community with perpetual peace. Indeed, in 
respect of each of these points the contrary has frequently been the case.  
Jan Aart Scholte  
(1996, p.47) 
Introduction 
The growing interdependence of countries as a result of globalisation is undeniable. What 
is more problematic is the implications of this increasing interdependence in terms of the 
ability of national governments to govern. This thesis examines aspects of the interface 
between national and international policy making in the telecommunications (telecom)2 
sector in Africa. Drawing on a case study approach, the primary focus of inquiry in the 
examination of Kenya’s implementation of its telecom reform process viewed as an 
assessment of Kenya’s telecom commitments to its international trade commitments 
undertaken through accession to the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO’s) General 
                                                 
2 The terms telecommunication, telecommunications, telecom and telecoms and in some cases ICT tend to be used 
indiscriminately and interchangeably in the literature. For the purposes of this study, I will use the term ‘telecom’ 
referring to both the plural and singular form unless circumstances require another version eg., International 
Telecommunications Union. The linkages between telecom and ICT as a general term shall be discussed in the 





Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS)3 framework. This chapter seeks to ground the 
research terrain by identifying the scope and the nature of the study. In particular, it 
examines further the rationale and justification of the thesis. This is achieved by providing 
an overview of the problem, the research framework, the originality of the study and a 
précis of the methodology. The chapter concludes by providing a preview of the 
development of the study’s argument as advanced in each chapter. 
1.1 Situating the problem 
Kenya is at a crossroad. Though wealthier and more stable than most African4 countries, 
it suffers from the same problems of incessant hunger, illiteracy, and lack of economic 
opportunity. At the time of independence in 1963, the Government identified illiteracy, 
disease, ignorance and poverty as the main areas to address post-independence (Republic 
of Kenya, 1965). Thirty years on, the poor still constitute slightly more than half the 
population. Agriculture is the primary economic activity and tourism and the flower 
industry earn Kenya its largest foreign exchange, accounting for more than 40 percent of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Omosa, 2002). Performance in all sectors of the 
country is severely restrained by structural factors such as poor institutions, corruption, 
insecurity, dilapidated public utilities, inefficient parastatal5 sectors, inappropriate 
regulatory frameworks and other market distortions (Holmquist et al., 1994). Its overall 
problems are derived from the degree of political decay, the Government’s control of large portions of 
the country’s economy and the use of that power to dispense favours to allies and cronies as well as to 
punish opponents (Kiai, 1998 p. 189). Over the years, regime efforts have been geared 
towards improving the standing of some business people and creating elites based on 
                                                 
3 WTO, General Agreement on Trade Services, contained in Annex 1B to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation, 15th April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round in Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.LM. 1143, 1168 {GATS}. The GATS is available online 
from the WTO website at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm 
4 Africa in this study refers to the countries south of the Saharan desert, generally known as Sub-Saharan Africa. I 
however note that there are several political, economic and social differences. 





patrimonial relationships (Ndegwa, 1998). For a long time, individuals, particularly those 
in the public sector, could not risk their businesses or positions by criticising Government 
as opportunities could be foreclosed or sanctions applied in the form of state banks 
calling in loans and legal difficulties emerging without warning (Holmquist & Michael, 
1998 p.241). The unpredictable landscape has inflicted severe deleterious effects on the 
country’s social and economic environment. For example in Kenya, most user services 
until 1997 for the telecom sector were provided through the Post, Telegraph and 
Telephone (PTT) ministry - Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation 
(KP&TC)6 which was solely run by the Kenyan Government. Like other sectors in the 
Kenyan economy, Kenya’s PTT organisation was overstaffed, inefficient, debt-ridden and 
had poor connectivity therefore offering telecom services at high costs. These 
inefficiencies were seen as a growing impediment to economic development to Kenya and 
many other African countries.  
In the early 1980s, in an effort to change these conditions, African governments were 
encouraged by the donor community, mainly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank to liberalise a range of sectors including telecom. This, it was thought, 
would minimise national government interference in these sectors. In the telecom sector, 
African governments such as Kenya’s were encouraged to pursue regulatory reforms that 
had been utilised by Western countries. However, by the mid 1990s reforms undertaken 
had been less than appropriate. The international financial community in an effort to 
improve the reform process institutionalised a range of conditionality procedures into its 
lending procedures. The idea was that loans would only be disbursed when particular 
conditions of the reform process were met. In Kenya this conditionality procedure began 
in the 1990s under the privatisation programme which also included the telecom sector 
(IMF, 1996). 
                                                 





1.2 Locating the problem: the telecom sector 
In the telecom sector, the reform process was further sparked by technological changes 
taking place globally leading to a change in the conceptualisation of the traditional 
boundaries of telecom management. To summarise these changes here, the market for 
international service was no longer limited to the national customer base in the country in 
which the license was based. Pricing arbitrage could make that carrier’s service attractive 
anywhere in the world. These developments challenged the way telecom institutions 
operated at a national and international level. In the developed and developing world, 
telecom reforms were therefore implemented to improve efficiency and remove 
monopoly from the ministries/agencies that controlled the growing telecom sector 
(Melody, 1997b). These reforms entailed liberalising and privatising the telecom sector in 
order to open up new markets for the development of telecom. Leading this process were 
the United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK), and France with other 
countries with implementation of varying levels of telecom reform. The growth7 of the 
internet and the use of mobile services and value added services8 such as messaging and 
more recently Voice Over Internet telephony (VoIP) is therefore closely tied to the quality 
and availability of telecom competition based policies.  
The expansion and convergence of technologies however, mean that initial agreements 
made between nations were considered cumbersome and inefficient.9 This led to the 
advent of the General Agreement in Trade Services (GATS),10 notably the Basic 
                                                 
7 The ITU estimates an annual growth rate of 1.3 billion subscribers in mobile services and 1.2 billion in fixed-line. See 
ITU, World Telecommunications Indicators Database, 2004 
8 Value added services refer to the new technologies that rely on the telecommunications infrastructure such as the 
mobile phone and the internet. For example: checking emails on your mobile,  
9 Privy to the WTO, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) was the main international telecom regime, its 
aim being to “promote, at the international level, the adoption of a broader approach to telecommunications issues in 
the global information economy and society” (ITU. Strategic Plan for the Union, 1995-1999, Annex 1 (Oct.14 1994) 
in FINAL ACTS OF THE PLENIPTENTIARY CONFERNCE (1994).  
10 WTO, General Agreement on Trade in Services, contained in Annex 1B to the Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organisation, 15th April 1994, Final Act embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 





Telecommunications Pact or Fourth Protocol11 initiated by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO)12 to signify the introduction of telecom services competition in domestic and 
international markets. By the late 1990s most countries recognised that if telecom sectors 
were to be in a position to seize new technological and service opportunities, 
entrepreneurship, good management, frontier technical knowledge and an understanding 
of customer demand and regulation were deemed essential. In the absence of tried and 
tested regulatory models, various countries adopted a ‘try and see’ approach with 
privatisation as the main form of reform. Yet, in spite of this, the idea of telecom sector 
reform was pushed in African nations through the GATS framework. Specifically, the 
reform process was introduced as a means in which developing country governments 
could meet their Universal Service Obligations (USO).13 In addition, of the growing global 
convergence of telecommunications, the WTO reforms under the GATS emerged as a 
more viable option than its precursor, the ITU, (which negotiated bilateral agreements 
between nations) and was adopted by many countries. Nonetheless, because governments 
are equally attracted by the potential to raise capital from privatisations and to garner the 
benefits of foreign expertise and management, this privatisation process inevitably creates 
a tension manifest in how best to manage telecom reforms while the state retains often 
substantial or majority ownership in a partially privatised operator (usually the sole 
incumbent, at least in fixed-line services).  
                                                 
11 Fourth Protocol to the Basic Agreement on Trade Services, 30th April 1996, WTO Doc. S/L/20. The literature refers to this 
protocol varyingly: namely, the Fourth Protocol; the Basic Telecommunications Agreement (BTA), or the 
Telecommunications Pact. Throughout this thesis, preference is given to the term ‘Fourth Protocol’ as the BTA 
assumes a higher level of substantive consensus through the policy-making process than was/is arguably the case. 
Discussion in reference to the term consensus shall be discussed in chapters 2 and 4.  
12 As used throughout the study, ‘WTO and WTO Agreements’  refers to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organisation {hereinafter WTO} and the substantive multilateral agreements attached thereto, April 15, 
1994, in WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 3 (1999) {hereinafter the WTO}, 33 ILM 1143 
(1994). 
13 USO is generally defined as the provision of services (public utilities) to all citizens at affordable rates and has mainly 
been attributed to the provision of basic voice telephony also known as Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS). For a 
detailed discussion on USO see Telecommunications Policy Vol. 28 which covers articles on Universal Service. Further 





Coupled with the telecom reform process is the issue of establishing (at least in 
developing countries) and maintaining effective regulation. As shall be discussed in 
chapter 2, telecom reform models are adjunct with regulatory process that involves the 
decreasing involvement of government in the sector. Primarily driven by the GATS 
telecom instruments, regulation has been elevated from a purely domestic matter to one 
contemplated, if not fully realised, at a global level. Any telecom regulatory reform 
undertaken since the mid 1990s has therefore usually occurred and continues to do so 
with reference to the principles enshrined in the GATS Regulatory Principles (RP)14, 
illustrating a type of ‘codification’ of telecom policy, or at least some of its essential 
principles practiced in many parts of the world. Thus, while in 1990 there were only 13 
regulatory agencies around the world, at the beginning of 2005 there were no less than 
123 countries with regulatory agencies, with 140 expected by the end of 2005 (Wu et al., 
2004). Debates continue regarding the appropriate regulatory structure and institutional 
design and the question about whether public interest goals are best served by single or 
multi-sector utility regulators in a converging telecom environment (Henten et al., 2003). 
While these debates are unlikely to lend themselves to a prompt or universal solution, 
their existence is reflective of the fact that regulatory reform remains an enduring and 
dynamic process.  
In seeking to implement telecom reforms, Kenya acceded to the WTO in 1995. This 
process was to begin a broader telecom reform programme in Kenya and led to the 
enactment of the Kenya Communications Act (KCA)15 in 1998. This was set to change 
the telecom landscape of the country. However, eight years (2005) after the enactment of 
the KCA, telecom development country wide had not progressed as quickly as anticipated 
and Kenya had not fully met its liberalisation conditions as specified through its accedence 
                                                 
14 Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles Used for Consideration as Additional Comments in Offers on Basic 
Telecommunications, WTO Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications (24 April 1996), Online: WTO 
http://www.wto.org/wto/english/tratop_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm {Reference Paper or RP}. 
15 See Kenya Communications Act (1998). The KCA is the legal framework under which the GATS telecom reform 





to the WTO. Kenya’s PTT organisation - Telkom Kenya Limited16 (Telkom),17 remains 
under Government control in spite of various stated intentions by the Government to 
privatise it. As shall be examined in the analysis chapters, telecom growth as indicated by 
telephone lines, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and personal computers (PCs) is still 
low. Appendix A provides a comparison of Kenya’s telecom indicators with South Africa 
and the rest of Africa. In addition, the costs associated with telephone and internet use 
continue to be very high compared to the country’s average per capita earning. While the 
mobile telephone industry has grown exponentially, this growth has only been evidenced 
within the urban areas of Kenya.  
The solution (in this case reforming the telecom sector) has thus been conceived much 
too narrowly. Privatisation approaches tend, often indiscriminately, to ascribe assumptions 
about developed markets to developing ones. Such assumptions include, that the state has 
an unequivocal interest in privatising the PTO; that all countries will be attracted to 
foreign investment; that competition will serve the state’s interest; that the notion of 
public interest through the provision of USO will be best served through market 
restructuring in the telecom sector and that the notion of telecom reform will always 
produce a ‘positive-sum game’ in which all stakeholders gain (Hahn, 2000). This tendency 
to assume a ‘one dress fits all’ for telecom reforms is somewhat myopic, but is 
nonetheless prevalent because abiding by the WTO principles lends credibility to a 
country wanting investment to fund its telecom sector. Nonetheless, it could be argued 
that grafting assumptions about developed countries onto emerging markets is yet another 
manifestation of neo-colonialism, within the trade regime, or what Hahn (2000, p77) 
terms the internalisation of regulatory reform. It is therefore more appropriate pedagogically to 
                                                 
16 As shall be discussed in chapter 5 and expounded on in chapter 6, part of the reform process under the GATS and as 
enshrined in the KCA required that the telecom sector be split into a regulatory body, and that telecom and postal 
services be separated. This separation created Telkom Kenya Limited (Telkom).  
17 It is noted that the terms telecom and Telkom are similar. However, preference was given to the term ‘Telkom’ as the 
standard reference over Telkom Kenya Limited or TKL for consistency given that majority of those in the telecom 
sector in Kenya referred to Telkom Kenya Limited as Telkom. It is noted nonetheless that several other countries use 






suggest that the explanation of telecom reform outcomes, at least in part arise from a lack 
of rigorous academic literature on the experiences of developing countries due to the very 
recent time within which such far-reaching changes are taking place (Kerretts, 2004).  
For example, Kenya, like other African countries, does not have a complete telecom 
network. The telecom infrastructure country wide is vastly under-developed with a 
majority of those in rural areas not having access to land-lines (CCK, 2005). In addition, 
Kenya has never had sufficient capital to construct a full international network and suffers 
from a shortage of technical skills. Attracting foreign capital, while necessary, underscores 
the fact that Kenya must be in a strong position to control and manage foreign resources 
in the best interests of the Kenyan domestic economy and society. Thus, telecom reforms 
in African countries open up three new dimensions of the issue that have not been 
explored to any significant degree in the literature.  
First, the literature and policy debates have paid insufficient attention to the domestic 
implications of telecom development in African countries based on models adopted from 
‘information rich’ countries. This is not to say, however, that telecom reform in African 
countries has not been dealt with in the literature. New and emerging literature in the last 
five years on the subject of telecom regulation and its implications for developing 
countries spearheaded by the Learning Information Networking and Knowledge (LINK) 
centre in South Africa and its network of partners.18 While relatively new, this is a very 
important aspect of the process and provides a window through which to address the 
issues associated with telecom reform. This study therefore contributes to this new field 
that seeks to analyse the experiences of African countries in telecom reform. Nonetheless, 
the majority of the literature outside this collaboration, deal mainly with models of 
                                                 
18 The LINK Centre defines itself as “the leading information and knowledge hub providing training, research and 
consultancy in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) arena in order to develop public, private, 
NGO and community-based capacity within the Southern African region” (http://link.wits.or.za). Its partners include 
LIRNE.NET: Learning Initiatives on Reforms for Network Economies, a Strategic Collaboration between Centre for 
Tele-Information (CTI), Technical University of Denmark, and Economics of Infrastructures, Delft University of 
Technology, Netherlands  and  WDR: The World Dialogue on Regulation for Network Economies, which generates 





regulation, the function each model has in different economic conditions and the 
technological developments that have taken place. While this literature is important, given 
that it provides a base from which to start any analysis of the telecom sector, it should be 
noted that little attention has been given to the actual elements of the policy process to 
which these models are applied. Questions must therefore be raised about how Kenyan 
actors interact with these international models and the role that these actors play in 
influencing the eventual outcome of the telecom reform process. This means evaluating 
the way in which political and economic structures within the domestic environment 
influence telecom outcomes. And while very little is known about the underlying forces 
shaping telecom policy, this is not because it has not been covered. Rather, policy and 
politics have always been in the domain of politics and international relations. As a result, 
much of what has been said about telecom has tended to emanate from practitioners 
devoted to the technical aspects that have made telecom analysis an ‘experts’ domain. 
Thus, instead of a holistic assessment of telecom in the social fabric of society, many have 
been scared off by the use of technological terms resulting from the lack of an academic 
discipline in telecom studies. 
Second, studies which consider the realm of the state and the international arena as 
separate contexts fail to explain the role that both play in influencing the policy-making 
process. For example, since the establishment of the WTO and the GATS telecom 
instruments in 1995, a pragmatic approach to liberalise or privatise remains the dominant 
norm and is expanding as countries continue to accede to the WTO treaties and domestic 
regulatory design becomes a discourse within multilateral negotiations. Coupled with this 
shift, is a movement towards more general and procedural systems of rules in the face of a 
clear trend towards the globalisation of service provision in telecom (Noam 2003), which 
suggest that as telecom reforms grow internationally, it also transforms the international 
and national system of telecom, leading to the end of the traditional notion of telecom as 
a national and territorial sector. Without necessarily desiring to establish itself as a supra-
national regulator, the effect of the WTO telecom instruments in general and the RP in 





international policy making in the sector. By early 2004, more than 100 countries had 
taken up commitments to basic telecom reforms (WTO, 2005), and despite the ‘crash of 
silicon valley’ that followed the post-dotcom boom, telecom reforms have continued 
unabated. Thus, while a large body of the public policy literature argues that states are 
increasingly constrained and shaped by global forces (Ohmae, 1995; Falk, 1997), for the 
most part public policy literature has tended to focus on domestic state activities and to 
treat the international arena as an external condition to which policy actors respond rather 
than an integral part of the policy process.  
Third and particularly evident in what is now known as the field of Information 
Communication Technology (ICT)19, is the fact that ICT which includes telecom is seen 
by many commentators as underpinning the social and economic progression of nation-
states throughout the first stages of the 21st century. Likewise, researchers have presented 
convincing arguments over the past two decades as to how ICT will transform countries 
into ‘knowledge economies’ and ‘network societies’ (Castells, 2000). This often evangelical 
zeal has been taken up with equal determination by governments of (over)developed 
countries around the world. The ability to use ICT has thus been heralded as the 
indispensable language and a fundamental aspect of citizenship in what is seen as the 
prevailing information age (Norris, 2001; Katz & Aspen, 2001). Equally involved, though 
usually less hyperbolic, are academics who have also welcomed the use of ICT as the key 
to transforming social divisions and inequalities (Van Ryckeghem, 1995). This is not to say 
that ICT cannot be used as a tool for development, however, as argued by Wilson (2004), 
for the most part, a ‘techno-determinist’ framework (framework based on technological 
developments) runs throughout much of the ICT and development literature. Techno-
determinism however fails to recognise routine practises as repositories of power and tend 





2002). Failure to take these elements into account has led to a classification of people as 
‘information rich’ and ‘information poor’, depending on the availability of ICT (Nulens & 
Van Audenhove, 1999; Selwyn, 2004). This binary division (‘information poor’ and 
‘information rich’) that underlies many of the projects in ‘information-poor’ countries has 
however been shown to be too simplistic an understanding of both countries/societies 
themselves and of what development and change means (see for example: Wilson, 2004; 
Mansell & Wehn, 1998; Mansell et al., 2002). Further, such assumptions render passive 
those who are to be made ‘information rich’ and therefore limit the potential for ICT to 
challenge the social structures of poverty.  
Correspondingly, the study of telecom policy has privileged the role of economics and 
efficiency at the cost of other ways of conceptualising policy making options. The focus 
on telecom reform has therefore been depicted as the ‘best’ means in which telecom 
development would occur. A related emphasis has also been on the prioritisation of 
modernisation and neo-liberal perspectives in the analysis of the information and 
communication sector. As well as privileging strategic models for policy implementation, 
the actors associated with these interests have also received greater prominence without 
any critical analysis in their role in the policy process. The centrality of the telecom sector 
to the ‘information revolution’ or ‘knowledge economy’ internationally has therefore also 
elevated the interests and issues at a local level. 
Indeed, the opportunities presented to the ‘information poor’ countries like Kenya are not 
in question. Research into these opportunities has conclusively shown that benefits do 
accrue as a result of adopting telecom technologies (Gillwald, 2005). But such research 
should not be considered conclusive if the policy process and frameworks which shape 
the adoption and use of telecom are not analysed. The ‘techno-deterministic’ discourse in 
                                                                                                                                          
19 Information Communication Technologies or Information Communication Technology (ICT) refers to the 
convergence of technologies which includes telecommunications. Where used in this study in relation to policy, it 
denotes specific reference to policies that have attempted to incorporate the entire ambit of ICT within the policy 
framework. In the case of Kenya, this is included under the proposed Draft ICT policy. Further discussion is done in 





the field of telecom and the wider field of ICT has therefore rendered telecom analysis 
less open to critical scrutiny as the international agenda of information and 
communication adoption becomes entrenched into everyday discourse. The blame for 
this should therefore solely rest on telecom practitioners and academics in the field. If 
policy making is critical in understanding the use of telecom, then all ‘techno-
deterministic’ agendas of telecom studies should follow on with telecom policy research 
that seeks to understand how governments construct the process of adoption and 
implementation of these policies. Cleary, the implications for the above methodological 
inadequacies lie in its contribution to Africa and the international development sector’s 
failure to redress the issues that continue to sustain the gap between ‘information rich’ 
and ‘information poor’ countries.  
Presupposing the desire to redress this gap and given the tendency to assume the lack of 
involvement of domestic and international actors in influencing policy outcomes, this 
research seeks to improve the understanding of the relationship between international 
institutions and domestic policy making through an analysis of the GATS application in 
Kenya.  This study explains the current state of Kenya’s telecom reform process by 
offering a political explanation for the persistence of the slow development in the reform 
process in Kenya. As argued, within the narrow analytical universe of studying telecom 
development, certain issues and actors have been privileged in the form of an accepted 
problematic. The term problematic defined here as a social theoretical position which is linked either 
explicitly or implicitly, to a broadly based philosophical view point (Bocock, 1982 p.40). The 
problematic within the telecom and development literature has thus been to bias three 
main issues as reviewed above. First, a techno-deterministic paradigm in which the role of 
technology prevails over the role of actors. Second, a tendency to assume that domestic 
and international realms are separate arenas in the telecom process and third to ignore the 






Seeking to transcend this orthodoxy and hierarchy of issues and interests, this research 
will treat the analysis of telecom reform in Kenya as historically specific to its domestic 
context. In doing so, this study takes as its starting point the premise that domestic 
institutions and patterns of politics will continue to function as highly critical filters of global forces 
(Pempel, 1998 p.219) and therefore places historical development at the centre of its 
explanatory framework recognising history as the framework within which meaning is 
located.  
1.3 Argument and theoretical framework 
The need for an expanded analytical framework for understanding telecom reform 
outcomes in Kenya as implied in the previous section is more fully supported by locating 
the study within a Global Political Economic (GPE) framework that address the empirical 
(‘what is’) nature of policy making in a given historical context. This is not to suggest that 
normative theories (‘what out to be’) are not valid, but rather, as argued earlier, 
recognising that policy making takes place in both domestic and international contexts 
allows the study to address the underlying issues of development often accepted as 
normative. Thus, the research inquiry is predicated on the assumption that, the tension 
proposed between the two contexts, namely domestic and international contexts do not 
require a resolution as neither the domestic nor the international policy framework 
individually provide a holistic framework for understanding policy reform undertaken 
through international commitments in African contexts. 
Since the onset of Africa’s economic crisis over twenty years ago, political scientists have 
sought to explain the inability or unwillingness of governments in the region to undertake 
policy reform. Three main types of reasoning are found in the literature. First, one set of 
literature argues that the lack of societal power as asserted through organised interest 
groups is in part to blame for Africa’s lack of reform. Nonetheless, this literature disagrees 
on the extent to which these actors can act to achieve real policy change (see Shaw, 2000; 





political economy also views African governments as prisoners of their societies through 
their reliance on clientelist practices to ensure political stability (see van de Walle, 1997). 
Finally, most analysts of why Africa has not been able to renew with economic growth in 
the last twenty years place the blame squarely on the inability of African governments to 
overcome society opposition to the policy reform imposed on them by International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) (see Mkandawire & Soludo, 2003). All of these three main 
themes in the literature on Africa contain valuable insights, but they underestimate the 
autonomy of African governments from societal forces, a feature not common in Western 
societies. Most states in Africa combine weak capacities and discipline with a fair amount 
of autonomy to make economic policy decisions, largely because of the lack of strong 
organised pressure groups that would hold the state more accountable. Thus, partial and 
uneven implementation of reform, as is argued in this study, is less of a paradox if it is 
understood that African state elites have sought to adapt to the changing global arena 
without losing hold of the state and state resources.  
I argue therefore that the main obstacles to telecom reform are to be found within the 
state itself and the political institutions that link state and society. My starting point is that 
patterns of telecom reform outcome in Kenya can be explained with reference to the 
nature of political institutions there first, and second to their interaction with IFIs within 
the wider ambit of the global trading system. Specifically I argue that the GATS 
framework20 provides the Kenyan Government with credibility to access funds from IFIs 
and yet at the same, legitimises its policy actions domestically.  
Seeking to understand the political and policy context of Kenya, I draw on the theoretical 
concepts of neo-patrimonialism and the broad principles of New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) as a framework. African governments have received several billions of dollars from 
IFIs since the early 1980s for economic development. Yet, the dependency and neo-
                                                 
20 These include the GATS framework Agreement applicable to all services (1994); the GATS Annex on 
Telecommunication (Annex) applicable to essential infrastructure (1994); the Fourth Protocol to the GATS, applicable 





Marxist literature have always viewed donor resources as complementary to private 
capital. They have argued that aid is designed to better integrate Africa into the global 
trading and financial networks, dominated by Western capital. More mainstream 
observers have viewed aid as a force for positive change in the region, which would help 
African countries adapt to changing global markets. On the contrary, it is argued in this 
study that both the international trading system and the political system of clientelism 
have over the years created a co-dependency between Kenya and IFIs. This combined 
effect of dependency and clientelism is termed as neo-patrimonial21. The term captures 
the thesis that most African states are hybrid regimes in which patrimonial practices 
coexist with modern bureaucracy.  
Understanding the context of Kenya as neo-patrimonial draws the question as to why a 
country would want to consider making commitments in international institutions that 
could be viewed as an unnecessary external constraint on the pursuit of domestic goals in 
neo-patrimonial states. The field of NIE seems to provide this answer. Recent 
developments in the world of IFIs indicate that NIE continues to be a strong theoretical 
framework framing the critique of international institutions today. This field of literature 
includes work by Sachs (2003), Easterly (2001) and Jutting (2003). For example Jutting 
(2003) from the OECD critically evaluates the role of the international institutions in 
development work using NIE, while Rodrick et al (2002) from the IMF analyse the role of 
institutions in integration and economic development. While these studies do not deal 
with the GATS, their findings indicate the NIE provides a window in which to directly 
focus on the role played by institutions in the new global economy. While the definition 
of institutions differs, this study follows North’s (1990) definition as constraints that 
human beings impose on themselves. Following this definition, institutions prohibit, 
permit or require a specific type of action, ie political, economic or social, which is 
important for reducing the degree of uncertainty, for improving information flows or 
                                                 
21 The term is drawn from the Weberian notion of neo-patrimonialism. For Max Weber’s theory of political authority, 





defining and enforcing property rights. This action is thus called a transaction cost. Thus, 
Kenya’s accession to the GATS it is argued, must lie in the perceived legitimisation of the 
GATS as part of the WTO’s broader bargaining structure which facilitates trade deals 
(Bronckers, 1999) namely: that concessions made in one area will assist in obtaining trade 
concessions in other areas22.In this study, the GATS is viewed as a transaction cost that 
offers Kenya the opportunity to signal to the international community its growing 
commitments to trade and liberalisation and the terms upon which that commitment is 
based.23 Yet it is argued, that in doing so, it also provides credibility for the Kenyan 
Government to access funds from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and at the 
same time legitimise its actions in the telecom sector domestically. 
I am not attempting to marry a critical GPE - neo-patrimonialism to a post-positivist 
rational choice approach - NIE. Rather, I accept that the world of telecom reform is not 
neatly divided into sectors that accord neatly with academe’s disciplinary boundaries and 
departments. Telecom practice crosses these boundaries at random and with no respect 
for the reductionist methods of social science disciplines and is shaped by the interaction 
between the state and the contemporary international trading regime. Central to this study 
is therefore is the notion of strategic action. This work follows Giddens (1984) in 
conceptualising actors as drawing upon the historically produced structural properties of the 
constitution of social relations (p.288) in their strategic conduct. Such structural properties 
involve complex and interacting issues of politics, ethnicity and class which often define 
the axis of struggle in patrimonial states. Members of ruling cliques, many of whom share 
locations within this network of hierarchies, are contrary to many telecom analyses, not 
floating above the economic and social conditions of their societies but are deeply rooted 
in them.  This study therefore provides a modest explanation of telecom policy outcomes 
                                                 
22 The legitimisation process can be seen through the WTO overriding purpose which is stated as: “to help trade flow as 
freely as possible-so long as there are no undesirable side-effects” (see www.wto.org: ‘Understanding the WTO’).  





by offering a political explanation of the intricate linkage of the Kenyan policy process 
with the international arena. 
1.4 Significance of the research 
While the entire significance of the study is evidenced through the development of the 
argument within the chapters, three key contributions require further elaboration. First, 
this study is the first of its kind that seeks to provide a political explanation of telecom 
outcomes in Kenya. The inattention to politics by telecom analysts is a particularly glaring 
omission because telecom is hinged on the wider development of the economy. Perhaps 
as researchers in Africa, ‘we’ have had to first document ‘our’ progress to date 
technologically by collecting statistics on the state of the sector. Yet, on the other hand, 
perhaps this focus has left other areas unattended. This study attempts to move forward 
the discourse of telecom reform in Africa noting that political contexts contribute to 
policy processes which in turn influence policy adoption and implementation. 
Second, this study provides a distinctive framework in analysing the telecom sector in 
Kenya. Indeed, as noted earlier, both neo-patrimonialism and NIE tend to reside in 
opposite frames where academic discipline and argument is concerned. Nonetheless, the 
roots of political science are rooted in institutions (Peters, 1999) and institutions are 
located within specific contexts. In this study, neo-patrimonial literature provides a 
framework for understanding clientelist needs of neo-patrimonial states and its interaction 
with the larger international community while a broad NIE approach provides a basis for 
understanding international institutions and the value of the rules they create. For the 
most part, the literature on international institutions has taken a realist approach in which 
organisations such as the WTO are understood as mere arenas in which states convene to 
pursue their national interests, rather than viable institutions capable of acting in their own 
right to influence domestic outcomes. In addition, state centred approaches have tended 
to focus on the state as an autonomous actor rather than as part of the international order. 





on Africa’s failures in novel and distinctive ways. This study attempts to do just that, noting that 
both the international and domestic arenas are intricately linked where policy, politics and 
telecom development are concerned. 
Third, this study is the first detailed empirical study drawing the WTO GATS framework 
application in Kenya. Previous comprehensive literature on the topic is scant and those in 
existence (Muruiki, 2002, 2004, Kane, 2002; Etta & Elder, 2005) evaluate the growth of 
the sector in relation to the KCA making no mention or link to how international policy 
in the form of the GATS framework has shaped and influenced the framing of the KCA. 
While it would be wrong to dismiss these studies on the basis of approach, it would be 
equally misleading to claim that telecom development is best explained without taking into 
consideration its political and economic context. Thus, at doctrinal level, this study is the 
first of its kind to document the first stage of the implementation of Kenya’s telecom 
liberalisation process (1997-2005), applying a qualitative approach in which interviews and 
documentary analysis were used. This adds to the current knowledge of telecom reform in 
Kenya as it provides an explanation to current telecom indicators in the sector. 
There are a number of implicit assumptions that underpin the central argument of this 
study and are borne out of the theoretical framework discussed in chapter 2, but one 
critical distinction must first be highlighted here. The central argument put forth in this 
study is tested within the paradigm of engagement of African states with the WTO. While 
the institution and broader trend in globalisation that it is seen to reflect has multiple 
problems and critics, this study does not seek to engage in that broader discussion or 
challenge the existence or legitimacy of the WTO. But, it does not also dismiss the 
concerns pertaining to the merits and demerits of the GATS telecom instruments and 
more specifically the GATS Reference Paper.  
That said, I note that while misgivings remain about the WTO’s liberalisation agenda, the 
realities of the world dictate an acknowledgment that African governments will continue 





irreversible trajectory of modern times. The challenge for the future of countries such as 
Kenya therefore is to address the consequences of neo-patrimonial systems of governance 
that also play out in participation in policy processes. As a result, one area of concern in 
this study is the constraints that developing countries such as Kenya face in participating 
in international policy making. Drawing on interviews, the study discusses how the neo-
patrimonial system of clientelism and favouritism not only inhibits effective participation 
internationally but also inhibits effective policy making domestically. It is suggested that 
addressing these constraints might facilitate effective policy-making processes for Kenya. 
1.5 Motivations and interdisciplinary frameworks 
Commentators on telecom and the increasingly exciting new technologies that are 
emerging often divide into ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ when it comes to considering 
future trends in telecom access. I confess that I belong to both camps. I am optimistic 
that technology will continue to bring about increased benefits and convenience to the 
citizens of wealthy nations, both in support of entertainment and escape and in mobilising 
information as a future resource. I am also optimistic that technology will also provide 
better living standards for those with access to funds to afford the application and use of 
technologies in Africa. However, as an African, I am pessimistic when considering the 
future information resources that will be available to the majority of peoples in Africa, 
more specifically, those in rural areas. I cannot see how ‘we’ can ever catch-up. I cannot 
see a will among wealthy nations to share their bounty unreservedly in order to give 
poorer people the liberating effects of information at little or no cost. And neither can I 
see African governments taking a more holistic and pragmatic approach to the 
development of telecom without being forced to. 
My pessimism emanates from what I have witnessed living in Kenya and as a professional 
in the telecom field in Africa. Working as manager for a large international consulting 
firm, I noted that for the most part, telecom development was used as a political rhetoric 





registered as a voluntary member to several ICT civil society organisations, that I began 
see how our ability as Kenyans to make policy was not just limited to the national level, 
but was also present within the international level. I felt somewhat foolish attending both 
national and international meetings on technology adoption, such as those organised by 
the United Nations. While this provided an opportunity to travel internationally,  I felt 
that most of my Government representatives were indifferent to the events taking place in 
the telecom sector internationally and I became driven by a desire to understand how 
international policies affected policy making domestically. I left the firm driven by my 
own frustrations about the proffered strategies on how policy was made and the conflict 
between my new found inquiries. I hoped that the academic study would provide answers 
that eluded me in the professional domain. 
It is therefore important to acknowledge and be driven (to some extent) by my personal 
experiences and to acknowledge that they played a crucial role in shaping the research 
inquiry. As a consequence, this research relies on the freedom granted to an 
interdisciplinary approach in the School of Social Science & Policy. The choice of the 
neo-patrimonialism and NIE as a framework for this study relates to the suitability of the 
GPE framework that seeks to address the unique characteristics that have evolved in 
countries such as Kenya. Its scope is brought about by my preparedness to be reflexive 
and interdisciplinary therefore allowing the research to develop an understanding of the 
relationship between domestic political institutions and international regimes such as the 
WTO. Nevertheless, there are many other influences in this thesis including: critical social 
theory, economic theory political theory and information revolution theories. This thesis 
is therefore reflective of its time. At the beginning of the 21st century we reside in an 
increasingly interdisciplinary age. Ironically, like ICT, it an age less bounded by the 
dominance of modernism and its desire for order through the categorisation of thought 
and is heavily influenced by the uncertainty of what is understood by some as the post-
modern era, the globalisation era (Jameson, 1998; Nash 2000). Supported by a critical 
perspective on technology and the changes taking place in the global world, it was 





the recognition of ‘power’ as it exists within states and their institutional governance 
systems in Africa.  International regimes are confronting shifts in power relations in the 
context of ICT and are, in turn, influencing the form and structure of the institutions of 
their respective member states. This analysis therefore offers insights into these changes 
that are rapidly altering and re-defining neo-patrimonial regimes such as Kenya. 
1.6 Methodology 
This study lends particular weighting to a qualitative framework as it seeks to understand 
the role of actors in the policy process. The study employed a triangulated approach in 
which interviews and documentary analysis were used. Since I could not anticipate the 
exact number of interview participants, meetings and observations that I would be 
allowed to attend, my initial attempts to gain access were broad, with letters sent to every 
institution and key individuals partaking in the telecom policy process (as depicted from 
the policy document itself, readings from the press and contacts with colleagues in 
Kenya). In Kenya I was interested in locating myself within the regulatory body – the 
Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) and the Government’s telecom policy 
advisory body – the National Communications Secretariat (NCS)24. My two letters to 
both organisations, however, were in vain as I received no replies while in Australia. On 
landing in Kenya I went to see the then Managing Director (MD)25 Mr Chepkonga. After 
a brief on my research and helped by the fact that I had previously dealt with CCK 
through consulting work with the African Telecommunications Union (ATU) as well as 
the fact that my parents were his acquittances, a letter was issued to all management in 
CCK letting them know that I would be conducting research in CCK and would be 
approaching several departments and individuals for interviews and data. This was the 
start of an interesting journey into the corridors of Government. In hindsight, my stay at 
CCK (where I had an office) also allowed me to attend several Government meetings. 
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25 In the CCK, the Managing Director is known as the Director General. However as the titles are symbolic and unique 





And it was here that I was able to piece together the personalities who took part in the 
formulation of the telecom reform process that led to the enactment of the KCA. What 
seemed surprising at the time and now trite given the data I collected (as shall be observed 
in later chapters), was that many of the personalities involved in the policy process were 
now working for CCK and Telkom. I was later to learn that a large number of CCK 
employees had been employed by the former PTT organisation, KP&TC. This greatly 
facilitated obtaining data and as well the provision of information.  
Through contacts in CCK, I was also linked to the Kenyan National Committee on 
World Trade Organisation (NCWTO)26 where I was able to talk to the members of the 
committee and appreciate the issues they faced. The interviews with the NCWTO 
members were also instrumental in piecing together the rationale for joining the GATS 
and the current thoughts at the time of Kenya’s accession to the GATS. The members of 
the NCWTO were initially less than thrilled by my investigations given the political angle 
to my questioning. I thus approached the members individually as they were all 
Government and private employees working in different ministries and organisations. I 
would say this was one of the more difficult tasks of my fieldwork as most of the 
individuals would book meetings but cancel them abruptly with no notice. Many times I 
had to sit and wait for more than two hours to talk to the more senior Government staff. 
However, once I had developed a rapport with the individuals, the process seemed easier 
and many were always more than willing to contact their colleagues and speak to them on 
my behalf. 
A further daunting task was in understanding the GATS framework. Having no prior legal 
background but a general awareness of law and rules, I immersed myself in the reading of 
the GATS and the KCA and was helped by the legal team of CCK, who provided legal 
interpretation for some of the more complex and unclear regulations. In addition, the 
private sector - through the Kenya Leadership Institute which had three legal experts in 
                                                 





telecom issues also provided key interpretations of the various rulings and arguments that 
I had been unable to access while at CCK. My attempts to interview staff of the NCS, 
however, proved difficult and many of the CCK staff felt that there was no need to do so. 
I later learnt that tensions existed over the roles of CCK and NCS. My wait to see the 
Communications Secretary, was the longest at three hours! Various officials kept walking 
in and out of his office and at one time, even the Minister stepped in to his office. It 
seemed I was always the lessor of importance. Finally, after my persistence, which he 
acknowledged, I had my first chat with him on October 4th 2003. A key factor that 
facilitated this was that he had also done his PhD and was keen to explain what he did 
(Engineering). While I spent the first half hour listening to how ‘young people are 
nowadays lucky to have technology and the ability to travel’, my patience eventually paid 
off. Through the NCS I was linked to the corridors of Government and invited to several 
meetings which enabled me to appreciate the various conflicts within the different 
Government institutions. 
Finally, one last mention is required here, the local newspapers had begun to take an 
interest in the events of telecom and they proved an immense source of data particularly 
in recording statements made by the various leaders in the press. I was able to speak to 
the various telecom reporters of both the Nation and Standard newspapers (the two widely 
circulated dailies in the country) and was able to get backdated information through their 
archives. This facilitated a wonderful paper trail of events that I had been unable to 
capture on interview or through documents provided by the interviewees and various 
institutions. 
The advantages of this study design therefore comes from the ability to discuss the 
intricate and salient aspects of policy making that are often the product of the political 
process and the nature of how decision making takes place locally and internationally. It is 
within this framework that the study is able to correlate, compare and analyse the 





face of the complicated landscape of policy making then, the Bridges Organisation’s27 
paper ‘Spanning the Digital Divide’ (Bridges.org, 2005) comment below is acknowledged.  
Detailed case studies provide the most valuable tool to critically analyse what policies should be 
reformed. More importantly perhaps, a good case study details the needs of stakeholders and 
clients that governments seek to balance as they plot their course. 
Further details of my process of learning and acquiring the data are provided in chapter 3 
which forms the methodology chapter.  
1.7 The development of the argument 
For the purposes of explanation and understanding, and in keeping within the parameters 
of the PhD decorum, the research is divided into distinct chapters. The three fields of the 
thesis: telecom reform, international institutions and neo-patrimonial regimes are treated 
in the theoretical framework in chapter 2 and hence forward discussed through chapters 3 
to 8. The merits for this are advantageous as this provides the study the opportunity to 
remain within the decorum of the PhD format and yet still conclusively develop the 
argument through the chapters.  
Chapter 2 provides the framework. Policy outcomes are shown as resulting from the 
interaction of neo-patrimonial states with the international donor community. The 
chapter is divided into two parts. Part I argues that political institutions established 
following decolonisation were weak and endowed with little legitimacy. As a result, state 
elites came to quickly rely on patronage and the distribution of economic rents in order to 
ensure political stability. African political systems thus became neo-patrimonial, 
combining a façade of western bureaucratic logic with internal patrimonial logic. Drawing 
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According to its website its mission is to “to promote the effective use of information and communications 
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on NIE, part II of the chapter provides a contextual understanding of the role of the IFIs.  
This is done so as to establish the link between IFIs and the WTO in later chapters. The 
chapter then proceeds to understand the value of the GATS as a policy instrument which 
structures complex exchange as well as its role as a credibility enhancing mechanism with 
which to lower the transaction costs and address, to some extent, the risks associated with 
policy implementation common in telecom. This provides a background against which to 
examine how this has manifested itself in the Kenyan telecom sector.  
Chapter 3 describes and discusses the case study design of the research within a qualitative 
paradigm. As the thesis espouses various political understandings and experiences of 
policy actors, the chosen methodological framework is aimed to reflect this. The 
methodological aspects that shape this study, my journey towards obtaining, interpreting 
and presenting the data on the telecom reform process in Kenya form the main themes of 
the chapter. 
Chapter 4 in its entirety is largely descriptive but certainly important in conveying what 
precisely is at stake and draws on the framing of the GATS as a transaction cost 
developed in chapter 2. The chapter examines the main tenets of the GATS framework 
and its related telecom instruments, the Annex on Telecommunication (Annex),28 the 
Fourth Protocol and the Regulatory Reference Paper (RP).29 It describes the rules, norms 
and disciplines imposed by the GATS in this regard, sufficient to provide the basis for a 
thorough subsequent investigation of Kenya’s compliance with its GATS commitments.  
Chapter 5 draws on the framework of neo-patrimonial states developed in chapter 2, 
locating, describing and analysing Kenya’s political and economic development within its 
neo-patrimonial context. It shows how the dynamics of the international and domestic 
context have conditioned the states response to reforms since the 1970s. Specifically, the 
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chapter posits the ‘development priority’ underpinning the reform and how this was 
conceptualised within the GATS framework and adopted through the KCA.  
Chapter 6 continues the account of Kenya’s telecom reform process from 1997-2005 by 
critically evaluating developments within the framework of Kenya’s implementation of its 
GATS commitments under the Fourth Protocol and the Schedule of Specific 
Commitments, including the additional obligations undertaken by the adoption of the RP. 
A comprehensive analysis of these undertakings is provided in regard to the current status 
of each within Kenya.  
Chapter 7 draws the chapter together by analysing the application of the GATS 
framework in Kenya within the framework of the study developed in chapter 2. This is an 
important chapter as it draws on the findings from chapters 4 to 6 and discusses the 
tensions exhibited between domestic and international preferences as displayed through 
Kenya’s telecom process. In doing so, it also comments on Kenya’s options in 
participation in international governance mechanisms. 
Chapter 8 concludes the study by summarising the findings of the study and discussing 
the implications of these findings for the telecom sector and as well for policy making in 
Kenya and other neo-patrimonial states.  
1.8  Limitations of the study 
This study aims inter alia, to document the first phase of Kenya’s liberalisation 
programme and advance an innovative theoretical approach to understanding its success 
and failures in light of undertakings made by the country through GATS accessions. All 
studies of this kind, ambitious in scope and depth, have a number of inherent limitations 





1.8.1 Logistical constraints 
The first such limitation is temporal. Telecom by its nature is a dynamic industry and its 
regulation is constantly evolving (and in some cases delayed). With most studies of this 
kind, and relating to telecom in particular, the challenge is to reach completion without 
argument and analysis becoming outdated before publication. While the thesis attempts to 
document a period of time (1997-2005), it is inevitable that this will not reflect the entire 
picture. This is reflected through the nature of what policy is, incremental in process 
(Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993). A number of facts and issues therefore risk redundancy 
through the natural course and pace of development in the sector.  
First, while it had initially been hoped to discuss the logistics of telecom reform within the 
proposed ICT Policy that was to come into effect in 2003 and therefore replace the KCA, 
the ICT policy remains in draft form. As shall be discussed, political interests can be 
attributed for its delay. In addition, the KCA requires that Telkom be privatised and a new 
Second National Operator (SNO) introduced to compete with the incumbent. However, 
this too has been delayed due as the thesis suggests to political interests. The Minister of 
Communications at the time the last chapter of this thesis was being written mentioned 
that the ICT policy was ready to be tabled in Parliament and that Telkom would 
eventually be privatised early in 2006. As a result of the setbacks experienced in this 
process and other practical reasons, 31st December 2005 was chosen as the cut off date 
for monitoring and including developments in the sector, subject to further relevant detail 
being discussed in the concluding remarks. Setting such a date is unavoidable, but should 
be borne in mind for future studies drawing from this thesis.  
Second, while the study draws on the commitments made by Kenya specifically in 1999 in 
the WTO, other rounds of service negotiations are ongoing. This means that further 
country offers will emerge and by 31st December 2005 Kenya had not formally lodged a 
formal offer in respect to the new rounds. This situation may thus translate as an 





1.8.2 Definitions and borders 
The research recognises that in choosing to focus on the telecom policy process and how 
agents interact within a political, economic and social process in a given context, it cannot 
offer insights into how people actually experience technologies. It cannot uncover their 
hopes, values, fears and capacities for action. This is, however, an important aspect of 
analysis and is emerging as a challenging site of study. Key researchers involved in this 
field include Kling (2003), Mansell (2002), Millar (2002). Knowledge Management studies 
also seek to integrate the relationship between people and the technologies they use (see: 
Kerretts 1999; Holsapple, 2004; Cader, 2004; Mansell & Wehn 1998, Mansell et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, the study does not analyse demand patterns of information technologies in 
Kenya such as gender and income. Recent work by Curry (2002) and Walker (2001) 
evaluate the various ways in which demand is influenced by these factors. It is noted 
however that this field of critical theory is contributing to the understanding of telecom 
application. 
The choice of focusing on the policy-making process in the telecom sector also implies 
that the study does not delve into how and why people adopt technology. There is a 
growing field of study in this area including work by Mansell and Wehn (1998) as well as 
work done by various international agencies such as the United Nation’s (UN) Human 
Development Reports (HDR) which began a telecom analysis under the title ‘ICT 
indicators’ in 2001.This also means that the focus of this research is not dependent on the 
technological advances in the wider ICT sector. Instead this investigation is on the 
underlying telecom policy frameworks and policy process that underpin the introduction 
of these technologies into a given society. By focusing on the telecom policy process, I 
intentionally align the study within policy and not technology. Instead, I recognise that 
technology is a tool that does not act on its own.  
In addition, this study accepts the view that a distinction between trade in goods and 





goods and services no longer exist.30 However, the thesis also asserts a narrower 
contention that trade in telecom services, because of the central link to telecom 
infrastructure and development is distinguishable from other trade services such as 
transport or financial services. The importance of this has been underscored and will be 
discussed in chapter 2.  
Finally, it is important to note that there is little if any consensus in the field as to what the 
term ICT actually denotes. This in itself provides inherent difficulties for policy making 
and policy makers. In this study, the use of telecom instead of telecommunications is 
preferred in the discussion though the literature uses it interchangeably. The meaning of 
telecom is derived from the 3 definitions used in the KCA which frames both the telecom 
industry in Kenya and the analysis of this study. Namely:  
 ...a service offered to subscribers which provides such subscribers with a telephone connection to, 
and a unique local telephone number address on a licensed local access provider and which enables 
such subscribers to place calls to or receive calls from, other telecommunications stations on those 
systems and shall include residence and business line services.  …a service provided to the public 
which allows end users to transmit and receive real time voice communications, including voice 
telephony service, public pay telephone service, operator assisted services, local, domestic and 
international long distance telephone service whether  by wire or wireless means as well as basic, 
non-packet switched data communications, such as facsimile but does not include advanced or 
enhanced services or dedicated data communications services such as paging services… a fixed line 
or mobile communications service in which a two-way connection are established without any 
deliberate removal or addition to the information content transmitted over that connection or any 
additional service having been provided thereof (KCA, 1998 Part I). 
The study therefore does not deal with organisations that make the actual technologies 
themselves such as the development of content services, broadcasting and other forms of 
                                                 





entertainment with vertical ICT applications (such as e-commerce, e-learning, e-
government), with intellectual property rights, or with issues such as privacy, security or 
gender in relation to ICT. Where the term ICT is used therefore there is an implied 
knowledge that it includes other services such as e-commerce and technologies that have 
converged with broadcasting making up the term ICT. ICT therefore denotes this 
convergence.31 This research therefore excludes media and broadcasting. The reasons for 
this are first, practical as a thesis would not permit such a discourse and second, the 
GATS framework focuses on telecom policy reforms. In addition, in most cases telecom 
policies around the world have left media and broadcasting as separate entities, though 
even this is being contested with the convergence of technologies.  
1.8.3 Practicalities and resources 
The remaining limitations are practical in nature. First, while I have endeavoured to cover 
all aspects of the research terrain as documented through the methodology chapter 
(chapter 4), it is impossible to monitor every relevant process and regulatory hearing on 
matters pertaining to this thesis. In addition, websites of Kenyan Government institutions 
have been slow in updating information. Resources in this regard have been limited but 
have not meant that the thesis has suffered. As a result, the reliance on relevant statistics 
has meant using international bodies such as the ITU, WTO, UN and others as opposed 
to local Government data. Nonetheless, where websites were used, in order to verify 
consistency and content, all websites remain valid as checked by the author on December 
10th 2005.  
In addition, this study would have been quantitatively strengthened if reliable statistics on 
the participants in policy meetings were recorded over the years. Moreover, using multi-
method analysis within a case study involves other complications like financial and time 
costs. It also affects the depth at which one is able to examine each case. I believe my 
                                                 






work would have benefited from a stay in the field for longer than the 12 months I 
undertook. This would have facilitated a longer analysis of the meetings and observations. 
In addition, a long period of stay would have provided me with opportunities to revisit 
issues for further clarification. Nonetheless, I have been fortunate to live within a 
‘technological world’ that has allowed me to maintain contacts with respondents by email 
and telephone and further listen to Kenyan news online.32 
Finally, any historical interpretation of political events and process has inescapable 
elements of subjectivity as discussed in the methodology chapter. While I have 
endeavoured to keep the work within the theoretical confines of the study, my thoughts 
and ideas have evolved over the period of this thesis and have been shaped and moulded 
by discussion with colleagues both abroad and at home in Kenya. This is my version, any 
factual errors or subjective distortions in interpretation remain my own. 
The remainder of the study is devoted to the development of the argument. I begin 
chapter 2 with the framework of the study namely: neo-patrimonialism and NIE. As 
stated earlier, this framework provides the basis upon which the analysis of Kenya’s 
application of the GATS is done. 
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2  C h a p t e r  t w o  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
It is an irony of history that the very losers of globalisation will in future have to pay for everything  
from the welfare state to a functioning democracy – while the winners of globalisation post dream 
profits and steal away from their responsibility for future democracy  
(Beck, 2000 p.6) 
 
Introduction:  
The aim of this chapter is to present the underlying theoretical considerations of the 
thesis. This is an important chapter as it explores the political complexity of Kenya within 
a domestic and international context and strives to make sense of, - a context that is the 
starting point for an analysis of telecom reform in Kenya.  
The research inquiry presented in chapter 1 can be posed through the question ‘why is 
Kenya’s telecom reform lagging behind in spite of its adoption of the GATS framework?’ 
This question may be simple, but devising a reasonable empirical strategy for answering it 
is far from straightforward. This is not because we do not have good empirical studies. As 
noted in chapter 1, in the field of telecom, outcomes have mainly been explained through 
technological quantitative data. While these studies provide an indication of the status of a 
country’s technological development, they nonetheless do not explain why they happened. 
On the other hand, in the voluminous literature on economics and political sciences, three 
strands of thought stand out explaining outcomes in general. First, there is a long and 
distinguished line of theorising that places geography at the centre of the story. In 
summary, this field argues that geography is a key determinant of the endowment of 
natural resources and climate, therefore explaining outcomes. Writings by Jared Diamond 
(1997) and Jeffery Sachs (2001) are the most notable. A second strand argues that 





and poor countries provides an explanation for outcomes. Notable research in this field 
includes works by Frankel & Romer (1999) and Rodrick et al., (2002) and Jutting (2003). 
Allied to this strand is the work focusing on African economies and the structure of their 
political and economic context. Notable works here include van de Walle (2001). The final 
strand centres on institutions and in particular the rule of law and property rights. In this 
view, what matters is the rules of the game in a society and their conduciveness to 
desirable behaviour. This view is associated most strongly with Douglas North (1993).  
The reason for telecom outcomes can thus be explained by all three strands. For example, 
the geographical strand can account for telecom outcomes using the physical 
infrastructure within a context. The international markets framework can explain telecom 
outcomes as a result of the networks a country may have with other telecom industries 
and alliances therefore lowering the costs of telecom access and the institutional strand 
can measure both domestic and international institutions and the extent to which they 
structure outcomes. The difficulty therefore is not with the lack of solutions but rather, 
how to sort out this complex web of causality that entangles the above factors. 
Attempting to provide a holistic framework that accounts for the domestic and 
international context and therefore this complex web of causality, this study applies neo-
patrimonial and NIE literature as a framework to help analyse telecom outcomes in 
Kenya. 
The chapter is presented in two sections. Part I provides an explanation as to why African 
economic crisis has persisted for over two decades and why efforts put in place to sustain 
more effective economic policies have proven much more difficult. The central aim of 
this section is to understand the underlying structure of neo-patrimonial states and how 
this affects day to day policy. This will assist in framing the understanding of the Kenyan 
context in later chapters.  
Part II seeks to understand the role of IFIs in African neo-patrimonial states and how the 





discussion within the rationale for reforms in African countries, a broad NIE approach is 
employed to locate the narrow thesis of trade commitments as instruments of credibility 
in the context of telecom liberalisation.  
Three main themes are developed through the chapter and form the context for 
discussion and analysis in later parts of the study. The first is the clientelist nature of 
political authority in African states. The second is the way in which these patrimonial 
states have interacted with the international community creating a co-dependency 
relationship. Allied to the second is the way in which an imperfect conditionality 
framework has over the years unwittingly created a ‘culture of approval’ in framing policy 
reforms. Third, is the way in which the GATS is structured with flexibility for 
manoeuvrability of a country’s commitments. This is what this study appropriates as the 
transaction cost. 
Part I: The neo-patrimonial state 
2.1 Historical context 
Any attempt to study any African political system and its issues confronts three problems: 
historical scope, comparability and generalisation. Does one start from the history of the 
pre-colonial era to the contemporary? Can one afford to make generalisations over such a 
vast and varied continent of Africa, encompassing several countries? On what basis does 
one generalise? Chabal (1999) suggests that one should focus squarely on how 
arrangements of power contrast with those found elsewhere. As he rightfully notes, 
politics in Africa is in no way unique, in spite of being historically singular it can readily be 
related analytically to Europe or Asia.  Hence this study attempts to locate the theorisation 
of African political contexts firmly within its rightful historical context.  
There are many imperfect democracies in Africa. These democracies are considered 
imperfect in that they do not fully comply with the conditions of inclusiveness, 





democracy. However, defining any country as democratic is also in itself problematic. 
Schmitter has proposed making the distinction between two sub-types: first, a hybrid regime 
that combines elements of autocracy and democracy and second, a persistent but unconsolidated 
democracy (Schmitter, 1994, p.59; see also Conaghan & Espinal, 1990). Hybrid regimes, in 
turn have been subdivided further into dictablandas and democrandus (Schmitter, 1994). 
In the former, there is some liberalisation with individuals having some rights but under 
government control where elections are concerned. In democrandus systems, there is 
some semblance of democracy but no liberalisation. However, both these two types tend 
to be short-term regimes not durable over a long period. On the other hand, Schmitter 
(1994) notes that a mix of autocracy and democracy tends to appear through what is 
known as delegative democracies. O’Donnell (1994) has described delegative democracies 
as those democracies in which the executive is granted the authority via elections, to do 
whatever it desires with little oversight or control by the other branches of government 
and with little participation by the country’s citizens. Delegative democracies are thus 
characterized as displaying considerable overlap with the Weberian notion of patrimonial 
democracies (Bendix, 1962). Patrimonialism, according to the Weberian notion, is a type 
of government that derived from and was based upon traditional authority that was 
organised as more or less a direct extension of the royal household in which officials were 
personal dependents of the ruler (Weber, 1968). Naturally this type of state has changed 
since Weber’s analysis. While neo-patrimonialism is no longer based on traditional appeals 
to legitimate authority, it now bears a mix of traditional and modern state practices. To 
expound on this further, I locate the discourse of neo-patrimonialism within its rightful 
historical context as discussed below. 
Some authors have suggested that the colonisation of the continent of Africa resulted in 
the wholesale destruction of pre-colonial political structures and the restructuring of 
power around the norms and practices of bureaucratic colonial political order (Tordoff, 
1997). However, such an interpretation is erroneous. It is not just that the observation of 
political practices belie the simplistic view that independence made possible the 





colonial rule was misjudged. As has been well re-counted by post-colonial literature on 
Africa (see van de Walle, 2001; Bratton & van de Walle, 1994) Africa’s colonial powers 
had neither the ambition nor the means to establish in Africa working models of their 
own political institutions. To recount briefly, the colonial masters of Africa were not 
interested in or for that matter zealous in eradicating pre-colonial political structures. 
Where this was done, it was simply because it worked for them. Instead, as Eisentadt 
(1972) and Synder (1992) note, in spite of the differing colonial powers with distinct 
political traditions, the colonialists went about managing their colonies in a surprisingly 
similar fashion. Where they were able to use African political systems they did so and 
where it was necessary to impose a hierarchical structure this was also done. In practice 
therefore the behaviour of the local colonial administrator (British district officers, French 
commandant de cercel or Portuguese chefe de posto) had broadly similar consequences 
for the political development of African states.  
After independence, which occurred for most African states between 1960 and 1970, 
African leaders redesigned the new political structures they had inherited. While each 
country had their differences, the political development was similar, with the narrowing of 
politics at the top. In retrospect what has become clear is that there was a more important 
political process at work, the Africanisation of politics entailed the emergence of neo-
patrimonialism. That is, a juxtaposition of an apparently ‘traditional’-patrimonial logic and 
‘modern’ formal state institutions derived from the Western experience (Bratton & van de 
Walle, 1994). This system of rule therefore became more informal than formal. In this 
way 
politics at independence became patrimonial rather than institutionalised…despite their Western 
appearance, African political systems developed a logic of patronage which relied almost entirely 
on networks of personalised and vertical relations between rulers and ruled, elite and populate 





Two characteristics therefore underlie the neo-patrimonial state:  1) the centralisation of 
power in the hand of the ruler, who seeks to reduce the autonomy of his followers and 2) 
the blurring of public and private purposes within the administration. At the level of ideal 
types, neo-patrimonial regimes therefore can be clearly distinguished from other similar 
types of regime; those based on rational-legal authority and impersonal law and/or those 
whose claim to legitimacy is based on ideology. The rather distinctive mark of African 
regimes is that they are neo-patrimonial. Neo-patrimonial regimes can have elements of 
patronage, law and ideology as is with different democracies discussed earlier in this 
chapter. Nevertheless, because of its nature, neo-patrimonialism clearly inhibits the 
effective exercise of the rule of law and the extent to which a state can be fully 
consolidated democratically. The orientation and approach to neo-patrimonial systems in 
this study is discussed further below.  
2.2 Structure and agency and neo-patrimonial states 
This study draws on the work of van de Valle (2001), who attempts to navigate between a 
structure-agency dichotomy through a ‘structured contingency’ approach, focusing on 
state institutions in the international and local contexts as contributory factors to the 
outcomes of policy in neo-patrimonial states. To avoid artificially separating agency from 
structure within neo-patrimonial context, the term ‘agents’ is used. By emphasising 
‘agents’, this study recognises that agents in neo-patrimonial states are conceptualised by 
their fields of power a term borrowed from Bourdieu & Wacquant (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992 p.97). Agents are conceptualised as responding to a reconfiguration of their ‘field of 
power’ which is often triggered by contextual factors beyond their control such as the 
adoption of international policies. According to Bourdieu & Wacquant’s (ibid, 1992 p.97) 
rather lengthy definition, a ‘field of power’ is: 
a network, or configuration of, objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively 
defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or 





species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at 
stake in the field as well as by their objective relation to other positions 
By emphasising the locations of agents within a network of power relations, the metaphor 
of a field is a useful conceptual device to bridge structure and agency. Agents are able to 
influence the field without changing the structure, but are at the same time embedded in it 
and experience the agencies of others through it.  The context of politics as part and 
parcel of the system in neo-patrimonial regimes means that dominant actors strategise in 
an attempt to maintain or enhance their positions in any changing context. Such 
strategising is necessary not only because of challenges by disaffected former members of 
ruling elites, ‘outsiders’ of the patrimonial system trying to get in (Bratton & van de Walle, 
1997), but also because of the challenge from the international gaze through policy and 
aid demands that seek to counter measures to neo-patrimonial practices. Moreover, the 
state is a particularly important context in which to examine the role of dominant actors 
and their embeddedness in the political process in the telecom sector in Africa. This is 
because as Singh (1999) argues, countries have three elements that can act as policy 
constraints. The first aspect is the degree to which the state is independent on other 
stakeholders in carrying out its actions which he calls state autonomy. Second, the degree 
to which the state is effective in its actions and relies on its resources (both human and 
physical), otherwise known as state capacity. The third aspect is the degree to which states 
are development oriented, which is largely dependent on the history of the state interest 
and its involvement in development issues. Since the state acts as an enforcer of policy, 
privileged access to state institutions facilitates the material and symbolic reproduction of 
dominant actors’ positions. Thus the state within the structured contingency approach is 
assumed to be embedded within social processes and is discussed in the following section.  
2.3 Neo-patrimonial states: patterns of functioning 
Africa’s rules play out patrimonial politics on three different levels -the local, national and 





is that they exist with formal trappings of the modern state. While the President’s friends 
may be more powerful in the affairs of the state, legal authority rests with the legislature or 
cabinet. Public policy studies have tended to downplay the patrimonial dimensions of 
these regimes hence a striking reality of most reformist policies, such as anti-corruption 
measures tend to assume that there is a rational logic at the apex of the state that will be 
available to carry out the strategy (van de Walle, 2001). On the other hand, some neo-
patrimonial studies downplay the rational legal dimension of these states. They argue that 
formal structures are irrelevant and that all meaningful decision making takes place within 
a parallel shadow state that is entirely patrimonial (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). I view both 
these views as excessive. As suggested in the introductory note of this chapter, the 
relationship between the domestic arena and international regimes is viewed as a key 
explanatory factor for policy outcomes in the telecom sector in Kenya.  
While definitions vary, four defining elements of neo-patrimonial relationships are 
generally stressed in the literature: access to state resources, clientelism, an asymmetry in 
power and status, and hybrid regimes (van de Walle, 2001). While all forms are existent 
within neo-patrimonial states, these forms usually play out through clientelist practices as 
discussed below. 
Clientelist relationships take on diverse forms and are found in a wide number of contexts 
at many levels in very diverse societies. Indeed, the patron-client relation as a concept fits 
with a number of relationships. However, it is the centralisation of authority through the 
state that creates certain forms of systematic patron-client relations that characterise a 
neo-patrimonial regime. A state is neo-patrimonial when state authority, exercised through 
institutions, is dominated by patrons and their vertical networks and the highest 
representative of the state in the executive (the President or Prime-Minister), is a 
paramount patron with wide control over bureaucratic appointments and resources 
(Clapham, 1982; van de Walle, 2001). The very presence of a centralised bureaucratic 
authority gives rise to particular forms of patron-client relations, particularly those in 





administrative power centres (Boone, 1992). Here then it is not the prevalence or density 
of diverse patron-client relations in society that characterises such a regime but rather the 
integral role played by patronage in the exercise of power (Kaufman, 1974).  According to 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997 p.62),  
{t}he right to rule in neo-patrimonial regimes is ascribed to a person rather than an office, despite 
the official existence of a written constitution. One individual, often the President for life, 
dominates the state apparatus and stands above its laws. Relationships of loyalty and dependence 
pervade a formal political and administrative system, and officials occupy bureaucratic positions 
less to perform public service, their ostensible purpose, than to acquire personal wealth and status. 
Although state functionaries receive an official salary, they also enjoy access to various forms of 
illicit rents, prebends, and petty corruption…The chief executive and his inner circle undermine 
the effectiveness of the nominally modern state administration by using it for systematic patronage 
and clientelist practices in order to maintain political order 
While these forms of rule are being challenged by more open political systems such as 
multi-party politics which now limit the rule of the President, forms of clientelism still 
exist as leaders seek to maintain their positions.  Bratton and van de Walle (1997, p.63) 
refer to these presidents as individuals who have the systematic concentration of political power in 
the{ir} hands. In return for loyalty and capitulation to the state, the neo-patrimonial leader 
often takes responsibility for the peoples’ welfare and is willing to entertain and redress individual 
grievances personally (ibid, 1997, p.64). As such, in neo-patrimonial regimes, the despotic 
power of the state is central. To provide for the welfare of the society, neo-patrimonial 
leaders intervene in the state economy. Extensive regulation of economic activity exists, 
through which the incumbent elite control a wide range of monopolies and economic rents (ibid, 1997, 
p.66). State ownership and control over public resources or individuals therefore helps to 
undermine the autonomy of clients who exchange political subordination for material 
rewards/and or protection.  In such a context, clients are not confined to the poorer 
segments of society but include businessmen and elites who require state sanctions for 





they do this largely because of the absence of physical security and legitimate public 
authority. In this way contemporary patron-client relations cannot be understood outside 
the workings of the state with its coercive capacities. Instead, it is the vulnerability of clients 
which is most obvious and important, and determines the extent to which they need patrons and hence the 
degree of subordination to which they will be willing to subject themselves in order to obtain them 
(Clapham, 1982 p.12).  
Thus conceptions which posit a dichotomy between patron-client ties and a ‘strong’ state 
or bureaucracy ignore how certain bureaucratic institutional configurations and practices 
undergird and facilitate these frameworks (for example, Reno, 1995). Particularly 
marginalised are the unaccountable, coercive and predatory actions of members of state 
bureaucracy at the national level such as Ministers and heads of institutions, many of 
whom owe their positions to higher level patronage within the executive positions. 
A number of scholars also argue that patron-client relationship ties are a substitute for 
coercion (Lemarchand, 1972; 1994). Thus, patron-client ties mingle material incentives 
with coercion. However, this level of analysis has been particularly ignored in the analysis 
of telecom development in Africa. Instead, there is a tendency to attribute issues and 
problems only as a result of international pressure for reform rather than also seeing how 
state actors interact with international policies and in doing so appropriate specific policy 
changes for their benefit.  This is surprising, given that in neo-patrimonial regimes, 
patronage generates privileged groups with respect to the state; defines the legal order 
(Roniger, 1994 p.9) and undermines the public realm.  Moreover, this is facilitated by the 
often colonial legal and institutional order, in which coercive and material power is 
concentrated. Critically, as the state has historically been the provider of public goods as in 
the case of telecom, neo-patrimonial regimes provide remarkable opportunities for those 
at the highest reaches of the patronage hierarchy to manipulate these rights. This explains 
why taking over the state with coercive capacities and institutional opportunities tends to 
become a high stakes, zero-sum struggle within the political class. van de Walle (2001) 





expand clientelism practices through patronage, nepotism and the granting of various 
exemptions from laws, taxes and licences. While not all forms of political clientelism are 
illegal, van de Walle (2001) notes that most involve the subversion of public norms and 
objectives for the sake of personal gain.  As shall be depicted through the case study, 
these features of clientelism and patronage were present in the reform process. The need 
to control institutions that hold immense power over material resources such as the 
telecom industry leads to informal and private negotiations over the control of these 
institutions and the right to manage them.  In such a case, clientelism practices became 
attractive to the political class for the selfish reason that they provide a clear path to self-
enrichment (ibid, 2001). 
Neo-patrimonial leaders in such states therefore use their concentrated power to 
perpetuate their rule and hence such regimes are often described as electoral despotism 
states (Schmitter, 1994). The term emphasises the subordination of the public to the 
private interests of the ruler and his clique who are unconstrained by law and can use their 
power to win newly competitive elections and determine who will lead and who will head 
certain institutions perceived as powerful. In brief, persisting neo-patrimonial rule 
undermines the essential elements of democratic rule such as equality before the law. It 
also allows for the manipulation of property rights, such as land ownership, to punish 
resisters and reward supporters. This selectively impoverishes and enriches sectors of the 
population and, in the process, plays havoc with economic production and the stability of 
institutions within the state. In neo-patrimonial regimes, state power and the interests of the 
ruling group are the central focus of state policy (Callaghy 1987 p.100) or in Weber’s words 
governing powers and the associated advantage are treated as private rights (1968 p.353). This 
deliberate blurring of the public/private boundary renders the emergence of resistance to 
these informal practices and organisation in the ‘public interest’ difficult.  
Because the boundary between the public and private wealth is blurred, corruption - the 
abuse of public office for private gain, becomes part of the legitimate rewards of 





highest levels of the state and in doing so systematically lowers government revenue. 
Lofchie (1994) has convincingly argued that rent-seeking behaviours have not always 
motivated the initiation of policies but rather have over time yielded extensive rent 
seeking benefits for the political class. The issue of rent-seeking tendencies is also 
captured in Bayart’s seminal book ‘The state in Africa: The Politics of the Belly’. In this book, 
Bayart draws on the popular Cameroonian proverb: a goat eats where it is tethered to illustrate 
his argument that corruption and predatoriness are modes of social and political behaviour shared by a 
plurality of actors on a more or less grand scale (1993 p.238). Similarly, Chabal and Daloz (1999 
p.28), see widespread societal complicity in patrimonial practice with legitimacy primarily a 
function of who is able to create access to state resources. In these notions, Africa lacks 
any tradition of the public domain and hence discontent over corruption is explained by 
hypocrisy where corruption is as frequently denounced in words as practiced fact (Olivier de Sardin, 
1999 p.29, 31). Public domains are thus not in the hands of the ‘public’ and as Williams 
(1987 p.639) notes, little trickles down to the worse off through the patronage network. While 
structural programmes and reforms have been introduced to try and curb such practices, 
conventional frameworks of reform such as structural adjustment programmes introduced 
by the IMF and World Bank ignore the contestations around the shifting boundaries 
between ‘private’ and ‘public’.  
As will be shown in the case study, when privatised channels of distributing wealth 
become a resource for a few or when public utilities and resources become utilised and 
ruled by a small group of elites, there is the notion that those who benefit will only be 
those close to this clique. This is called ‘kukula’, a popular metaphor in Swahili translated 
as ‘eating’ which in Kenya is often used to refer to the process in which political elites 
acquire posts so that they can gain wealth through the system. Nonetheless, the system of 





2.4 Imagined communities and patrimonial politics 
Clapham (1985, p49) notes that neo-patrimonialism is the most salient type of {authority} 
because it corresponds to the normal forms of social organisations. I draw a finer distinction and 
concur with Bratton & van de Walle (1994, p.459) that while neo-patrimonial practice can be 
found in all polities, it is the core feature of politics in Africa as normal forms of social organisation 
in Africa depend on the arrangement of ‘imagined ethnic communities’.33 Mozaffar et al.,. 
(2003 p.380), concur with this noting that ethno-political groups facilitate political action 
because the identities that define them are strategic resources that are contingently (not reflexively) activated 
to define group interests that help to reduce the cost of collective political action in response to the 
institutional incentives that structure competition for power and resources. 
The politics of neo-patrimonialism is therefore intricately related to the politics of identity. 
A multiplicity of identities is at play in African politics. Africans are not only members of 
imagined ethnic communities, but also citizens, subjects, townsmen and city dwellers, 
believers (Ranger, 1999) workers, consumers and family members. As shall be depicted in 
the case study, struggles over patrimonial control implicate various identities within the 
political and public realm. This dates back to colonial history where most African 
societies, once profoundly local yet fluid and interactive, were administratively 
‘containerised’34 during the colonial period (Mozaffer et al., 2003). Van de Walle (2001) 
argues this point, noting that the issue of inequality and hence the need to manipulate 
state resources dates back to the colonial legacy. In addition, Ranger (1999) notes that 
during the colonial period, units were formed on the basis of constructed ethnic 
categories, some corresponding to the pre-colonial groupings and others more to colonial 
                                                 
33 Here I draw on Benedicts [Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities. London: Verso p.7] definition of a nation as an 
“imagined political community” and further from Lonsdale [Lonsdale, J. (1992,) “The Moral Economy of Mau Mau: 
The Problem” in Unhappy Valley Book two: Violence and Ethnicity. Edited by Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale. London: 
James Curry p.267] in understanding “tribes” (- a term shunned by most post-colonial academics with good reason, 
but very much part of the African lexicon) essentially as nations without states and hence as ‘moral arenas of political 
debates’ or ‘civic republics’. 





imagination. Berman (1998) also concurs with this view adding that the uneven colonial 
penetration of markets and production generated economic differences across the 
territory as well as differing degrees of class formation and the ethnogenesis of inequality. 
Locating the discussion of ethnicity and African institutions in its rightful context, the 
following section discusses present day institutionalised ethnicity in Africa. 
2.4.1 Ethnicity 
Probably the most important event that explains contemporary ethnic relations in Africa 
is European colonialism (Ekeh, 1975). In regularising the scramble for Africa, colonialists 
partitioned Africa among themselves in a manner that reflected their spheres of influence, 
paying little regard to matters concerning ethnic heterogeneity or hitherto existing 
institutions of governance. As a result, different ethnic groups, each with its own 
language, culture, religion, traditions, customs and political and economic systems, were 
brought together to form a single political and administrative unit. In Kenya, for example, 
an assortment of more than 40 ethnic communities were brought together to form one 
country, while in Nigeria, more than 400 ethnic groups were combined to form one 
country (Kimenyi, 2002). Additionally, as has earlier been mentioned, colonial rule did 
little to develop democratic institutions in Africa, the interest of colonialists being mainly 
in maximising economic gains. Their rule which consisted of favouring certain ethnic 
communities over others was therefore manifest during the struggle for independence and 
continues to be an important factor in present day Africa.  
In a bid to retain unitary governments bequeathed by colonialists, Kimenyi (2002) argues 
that African leaders sought to homogenise otherwise heterogenous groups. This was done 
through the centralisation of the state and power. Similar arguments were further 
advanced for single-party political systems where all ethnic groups would be joined 
together under a one-party state. For example, in Kenya leaders promoted tribalism by 
warning that political unity would be compromised if party competition was introduced 





(Holmquist & Ford, 1994). The approaches to coexistence that were adopted involved 
suppressing expressions of ethnic identity ostensibly to promote national unity and 
integration. Therefore, the common response to diversity in many African countries has 
been the adoption of institutional arrangements that seek heterogenous populations by 
limiting expressions of group differences (Kimenyi, 1997).  
The result over the last 30 years, however, has shown that institutional arrangements 
adopted by African leaders in the 1970s were not suited or capable of harmonising the 
interest of heterogenous groups. As Kimenyi rightly points out, since the state is highly 
centralised, the leader of the group that captures the state has control of an enormous amount of resources 
(2002, p.13). There is ample evidence to show that many African governments have 
maintained their control of governance structures by redistributing resources in favour of 
groups and specific ethnic communities. Instead of unifying various ethnic groups, 
African leaders have perpetuated a rule and divide system in which certain groups benefit 
at the expense of others (Kimenyi, 1989; Brough & Kimenyi, 1986; Kimenyi & Shughart, 
1989). The result in part has been the proliferation of claims to various interests based on 
local identities. This tendency is exacerbated by the practices of neo-patrimonialism.  
In struggles over the state and appointments to its bureaucratic apparatus, claims around 
ethnic community tend to dominate. While African Presidents rely on patronage for 
control, they do this through what Anderson (1983, p.7) calls the imagined ethnic community.  
As a result, neo-patrimonial politics relies on gathering the necessary resources to control 
the ethno-political landscape. This is because a ministerial appointment or an appointment 
to positions of power within state institutions brings with it patronage opportunities as 
well as significant perks and status enhancing privileges (van de Walle, 2001). Within the 
context of neo-patrimonialism, appointments of certain members of an imagined ‘ethnic 
community’ to particular positions of influence, particularly plum posts associated with 
higher level politicians, are often interpreted to confer benefits on a number of clients and 
sub-clients from that ‘community’ as well as the ‘community’ as a whole. For example, in 





drawing wider or narrower boundaries around the imagined ‘ethnic community’ and thus 
deepening in part the effectiveness of uniting people or cementing divisions as electoral 
strategy. Subordinates also make claims on those in power, naming them as part of their 
‘community’ as a means to claim access to state resources, security and representation at 
the national level (Ndegwa, 1987). 
Thus ethnicity as it is practised in neo-patrimonial regimes is flexible, with debates 
concerning the ‘real’ ethnic identity of patronage appointees. This becomes highlighted 
when the head of an institution is analysed not only as executives or professionals in their 
own right, but also as belonging to a certain ‘ethnic community’ and therefore perceived 
as gaining from that position especially if the President belongs to the same ‘ethnic 
community’. This feature is further entrenched through the political system. While African 
states have long been accused of having large cabinets, these are rarely a response to 
economic policy concerns but rather to facilitate compromise and cohesion within the 
political class as a result of ethnic diversity. This is evident in Kenya were membership to 
Parliament and more so to ministerial positions requires the President to preserve national 
unity by including elites from as many ethnic communities as possible.  The categories 
that arise within ethnic practice are fluid and incorporate multiple sub-identities. This does 
not imply that the ‘choices’ around ethnicity are either arbitrary or purely instrumental. 
Rather they must be understood to be historically produced and are related to the social 
conditions of their emergence and perpetuation, including the historical institutional context 
(Carter-Bentley 1997, p.47). As Gilroy aptly puts it, identity-making has a history even though its 
historical character is often systematically concealed (2000, p.100). For example, within Kenya, the 
category of ‘Kalenjin’ identity, a tribal grouping, subsumes many identities: Tugen, Keiyo, 
Marakwet, Pokot, Terik, Saboat, Nandi and Kipsigis. Kipkorir (1985) traces the formation 
of this politically charged category to a 1950s meeting by young educated men within 
these communities who wanted a more appropriate collective term. Thus, they chose the 





used by John arap Chemalian35 in his vernacular radio broadcasts during World War ll. 
Thus, to emphasise that ethnicity is historical is to recognise that it raises moral and 
political debate over the problems of exclusion, distribution and representation within the 
‘imagined community’ of the nation (Yeros, 1999). Thus, the national community in 
Africa is most often imagined along communitarian lines as nations of communities. This 
places the notion and agenda of liberal citizenship in tension with local ethnic 
understandings (Ndegwa, 1997).  
Nevertheless, ethnicity is not necessarily pitted against an over-arching nation. Here 
Lonsdale’s distinction between ‘political tribalism’ and ‘moral ethnicity’ is a useful one. 
‘Political tribalism’–the unprincipled competition for access to the state on behalf of leaders who draw 
support from administratively contained, ethicised constituencies.., should not be confused with 
‘moral ethnicity’– …the moral economy at the core of ethnicities that allocates ‘reputation’ to the means 
by which people pursue their self interest (1994, p.138-139). The former is part of domination, 
the latter has potential to resist domination and, when projected onto the imagined 
national community, to create the basis for a more accountable national public realm. 
Depending on political context then, ethnic claims can be a form of resistance to 
marginalisation and coercion or a form and means of domination (Berman, 1998). This 
can be seen in the Hutu Power movement or even the Moi or Kenyatta regime in Kenya 
where both leaders were perceived to have allocated most of the resources to the Kalenjin 
and Kikuyu communities respectively. Lonsdale (1992; 2000) explains the relationship 
between ethnicity, power and politics in his analysis of the Kikuyu ethnic community of 
Kenya, locating the construction of the Kikuyu community and their rise to power 
through the colonial underpinning of the Mau Mau resistance.  
Thus, ethnicity must be understood as embedded within existing power relations. Neo-
patrimonial regimes tend to lead to proliferation of ethnic and regional claims and 
mobilisations. Patron-client politics often deepen prior inequities and leave room for the 
                                                 





perception by the general public that public resources are being abused. Indeed this may 
be the case, but an executive in a pubic institution can also be merely doing his or her 
work but be perceived to be ‘eating’ from this office simply because he or she belongs to 
the same ethnic group as the President.  
‘Political tribalism’ then, is rooted in a failure of representation, which the institutional 
configuration of neo-patrimonial regimes engenders and ruling cliques quite intentionally 
foster. Through appointments to ministerial posts, by becoming clients of higher up 
patrons, or by directly soliciting Presidential support, Members of Parliament (MPs) 
access state resources that can then be used to buy support for ‘development’ in their 
constituencies. In this way, elected representatives, particularly but not exclusively those in 
the dominant political party, are often part of cascading patron-client networks clustered 
around the President (Barkan, 1979). For example, in his study of the Kenyan electoral 
process, Barkan (1987) notes that these networks between the MPs and the rural/ethnic 
community are at times parallel and at times, overlapping.  As part of these dual systems 
of networks, MPs engage in intense competition for access to the President and his power 
over appointments and allocation of state resources.  
As shall be shown through the case study, this network relationship, based in part on 
ethnic identities explains why the telecom process took different twists and turns as 
political rife over state resources became part of what was to be contested. Within this 
struggle over access to the state, particularly the concentrated power of the presidency, the 
practice of ethnicity becomes an integral part of strategy. Van de Walle (2001) notes that 
state-led clientelism should not be viewed as lessening state autonomy but rather the 
opportunity for the ruling elite to use the system for their own material wealth. While it is 
difficult to generalise and assume all political elites as prone to such tendencies, van de 
Walle (2001) notes that these elites are mainly holders and potential holders of offices at 
the apex of the state. However, he points out that these elites tend not to hold these 
positions for long as insecurity of office appears to be a prevalent mechanism for Presidential control 






This section has examined the nature of political rule in Africa. Utilising a neo-patrimonial 
framework it has been argued that African states are inherently bound up with negative 
synergies of clientelist practises and have a form of democracy that is patrimonial.  
Nonetheless, the character of neo-patrimonial states raised in this section raises a central 
question: Can neo-patrimonial tendencies change with international and economic 
reform?  In the literature, it is often hypothesised that a new leader has the potential to be 
a so called ‘new broom’ who can carry through more far-reaching reforms than a long 
standing leader because they are less tied in by the established patronage networks (Kjaer, 
2004; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995). The literature offers two reasons why a newly elected 
leader is supposed to be a better initiator of change. First, a newly elected leader is 
supposedly granted a ‘honeymoon’ grace period during which he bears no responsibility 
for the previous government’s failings. In this period he can introduce economic reforms 
that create a new group of winners who will then provide the support necessary to keep 
him in power and sustain reform (Haggard & Kaufmann, 1997).  
Second, it is often assumed that new leaders have fewer ties to the established patronage 
networks and thus simply tend to change previous reward structures. Coupled with the 
requirements of international financial institutions for adjustment, this will usually entail 
some kind of economic liberalisation (Bienen & Herbst, 1996 p.33). In differing from this 
view van de Walle (2001) notes that in Africa, winners have not always emerged and 
reforms have therefore been difficult to sustain. While in the honeymoon stage, new 
economic reforms are made, interests tend to regroup and reforms have tended to 
stagnate. Thus, new leaders return to what van de Walle (2001 p.60) has termed the partial 
reform syndrome. The new leaders remain rhetorically committed to reform, but only carry 
out reform to the extent that it does not politically hurt important individuals among the 
elite. After some years in power, leaders may continue to receive aid but they are no 





is in this light that van de Walle (2001) argues that the largest improvements in economic 
management are likeliest immediately after the democratic transition, before the weight of 
the past reasserts itself and while some of the transformist activities of the transition 
survive.  
Taking van de Walle (2001) argument further, a key feature of conceptual confusion 
between ethnicity and patronage in the literature stems from the failure to distinguish 
between two forms of patron-client ties present in most African countries such as Kenya. 
The first form involves the ties between a patron and a local community as a whole 
through the provision of public goods. The second form involves the ties between a 
patron and select individuals within either the local community or at the national level of 
the administration.  As will be evidenced in this study, there is little doubt that political 
party competition is likely to make the political leadership more responsive to a wider 
cross-section of the population or that reforms will take place.  This is because as Kimenyi 
(2002) suggests, political parties take on an increasing ethnic character under a multi-party 
system as power brokers prey on their ethnic background to drum up political support.  
The historical evidence from Kenya appears to confirm Kimenyi’s (2002) hypothesis. For 
example, in Kenya, the first multi-party elections in 1997 and subsequent elections in 
2002, political parties tended to form along ethnic lines: the ruling party Kenya African 
National Union (KANU) became the party of Rift Valley; the National Development 
Party (NDP) became the party of the Luo and Nyanza tribes; the FORD-Kenya party 
became the party dominated by the Luhya community in Western Kenya; while the 
Democratic Party (DP) and FORD-Asili party were largely dominated by the Kikuyus of 
Central province. When considering the telecom sector which has evolved under the Moi 






The following section examines the relationship of neo-patrimonial states with the 
international arena and in doing so sets a background to understanding telecom reform in 
Kenya. 
Part II: Telecom and development: the rise of  the neo-liberal ideology 
in telecom policy.  
By virtue of their global reach, organisational strength, professional expertise, and close connections 
with core governments and private banks and corporations, these international institutions [the IMF 
and World Bank] have acquired an authoritative status within the world economy comparable in 
some respects to that enjoyed by the state vis-à-vis the national economy. To this extent, the leading 
international organisations, of which the World Bank and the IMF are the are most conspicuous, 
may be said to play an increasingly important initiating, monitoring and regulatory role in the 
reorganisation of economic activity on global scale 
Camilleri & Falk  
(1992, p.95-96) 
 
2.6 Neo-liberalisation: A historical perspective of telecom reform within the wider 
economic development of Africa. 
The concept of telecom reform within the ambit of development is entwined with the 
wider economic and social development in Africa. By the mid 1970s virtually every 
country in Africa officially structured its development effort through a planning process. 
Pegged to this planning process was that aid projects were meant to train the staff who 
would eventually replace the foreign experts and create or strengthen the services that 
would one day be housed in capable ministry hands. Between 1980 and 1990, the aid 
system that emerged was essentially intergovernmental with rich country governments 
providing resources to poor country governments. From the 1990s onwards, a third 
group - the western non-governmental organisations (NGOs) had become a part of this 
process, intertwining themselves not only with governments in Africa but also with their 
own governments in the West (van de Walle, 2001; Kruger et al., 1989). In some 





of entitlement suggested that substantial and regular aid inflows was their right. However, 
Jackson & Rosberg (1982) note that this was never an unambiguous norm of the regime 
as the developed countries steadfastly refused to recognise such a right on either legal or 
moral grounds. In practice, however, the system of aid between the years 1965-1985 
worked as if it was a right as the international community did not choose to punish 
African governments who misappropriated funds. In spite of the funding received by 
western donors, African governments did not retain the final say over its allocation. While 
the rhetoric during this period was one of partnership, government control over the 
expenditure of funds was retained by donors. Nonetheless as Mosley (1994) and Ali 
(2003) show, donor funds continued to increase government corruption due to its 
mismanagement by African leaders. To tackle this problem, most donor agencies created 
their audit process resulting in the creation of numerous stand-alone agencies that were 
required to ‘police’ the flow of funds. As van de Walle (2001) notes, in the end these 
structures began to slowly replace government ministry planning.  
Olukoshi (2003) argues that two somewhat contradictory issues combined to motivate the 
emergence of a modified aid regime in the 1980s and 1990s. The first was the criticism 
directed towards the aid-regime system and the actions of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)36 and the World Bank37 which had lent unwisely to most African states. The 
inability to repay these debts resulted in an economic crisis in most African states in the 
early 1970s. The second was that the economic crisis in Africa was linked to poor 
governance structures. However, Olukoshi (2003) notes that in the initial phase of 
                                                 
36 The IMF is an international organisation of 184 countries established in 1945 that works to ensure the stability of the 
international monetary financial system. The IMF’s mandate includes facilitating the expansion and balanced growth 
of international trade, promoting exchange stability and providing the opportunity for the orderly correction of 
countries’ balance-of-payments. See www.imf.org  
37 The World Bank is made up of two unique development institutions owned by 184 member countries - the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association 
(IDA). Each institution plays a different but supportive role in our mission of global poverty reduction and the 
improvement of living standards. The IBRD focuses on middle income and creditworthy poor countries, while IDA 
focuses on the poorest countries in the world. Together they provide low-interest loans, interest-free credit and grants 






Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), there was little explicit or formal concern 
within the international lending organisations over issues of governance and it was not 
until the early 1990s that governance began to enter the discourse of these funding 
agencies. SAPs were introduced in Africa on a massive scale from the early 1980s onwards 
at a time when most African economies were already caught up in a deep crisis of 
accumulation. These crises manifested themselves not only in terms of rapidly declining 
output and productivity in the industrial and agricultural sectors but also in terms of 
worsening payments and budget deficits, acute shortages of inputs and soaring inflation, 
growing domestic debt and a major problem of external debt management (Tarp, 1993). 
Thus, the reform programme under the SAP framework which was introduced under 
donor pressure and implemented under the supervision of the IMF and the World Bank 
were, as Ali (2003) notes, ostensibly aimed at stabilising the African economies, 
restructuring the basis for accumulation and permitting the resumption of growth.  
In retrospect, neo-liberal theories grew out of the discourse on what the medium and 
long-term effects of the SAP would be on the economy.  Championed by Africanists 
based in North American universities and later embraced by international financial 
institutions such as  the World Bank and the IMF, neo-liberal ideology under the guise of 
‘political economy of African development or ‘public choice’, rested on the assumption, 
whether explicitly stated or not that ‘democracy’ and ‘economic liberalisation’ are two 
sides of the same coin (Ghai, 1991; Olukoshi, 2003). Within this view, it was argued that 
underpinning the failure of the post-colonial African state and its policy-making process 
was the neo-patrimonial nature of African states based on rent-seeking and poor 
governance (Bates, 1981; Sandbrook, 1991). Central to the discourse of neo-liberal 
theories was their thesis on neo-patrimonial states that produced such terms as 
‘prebendal’, ‘parasitic’, ‘personalistic’, ‘clientelist’, ‘kleptocratic’, ‘unsteady’, ‘overextended’, 
‘predatory’ and finally ‘neo-patrimonial’ to describe the state of most African economies 
(Olukoshi, 2003). Neo-liberal perspectives argued that the process of retrenchment of the 
state should result in the strengthening of civil society and associational life which, in turn, 





therefore emphasised as a means by which to reduce government control and create 
independent institutions. Thus, in the case of the telecom sector, the old view that 
telecom development was a natural outcome of economic development was slowly 
eroded as telecom activities intergrated into the operations of all industry sectors.  
Telecom reform was thus spurred on by both technological change and a growing 
urgency to attract financial investment for development. While it is impossible to detail 
the entire genesis of telecom reform, the linkage between telecom and development was 
unsurprising given that in effect these changes are closely tied to the quality and 
availability of telecom infrastructure. One of the seminal studies examining the 
relationship between telephone penetration and GDP is by Hardy (1980).38  His 
examination of aggregate variables of economic development (eg. GDP and energy 
consumption) and telephone penetration (eg. telephone lines per 1000 people), between 
1960 and 1973 in both developed and developing nations, found that the coordination of 
economic activity is better facilitated by the telephone and is mainly done through information flows 
which have an impact on the way in which economic activity is organised (Hardy, 1980 p.282 and 285-
286). This connection between telecom infrastructure or investment and economic 
development is well reflected in the ‘Jipp curve’, frequently used to illustrate variations of 
the ‘telephone gap’ and the positive correlation between telecom infrastructure and 
various indicators of economic growth such as GDP (Jipp, 1963).39  It is this causality that 
underlies the claim that telecoms services should be viewed differently from other 
services.  
While the direction of causality in Hardy’s (1980) analysis has been criticised, it suffices to 
note that the most basic of the arguments about the links between telecom and 
development is that telecom is foundational to other developments in the economy. It is 
                                                 
38 See also Hudson, H, Hardy, P. and Parker, E. B. (1982) “Impact of telephone and satellite earth station installations on 
GDP”. Telecommunications Policy 6 (4) 300-307. 
39 The first study exploring a correlation between telephone infrastructure and economic development was published in 





for this reason, that telecom sector has been referred to as the central nervous system of the 
emerging international economic order (Mukerji, 2000 p.60). But, as noted in chapter 1, until 
recently telecom had been provided in most countries as user-pay public services 
administered by the government. Typically, this was done through PTT organisations or 
by government regulation of private monopoly and operators. PTT organisations 
therefore fell under the category of public utilities. Given the important link between the 
concept of public utilities and development, the following sections briefly discuss this 
shift from PTT to the proffered reform models of liberalisation and privatisation.  
2.6.1 Public utilities and universal service obligations (USO) 
The concept of public utility is not new to most countries. Public utilities have always 
been recognised as a ‘special’ form of business in which public interest was more of a 
priority. According to Melody (2003 p.12), public utility describes industries that have been 
classified apart from industry in general and, at the same time, distinguished from government services. 
Until recently therefore, the most common industries classified as public utilities included 
telephone, electricity (gas), water services and in some cases, public transport. The actual 
definitions of public utility however, have largely been dependant on each country. More 
often than not as Melody (2003 p.12) notes: 
where the demand for a good or service is {was} considered a common necessity for the public at 
large, and the supply conditions are such that the public may not be provided with reasonable 
prices, the government may regulate to ensure they are.  
The concept of public utility has therefore provided the foundation for government 
control in the form of regulation in most countries. Based on the concept of public utility, 
telecom services have been considered a strategic means to create social and economic 
responsibility and, as such, are thought to be required in all sectors of a country. Like the 
term public utility, the term Universal Service or Universal Service Obligation (USO)40 
                                                 





has thus tended to be aligned to the provision of basic telephone services at affordable 
rates. The term USO has its roots in the 1907 ideology of AT&T’s President, Theodore 
Vail, which called for ‘one system, one policy under universal service’ and formed the 
foundational underpinning of the argument in favour of a regulated monopoly (Mueller, 
1997; Hadden & Larnett, 1995).41 For many developing countries, the term, as an 
offshoot of its historical roots, generally refers to policy aimed at promoting access to and 
affordability of telecom services through various policy interventions (Hudson, 1997, 
1999) and has been attributed to the provision of basic voice telephony also known as 
Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS) (Sawhney, 2000) 
The idea behind USO was for PTT organisations to provide POTS services to all citizens, 
hence ensuring USO. Nonetheless, by the early 1980s, various arguments were made in 
favour of privatising PTT organisations based on the shortcomings of PTT companies 
reviewed in chapter 1. For example, it was argued that PTT organisations unable to adopt 
new technologies and adjust to market changes were inefficient and consuming 
government resources that could otherwise be directed elsewhere (Melody, 1997b). Thus 
the idea of USO in the international arena shifted to one of efficiency. In essence the 
crusade to privatise was driven by the underlying neo-liberal ideology of privatisation. 
Neo-classical economics therefore provided telecom policy makers with a normative 
structure to consider questions of efficiency of resource allocation and institutional setting to achieve efficiency 
(Joseph, 2001 p.75). 
While various models of telecom development exist, two main models of telecom 
development have been espoused by the WTO and define the range of options available 
to African nations. Namely: liberalisation and privatisation. The following section 
                                                 





summarises the ideologies behind these models which are inherent in the GATS 
framework.42 
2.6.2 Liberalisation 
Liberalisation seeks to increase the number of participants in the market. In the telecom 
sector this often occurs when the telecom framework is based on a monopoly system. 
The aim of the government intervention would be to expand the number of 
communication service providers or lower barriers to entry on all or part of the market 
achieved through policy amendments (Petrazzini, 1997; Mosco & Reddick 1997). 
However, Piscotta (1997) notes that liberalisation is the slowest form of introducing 
reforms as competition is allowed in slow increments starting often with the introduction 
of new entrants in the mobile services (such as cellular and paging).  
Supporters contend that liberalisation lowers prices and expands services (ibid, 1997). In 
addition they contend that liberalisation provides the possibility of many more 
developments, more so with changes in technology and opening up of markets that would 
not have been possible with government control (ibid, 1997). Critics counter that 
liberalisation substitutes private oligopoly regulation for state regulation, carrying out 
prices, service and innovation mandates that advance the interests of an oligopoly cartel 
(Mosco, 1989). However, the latter has been seen as a misconception given that the trend 
experienced in most countries is an increase in regulation (Pisciotta, 1997).  
2.6.3 Privatisation 
Privatisation is a process of state intervention that literally sells a state enterprise such as a 
public broadcaster or state telephony company. Privatisation takes many forms depending 
on the percentage of shares to be sold off, the extent to which any foreign ownership is 
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permitted, the length, if any, of a phase-in period, and the specific form of ongoing state 
ownership. In the telecom industry this typically constitutes a regulatory body (Melody, 
1999b; 1997a). In addition, supporters of privatisation argue that unlike 
commercialisation, privatisation allows market control. Those who do not favour 
privatisation argue that privatisation promotes the loss of sovereignty for nations selling 
off to foreign firms and inevitably leads to the loss of control over national policy. 
Although the specific approach to privatisation varies among countries, two main models 
are beginning to emerge: 
(i) Privatisation with full competition: both developed and developing countries have 
followed this model, for example New Zealand and Chile (Kelly, 2003). In New Zealand 
the Telecommunication Corporation of New Zealand (TCNZ) was privatised in 1990 to a 
strategic investor led by New Zealand companies and American companies Bell Atlantic 
and Ameritech. Since the sale, the government’s shares have dropped to 49.9 percent for 
special control purposes. While New Zealand pursued a deregulatory approach by 
implementing competition without the establishment of a regulatory authority, the 
government still retained controls on compliance, foreign ownership and pricing rules. In 
contrast, Chile’s process was more gradual, with the introduction of a regulatory authority 
to maintain a fair market environment (Madden, 2003).  
(ii) Privatisation with Phased-In Competition: in this model, privatisation of national 
carriers is accompanied by a sustained period of exclusivity rights or limited competition 
(Pisciotta, 2003 p.337). Two main reasons can be cited for opting for this model: 1) 
governments want to maximise the sale value of their national carrier and 2) countries 
want to retain market share and accumulate income prior to sale. Two examples of this 
model from developed and developing countries include Japan and Argentina. In Japan, 
two competitors were introduced in to the market to compete with the government- 
owned telecom provider. However, analysis of Japans’ policy model shows that there have 
been problems because of the lack of competitive safeguards as well as the abuse of 





privatisation has increased over recent years with the phased in approach being the 
preferred route taken by most governments. Advocates of privatisation see it as being able 
to remove all control of the state (which has failed in providing service and efficiency) and 
moving it to the hands of the private sector which, it is argued, can provide more efficient 
services. 
In relation to this study, while the concept of privatisation and liberalisation has been 
separated in the literature as observed above, both concepts will be viewed as one and 
utilised interchangeably. This is because the GATS model does not distinguish between 
liberalisation and privatisation as they have been two processes that have taken place 
together globally with liberalisation facilitating the process of privatisation. Melody 
(1997b) and Fransman (2003) note that liberalisation was introduced to increase the rapid 
entry of other competitors in the market and has often consisted of the privatisation of 
the incumbent operator in the sector.  
Three issues of privatisation require emphasis. First, under the privatisation and 
liberalisation model, competition is viewed as the key factor in meeting the shortfalls of 
PTT organisations and therefore development - the factors of which have been suggested 
above. Second, as illustrated in the two models above of privatisation, regulation is viewed 
as the key model to manage competition in the sector. In other words, any reference to 
competition is taken to mean ‘regulated competition’ (Horowitz, 2001 p.254). Thus under 
the privatisation model, competition is generally a means to an end but not an end in 
itself. As outlined in chapter 1, the perceived ‘best method’ globally has been to 
commercialise and separate operators from government. This is viewed as a means of 
promoting competition and reducing monopolies and increasing private and foreign 
investment while introducing independent regulators. The need for independent 
regulators is based on the assumption that regulators will ‘referee’ the market to maintain 
fair competition. The assumption often underlying regulation therefore is that the 
regulator is an independent arbitrator (Samarajiva, 2001). This view is supported by 





the success of telecom reforms largely depends on the independence of the regulator. The 
term regulatory capture (Melody 1997a p.195-199) has therefore been used to refer to the 
loss of the regulator’s independence to make professional decisions on their merits because of undue 
influence either from politicians, politically driven Ministries, or the regulated monopolies (ibid, 1997, 
p195). It is in this light that Melody (1997b) notes that the lines of separation must be 
clear and should take three forms which are discussed briefly below. 
1) Policy development: in which policy is directed at long time societal goals that are able 
to encompass long-term implications of future developments in the sector. Consequently, 
the ability to perform this function would depend on a specialised policy unit which is 
able to provide professional and detailed information and analysis not only on the 
implications of changes in the sector but, more importantly, the implications of this for 
policy development. This, Melody suggests, eliminates the need for policymakers to intervene in the 
detailed affairs of the PTO {Public Telephone Operator} or the regulator except on matters of compelling 
policy significance (1999b, p.12). 
 2) Operations Management: which, Melody opines, must be separated from the 
government so as to reduce the interference of bureaucrats. More commonly, it is 
essential that the management be responsible to a Board of Directors that is insulated 
from government interference. While the Board may have political appointees, it needs to 
have a mandate to act independently.  
3) Regulation: Melody notes that this must be independent from both the PTO and from 
day-to-day government interference. The regulator is to implement policy and ensure that 
performance by all service providers in the sector including the PTO is fair. It is in this 
light that the RP was designed to ensure legitimate, non-discriminatory, domestic 
regulatory choices do not serve as barriers to trade. 43. 
                                                 





The third issue when considering privatisation is the issue of change in ownership from 
government entities (partially or fully) to private business entities. This raises the question:  
does the kind of ownership - public or private make a difference? Melody (1997a) notes 
from the experience of European countries, ownership may make no major difference in 
the efficiency of a nation’s telecom system and in the provision of its USO. He points out 
that there are usually three main regulatory areas: 1) integration: this takes place when 
countries link regional and international networks policies; 2) USO: this represents the 
goal of providing telecom services to the majority of the population and can take various 
forms such as a levy from service providers; and 3) competition: this takes place when 
market forces dictate the telecom sector (and in doing so increases efficiency).  
In sum, the concept of efficiency dominates contemporary telecom policy models and 
receives theoretical justification from neo-classical schools. Where USO levying is 
concerned, Joseph (2001) argues that this is simply tolerated for political reasons. The 
efficiency ideology coupled with changes taking place globally in the telecom industry 
limited the options that policy makers advanced in the sector. In this way, government 
intervention is viewed only as a necessity where the market had failed. For example, the 
market could fail when consumption exceeds available resources or when the market is 
more expensive such as telecom services in developing countries.44 It is within this 
context that the case of privatising the telecom sector emerged under the banner of WTO 
free trade negotiations.  
In brief, free trade theory is the liberalisation of trade between states. It includes the 
removal of both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. The accompanying theory of 
comparative advantage which is pegged to free trade theory suggests that once an 
environment devoid of trade barriers is in place, the most efficient producers in all areas 
will emerge allowing for the production of lower priced and higher quality goods and 
services. According to the WTO Secretariat:  
                                                 





open markets are expected to encourage quality improvement and product process innovation; 
reduce the scope of wasteful resource use and rent-seeking; constrain the power of individual 
economic operators; and ensure users continued product availability at reasonable conditions.45  
The comparative advantage theory further assumes that each state will produce that which 
it has an advantage in producing over other states. This advantage could take the form of 
capital, land, climate, technology or any combination of these which makes a country 
more efficient in its production of goods or services. Theoretically, this would allow states 
to focus on producing that which they are best able to do and, through trade, secure that 
which is cheaper to import than to produce, thus allowing these freed resources to be 
allocated to the most profitable production. Of course, this theory fails to take into 
account inequalities such as natural resources. Nevertheless, over the years, as argued by 
van de Walle (2001), the need to privatise became more of a system of confirming good 
governance in African states. Thus, over the last decade, several hundred billion dollars 
have been transferred from developed countries to African countries with the aim of 
helping liberalise their economies. This network of funding has led to a network of 
relationships based on donor to donor, donor to government and donor and recipient.  
Drawing on the broad concepts of NIE, the following section examines the rationale of 
institutions. NIE is used in the sense that Gamble (1990, p.405) refers to as an organising 
perspective as it provides a map of the subject and signposts to its central questions (Rhodes, 1995 
p.49). My quest here is to utilise NIE for its strong explanatory value in understanding the 
institutional motivation needed to ensure credibility and the role played by international 
institutions such as the WTO in doing so. 
2.7 NIE: A window into international institutions and credible commitments 
NIE is a broad theoretical domain characterised by many strands and capable of 
application in many areas across many disciplines. While NIE literature is mainly 
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characterised as constituting two general threads:- Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
and agency theory or theory of collective action, this study assumes their work to be 
linked. Thus a broad NIE approach is employed to locate the study’s narrower argument 
that of the value of the WTO and the GATS as an instrument seeking to deter 
opportunism and encourage predictability. To this extent, the overview that follows is 
limited by the requirements of this specific task and draws on the work of North (1990).  
NIE evolved in part out of a dissatisfaction with looking at politics purely in terms of 
executives, legislatures and constitutions (Parsons, 1995). It operates within the neo-
classical framework but augments and advances it considerably by acknowledging that 
norms, rules and ideologies matter (Clague, 1997). The neo-classical framework on the 
other hand argues that social relationships and institutions do not fundamentally matter or 
alter decisions, as rationality in the form of perfect information is assumed.46 Importantly, 
NIE recognises that economic problems experienced in countries are not necessarily the 
same and therefore do not warrant the same analytical approach and remedial tools. This 
makes NIE a useful heuristic device for analysing the WTO’s role in structuring the ‘rules 
of the game’ and the value of GATS instruments as a tool that seeks to reduce 
uncertainty. Combining elements of different origins, NIE proceeds from the central 
assumption that the market involves buying and selling and that there are costs associated 
with engaging in the decision to buy and sell (North, 1990). In other words, because of 
the uncertainty and lack of trust in engaging in the process, transaction costs - 
costs associated with addressing questions of trust in economic behaviour such as, 
the costs of negotiating, drafting and enforcing agreements47 - need to be 
addressed.48 The form that institutions will assume will be determined by the nature of the 
costs, and the cost of minimising arrangements {which} may change and evolve with changes in the nature 
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and sources of transaction costs and the means for minimising them (Nabil & Nugent, 1989 p.1336). 
According to NIE, transaction costs arise for two main reasons: the fact that an 
individual’s capacity to retain and process information is limited (bounded) and that 
information is asymmetrically held. This is encapsulated in the often quoted statement 
human behaviour is intendedly rational but only limitedly so (Simon, 1961 p.xxiv).  
According to Williamson (1996, p.103), this unavoidably incomplete nature of contracts is the 
most important implication of bounded rationality. There is also an enduring risk of 
opportunistic behaviour where actors undertake to do one thing but when circumstances 
change may seek to do another. Economic actors thus develop and use institutions to 
address these constraints created by uncertainty or limited alternatives and by doing so 
create a stable structure for human exchange, lowering the overall cost of enforcing the 
exchange process49. Institutions thus develop and use instruments that seek to limit 
uncertainty and create ‘stable’ structures for human exchange and in doing so lower the 
overall costs in the exchange process.  Transaction costs that institutions and members of 
those institutions use in agreeing to contract (including measuring all the attributes 
relevant for the exchange) and the costs of enforcing the contract (including the costs of 
detecting infringement, policing and punishing) (Khan, 1996). 
The vast literature examining institutions defines them in a variety of ways.50 Ostrom’s 
well known definition of institutions is arguably the most expansive and summarises the 
concept as:  
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…the  set of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some 
area, where these actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what 
procedures must be followed, what information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs 
will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions... All rules contain prescriptions that 
forbid, permit or require some action or outcome (1990, p 51).  
This is similar to North’s (1990) definition in which institutions comprise formal rules and 
informal constraints that facilitate coordination or govern relationships between 
individuals, and the enforcement characteristics of both. Taken together these comprise 
the ‘rules of the game’ which are distinguished from ‘organisations’ or the ‘players of the 
game’ which comprise groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives which 
are defined by the opportunities afforded by the institutional structure (North, 1990 p.132). However, 
it is important to note that institutional instruments do not necessarily all have positive 
results and by influencing transaction costs, institutions can both raise and lower these 
costs and can have the adverse effect of inhibiting economic growth.  
While the issue of GATS and its direct impact on economic growth is not directly 
examined in this study, the extent of economic growth is indeed influenced by the nature 
of the perceived relationship between the GATS instruments and the way it structures the 
telecom sector in a specific country. This explains why the same institutions might have 
different outcomes in different countries.51 As suggested in this study, there is already a 
co-dependency system between neo-patrimonial states and international institutions. Thus 
how institutions are designed, how they function and how they respond to change and the 
incentives they create through various policy instruments or formal or informal rules 
therefore has an impact upon policy development and outcome. The following section 
expands on the inter-relationship between institutions in what this study argues is an ‘aid-
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cartel’. Its purpose is to locate the WTO as part of the ‘aid-cartel’ institution that 
structures the ‘rules of the game’ in the global financial and trading arena. 
2.7.1 The ‘aid cartel’ system and credible commitments 
The aid system functions within a complex set of relationships that can be called an ‘aid-
cartel’ institution, where donor agencies, IFIs and trade blocks such as the WTO rely on 
each other to sustain the dependency on aid. According to Easterly (2002), the guiding 
principle motivating IFIs is self preservation. Individually, IFI agency staff members have 
a heartfelt concern for eliminating poverty, advancing good governance and building 
viable civil society. Yet, as with any agency or bureaucracy, the overriding concern of the 
institution is its own existence (Niskanen, 2001; Moe, 1997; Wintrobe, 1997). Easterly 
argues (2002, p.6) that it is for self preservation that  foreign aid agencies agree to coordinate their 
actions rather than compete, forming a ‘cartel of good intensions. He reasons that IFIs moved 
towards the cartel model to manoeuvre around issues of accountability. With a 
questionable record on reducing poverty in African states, Easterly argues that donors 
evolved from a cooperative to a cartel model to thwart any effort to place blame on the 
cartels’ actions. The cartel model creates an environment where each agency duplicates 
the work of the other and a monopoly on foreign assistance eliminates a competitive 
challenge. As a result, he argues, by engaging in redundant activities, no single agency 
within the cartel is exclusively responsible for any one assistance programme. For 
example, if the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) wider 
programme of telecom development under the banner of ‘ICT’52 fails to increase the 
development of interconnection in Kenya, it can explain that the World Bank E-
programme also failed and vice versa. In addition, the cartel’s monopoly on foreign 
assistance eliminates competition so that any effort to reduce the UNECA ICT 
programme or the World Bank’s or the recently introduced ‘ICT’ programme by the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), harms the entire effort, as the cartel is 
                                                 





the ‘only game in town’. Thus, through the use of redundancy and monopoly, the cartel 
structure sustains IFIs as long as rich countries feel obligated to aid impoverished African 
countries.  With respect to African nations, the IFIs cartel structure begins to mirror that 
of a ‘David and Goliath’ situation, in which, as Easterly (2002 p.12) explains: 
Foreign aid is approved by voters of rich country A. whose national government gives the money 
through its own aid bureaucracy and international aid bureaucracies to the government of rich 
country B, who in turn is supposed to make some effort to give the money to poor people in 
country B. The poor people in country B have little voice in their own government, much less voice 
in the distant national aid bureaucracy, international aid bureaucracy and political campaign of 
rich country A. The rich country aid bureaucracy and international aid bureaucracy, although 
well intentioned, have little incentive to hear poor people of country B who do not vote or form 
pressure groups in country A.  
In this way, much of the work involved in generating public projects in African countries 
has been removed from most African governments to the lending institutions (van de 
Walle, 2001). If a state requests assistance, the evidence suggests that IFIs determine the 
structure and implementation of the aid programme.53 This leaves African states with little 
manoeuvrability when seeking assistance and forces them to capitulate to IFI demands. 
While African nations are the clients of IFIs, the donor countries are the constituency that 
dictates the way IFIs function. For each of these donor countries, the primary concern is 
how they can effectively export their development goals. For example, Carothers (1999) 
documents the evolution of US economic development on the part of the people of 
developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local 
institutions. During the Cold War, Gibbon (1993, p.37) notes that the superpowers used 
aid as an instrument for changing and maintaining the developing country’s political alignments. Because 
this can be viewed as a primary constraint on IFIs, complex aid conditionalities such as 





gesture designed to respond to donor country requirements for IFIs to report on their 
progress.54 IFIs inturn report their use of donor funding in the form of visible outputs as 
described above.  
With the formation of aid conditionalities, such as public sector reform and privatisation, 
IFIs must promote these aims, report on their effectiveness, monitor reports, and re-
evaluate success or failure55 as a means to maintain their relationship with their clients –
Western donor countries. Because of this, donor institutions are constrained by the need 
for aid disbursement to justify development assistance.56 Thus, proponents of IFIs have 
justified multilateral aid based upon precise calculations of funding necessary to meet the 
development goals of their Western donors. Easterly (2002 p.13-15) and van de Walle 
(2001 p.188-235) document the evolution of this measure through the actions of 
numerous IFI leaders and government officials.  For example, Easterly (2002 p.15) notes 
that IFIs annually project an arithmetic growth in funding needs to reduce poverty, 
meanwhile, the typical poor country has stagnated over the last two decades, and in many aid-intensive 
African countries even longer. The result is a paradox where IFIs increasingly distribute aid 
with conditionalities to African states and those states, in turn, commit to implementing 
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these conditions in order to have a resource for funding to sustain them. IFIs are thus 
forced to develop agreements for credibility – a transaction cost. 
The result is a co-dependency system where IFIs increasingly distribute aid with 
conditionalities on African states. African states in turn commit to implementing these 
conditionalities in order to have a resource for funding to sustain their states. IFIs are thus 
forced to develop a system or what is can be termed a transaction cost in which 
agreements for credibility are enforced. Broadly speaking, North (1993) suggests that 
credible commitments are made in two ways: one, by establishing a reputation for playing 
fair and two, by voluntarily constraining the power to act in various ways. If applied to 
African states and international institutions, it is possible to articulate this as taking steps 
to cater for the situation where an African state which at the time of agreement intended 
to apply a policy reform (eg liberalisation of the telecom sector) or refrain from doing 
something (eg unfairly protect domestic monopolies), but later discovers that it may be 
contrary to their interests to honour that intention (in order to protect monopoly rents 
and political clout) and seeks to act differently (not honouring the commitment of 
telecom reform). As North and Weingast (1984 p.806) note: while parties may have strong 
incentives to strike a bargain, their incentives after the fact are not always compatible with maintaining the 
agreement: compliance is always a potential problem [emphasis added}.  
In order to reach an agreement, each side must agree to the conditions, however as 
suggested above, African states are also tied because they depend on aid for the 
development of their countries. Nonetheless, IFIs require a situation in which they are in 
some way able to determine the compliance of their conditions on these African states. 
IFIs thus play a crucial role in addressing these compliance concerns and facilitating 
smooth exchange. As Moe notes, the mutual goal may be one of cooperation with one 
another but states are self-interested and opportunistic, because information is imperfect and sometimes 
asymmetrically held, and so on, they will not necessarily have the incentives to live up to the terms of their 
agreements (1991 p.122).  They therefore need to devise incentive schemes – monitoring, 





be anticipated at the time of transacting (ex ante) the parties can also alter incentives and device institutions 
and/or superior governance structures that promote compliance with bargains after the fact (Keohane, 
1984 p.95).  
In light of this, the credibility issue takes on an added urgency. What does this imply in the 
context of neo-patrimonial states and the GATS framework? It is argued that reforms 
such as the telecom privatisation model inherent in the GATS have been used as a policy 
output tool by the international donor and development institutions as a pre-condition for 
aid and any form of international support. Together with the IMF and World Bank, 
the WTO has created an ‘aid-cartel’ system in which the co-dependency between 
it and African states is based on a transaction cost namely ‘aid for trade’. This pre-
conditionality has thus been institutionalised and entrenched into the relationship between 
international institutions and neo-patrimonial states in Africa 
As observed earlier in this chapter, the principles outlined above are not only evidenced at 
the level of theory but are clearly evident in development strategies in Africa by 
international agencies which advocate reforms in government service provision. This 
articulates and enlivens at least two core tenets of NIE theory and the arguments 
proffered in this study. The first is the recognition of the role of the state and the second 
is that privatisation and economic reforms are not enough for development. As a policy 
tool then, NIE goes well beyond the approaches of economic development and suggests 
that the focus on the static analysis embodied in efficiency models is insufficient to foster 
efficient markets and development. NIE thus encompasses the pluralistic approach to 
economic life, paying close attention to the diversity of institutions, which are 
incorporated as potential constraints, and the practices and underlying conditions for 
economic activity (Ostrom, 1990). This applies to the WTO and has two significant 
implications for any member seeking to participate in the telecom sector. First, the GATS 
instruments dictate the terms of accession. Second, the relationship between member 
states and the WTO will largely depend on its manoeuvrability of the state in relation to 





‘rules of the game’ are not in favour of Kenya given its dependency on external aid for 
development. Moreover, as has been explained earlier, neo-patrimonial tendencies of 
governance, specifically where public goods are concerned suggest that a level of 
confrontation and/or failure to abide by the rules may take place. In the telecom context, 
it is precisely because of the need to address the risk of opportunism that the WTO 
GATS telecom instruments emerged.  
This study thus applies this claim to the WTO as an example of an international 
institution (working together with the IMF and World Bank), whose aim through the 
GATS telecom framework is to reduce uncertainty for potential investors in foreign 
telecom markets through the liberalisation process. As will be evidenced in chapter 4, 
tools such as the GATS become necessary in complex trading environments in which 
information is limited and asymmetrically held and rationally bounded. The quote below 
by Furubotn & Richter (1997, p.104), albeit applied to international agreements rather 
than trade pacts such as the GATS, but equally applicable to trade in telecom services and 
the reasons why the GATS accession is important to enhance credibility, aptly summarises 
the relevance and usefulness of NIE in the present study: 
…what is at issue is the definition, guarantee, and transfer of political or economic property 
rights. Transactions lead to implicit agreements, explicit (formal) treaties, or anything in 
between…The distributional problem is central: who gets what out of a lack of knowledge of 
what the future will bring, it is impossible for the parties to agree ex-ante on all future 
eventualities that may affect the relationship. Nor do they have the ability to verify all relevant 
variables…Transaction-specific investments are generally necessary, and thus ex post 
opportunism of the parties may be invited. Ex ante safeguards against ex post opportunism have 
to be arranged…Ex post dangers of contracting include expropriation, debt repudiation, 
confiscation, reneging, and other forms of opportunism. International contracts are involved, not 
only between governments but also between firms and governments across borders with respect to 





But how do international institutions such as the WTO ensure that binding agreements 
are made over space and time? Bardhan (1989) notes that the possibility of opportunism 
is less when transactions take place between two parties or where the exchange process is 
such that both parties have an ongoing mutual relationship and where the relationship is 
not protracted and non-simultaneous. A key application of addressing opportunism is to 
take (pre-commitment) measures to ensure trust between parties that the promises and 
undertakings made between them are ‘credible’, or more specifically, that they will be 
enforced and will be reneged upon when circumstances change or occasion to revive the 
rules at a later stage emerges. Looking at the broad characteristics of institutions-their 
ability to act as structures to govern relationships and prescribe, as well as enforce certain 
behaviours over time- this study argues that the WTO and specifically the GATS telecom 
instruments suggest rules for ordering negotiations, behaviours that must be engaged in 
(eg the requirements of the RP) and those that must be avoided.  
The GATS Fourth Protocol negotiation process aptly illustrates how the various interests 
and power dynamics, disparate development levels, as well as varying stages of domestic 
reform processes all contributed to the complex nature of the negotiation that was needed 
to ensure a critical mass of signatories. The GATS pre-commitments can be viewed as a 
means of reducing opportunism and legally constraining nations that would seek to 
otherwise ‘change their minds’ later in the process.  To be sure, the stakes for 
opportunism or self-interest remain high, given as was noted earlier, that neo-patrimonial 
state institutions in African countries serve as government agencies of power providing, 
for example, large sums of income to the government and funding from the private 
sector. It is because of this, it is argued, that if the GATS lacked flexible arrangements 
such as enabling domestic governments to schedule their own commitments, it would not 
have received the favourable support it did given that most developing countries such as 
Kenya, had placed strict limits on foreign participation to encourage domestic ownership 
and limit the repatriation of profits. The dependence of the GATS framework on the 
participation of states and the encouragement to open up markets for telecom investment 





More importantly, as suggested in this study, African neo-patrimonial states utilise their 
public institutions as a means of political power and as opportunities for rent-seeking 
behaviours. With regard to the bargaining context, the precise problem to be avoided 
during the negotiations for the Fourth Protocol, in particular, was to minimise the risk of 
‘free riders’ and induce a critical mass of countries willing to open their domestic markets 
while benefiting from the open markets of others. Thus, at the heart of the GATS 
framework is the idea that telecom would now not be in the hands of the state. As is 
documented in the following chapters, this was no easy task and it is precisely the risk of 
free riders coupled with a lack of trust that signatories might alter their regulatory 
promises after the fact that the RP (key conditionality outputs) and its disciplines came 
into focused analysis. 
The commitment of the GATS rules that guarantee the liberalisation process at the 
domestic level is therefore a significant issue for the WTO. The extent of commitment to 
the GATS is best seen through its effect on markets. For example, the USA Government 
calculated that approximately 85 percent of the world market, measured by revenues, is 
covered by strong market access commitments in the WTO (Cowhey & Klimenko, 2001). 
The implication of this statistic is that doing business in the global arena, be it in trade 
goods or services, requires an agreement governed by the WTO. Moreover, recent figures 
from the WTO place trade services firmly within the GPE, estimating that the value of 
international cross-border services trade now accounts for an in excess of  US$ 1345 
billion annually (WTO, 2005).57 Thus, even if a government did not make binding 
commitments to liberalising its economy, the GATS commitments are still valuable as 
they are enforceable. The GATS telecom framework is an important policy tool for 
analysis as this is the framework that will shape future policy outcomes and contexts for 
service trading globally.  
                                                 





Previous empirical studies using NIE all indicated the importance of a broader interaction 
between institutional environment and domestic policy processes. Keohane (1984) 
himself has applied NIE and TCE to the formation of international regimes in examining 
broader questions of co-operation in a variety of contexts. The study of NIE has also 
increasingly been utilised in policy studies as a theoretical tool for social science research 
in the telecom sector. A notable example and the only existing study of this nature in the 
telecom sector in Africa, is Tracy Cohen’s (2004) study on the telecom sector in South 
Africa which examines the crucial role of the GATS as a credibility tool for the South 
African government and also as a credibility tool for South Africa in the standing of other 
African states as an economic super-power. Another notable example is Spiller and Levy’s 
(1996) comparative research in five countries examining the interaction between social 
and legal institutions on the design of regulatory structures. They note that performance 
can still be satisfactory even in undeveloped institutions provided there are restraints and 
appropriate discretionary actions by the regulator. In a more general context, Wilson 
(2004) and Singh (1999) examine telecom policy outcomes and seek to explain these 
outcomes as the result of structural contexts such as politics. For example, Wilson (2004) 
asserts that political structures and political preferences in the policy process have had a 
direct influence on the outcomes of telecom policy implementation. NIE therefore offers 
this study a framework upon which to understand the WTO’s GATS telecom framework.  
Nonetheless, three brief points require noting. First, beyond suggesting that institutions 
are not always efficient, North’s account does not fully consider the diverse, distinctive 
and often unequal attributes and endowments of individual or collective actors to 
participate in the structures that institutions manifest or impose. Significant in this study, 
therefore, is the contextual underpinning of neo-patrimonial theory against that of 
transaction costs. While the above studies have sought to explain telecom policy 
outcomes from the perspectives of institutions, this study employs an understanding of 
neo-patrimonial politics to explain how African states interact with the international 
context within the concept of transaction costs. By locating a historical understanding of 





the study addresses the gap inherent in NIE by specifically questioning the objective 
approach to institutions in light of developing countries differing abilities to meaningfully 
participate in the creation and renegotiation of the rules, norms and principles that 
underpin global institutions.  
This underscores Knight’s primary critique of the NIE; that is its failure to address the 
importance of power asymmetries and instead focus on the problem of transaction cost 
minimisation among symmetrically endowed actors (Knight, 1992 p.113). This is important for 
the case study in the context of the WTO and Kenya where its history reflects these 
disparate bargaining power asymmetries. Bargaining asymmetry is discussed further in 
chapter 7, where it is noted that the capacity to adequately garner the option to use the 
GATS is completely dependent on a country’s relative capacity to participate in the trade 
negotiation regime. This is also noted by Ensminger (1997) in his article on property 
rights to land in Africa which notes that the institutional environment and the existence of 
(Western defined) property rights and the economic agents simply tend to assume that 
choices are made within an assumed decision set.  He notes that in African countries, 
property rights are based on social understanding of the context such as historical kin 
ownership and thus informal rules dictate the ‘rules of the game’.  
Second, on a cautionary note, North (1989; 1993) points out that credible commitments 
are not a panacea for the problems of development and concedes that describing the 
characteristics of institutional or economic change are quite different to prescribing how 
to improve the performance of economies. He maintains, however, that the fundamental 
characteristics of institutions do provide some guidance and offer some explanation. This 
is a view also held by Peters (1999) and Lowndes (2002). It is in this vein that Peters 
(1999, p.150) asserts that institutions are the variable that explain most of political life, and they are 
also the factors that require explanation”. The concept of transaction costs thus offers “an organising 
perspective (Gamble, 1990 p.405) to explain the interwoven relationship between the GATS 





Third, it should be noted that in the absence of empirical studies the enforcement aspect 
of the GATS in regard to telecom remains ostensibly untested and offers little insight into 
how those not abiding will be treated or how the WTO will react. Several disputes have 
been logged to date and the pronouncement suggests enforcement through compliance.58 
The literature, however, notes that to be credible a commitment must be irreversible or at least 
very costly to do so (Shepsle, 1991 p2-4). Keohane (1984,) offers an explanatory note on this 
issue. He opines that institutions derive their value not by promoting enforcement rules 
(because they have no real enforcement powers) but by contributing to cooperation 
between states by changing the bargaining context within which states make their (self-
interested) decisions. In this light he sees commitments or rules not as restricting states 
but rather as a means of empowering them by promoting cooperation. In addition, North 
and Weingast (1989) suggest that compliance can be reduced when the institutions 
anticipate the problems and seek to meet them through incentives. In this context, the 
Fourth Protocol to the GATS adequately addresses this concern. As will be demonstrated, 
the GATS offers a flexible time-frame for implementation, allowing for the existence of 
domestic telecom monopolies and exemption rules of national treatment for limited 
periods. Like its counterpart the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),59 the 
GATS also contains a safeguard clause in Article XIV, provided that certain conditions 
are met.60 Nonetheless, while GATS commitments are not irreversible, altering a 
                                                 
58 See WTO: Disputes section: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm# for a list of the countries 
that have put in complaints.  
59 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade {GATT}, Oct.30, 1947, Art. XXV.TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS194. The 
current version of the GATT is in Annex 1A to the WTO charter, THE LEGAL TEXTS.  
60 Article XIV specifies general exemptions to the GATS which include measures to protect public morals or maintain 
public order, to prevent human, animal or plant or health life, to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are 





commitment once scheduled is no simple task61 and being known as a country reneging 
on its commitments is not a role to which a state aspires.  
Notwithstanding the above, a broad NIE has been usefully employed to examine the 
problem of credible commitment in exchange and offer a rich context in which to frame 
an understanding of the value of the GATS in the present study as shall be examined in 
chapter 4. As the GATS, through the RP offers a common set of regulatory principles 
and practices recognised by all WTO members and hence an avenue for appeal through 
the WTO processes,62 it is a useful tool in enhancing credibility between member states 
2.8 Conclusion 
This central aim of this chapter was to present the theoretical framework framing the 
study. This chapter has drawn on the theoretical concepts of neo-patrimonialism to 
explain the importance of the political, economic and social structure of African states. 
The chapter further sought to establish the link between African states and the 
international arena. Utilising selective principles of the NIE to explain the position and 
importance of the international institutions relative to African states, the chapter adopted 
a broad definition of institutions as a set of devised rules and norms that govern, shape 
and structure human interaction by helping them to form expectations of what other 
states will do (Shepsle, 1991).  
                                                 
61 There are four ways in which a country can modify, suspend or withdraw a commitment: First, any commitment must 
may be withdrawn or modified after it has been in force for three years. On request ‘compensation’ may need to be 
negotiated with members who feel their trade position has been affected. Second, Article XIV of the General 
Exemptions to the GATS can be invoked through is generally only applicable to where issues of ‘public interest’ need 
to be protected. This could include for example: national security or human safely. Third, a government may seek a 
temporary waiver and finally, a member may suspend commitments in the event of serious financial problems. 
62 While the WTO provides an enforcement mechanism, although still largely unproven, The GATS still remain a 
binding commitment. Case law is limited where enforcement is concerned however. Arup [Arup, C. (2000). The New 
World Trade Organisation Agreements: Globalising Law Through Services and Intellectual Property. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press] suggests that the GATS decentralised negotiation process and the inherent specifities of the various 





In relation to this study, emphasis has been placed on the attempt to explain how 
institutions reduce transaction costs inherent in reaching agreements on complex 
exchanges for financial aid development assistance to African neo-patrimonial states. It 
was thus argued that ‘aid-cartel’ institutions structure the norms, cognitive and regulative 
frameworks that dictate the relationship between African neo-patrimonial states and 
international aid institutions. Applied to trade in telecom in African neo-patrimonial 
states, the specific mischief sought to be addressed is that member states do not renege on 
their commitments to liberalise their markets or service sectors and more so that a 
number of standardised measures to ensure fair play will be assured for foreign operators 
who enter domestic markets. As suggested in this study, these conditionalities are pegged 
on the exchange of the subtle but often present need for financial assistance. The need for 
credibility to gain financial assistance is therefore a topmost priority for many African 
states. This urgency is borne out more so in African neo-patrimonial states where the 
functioning of the state suggests that opportunism and self-interest are the norm rather 
than the exception. It is within this framework therefore that the study’s hypothesis is 
borne out.  
Hypothesis  
In applying commitments as a form of credibility, neo-patrimonial states necessarily only 
partly conform to the conditionalities and have instead utilised these reform agendas as 
platforms to further their own underlying interests.  
Three assumptions are drawn from this hypothesis based on the framework in this 
chapter. 
1) That the Kenyan state is neo-patrimonial in which Kenyan elites utilise forms of 
clientelism to maintain their political authority and positions. 






3) That in creating a transaction cost, the GATS legitimises telecom policy actions at 
domestic level. 
The contribution of this chapter and therefore this research lies in its analytical framework 
for developing critical analysis of how the policy can be understood within the context of 
African states. Drawing on the three themes, namely clientelism, co-dependency and 
conditionality or what NIE theorises as a transaction cost, chapters 4 to 7 present 
evidence in support of the arguments presented in this chapter. In conclusion, as Dickens 
observes too often critical social scientists have contended themselves with providing critiques of traditional 
research without engaging in empirical research of their own (Dickens, 1983 p.155). While falling 
short of critical theory in not providing a strategic guide for bringing about an alternative order 
(Cox, 1981 p.130), the utilisation of a combined framework exposing an understanding of 
both the national and international context of telecom reform offers a deeper 
understanding of how the two usually separate contexts are linked.  
This research seeks to provide a ‘formative’ evaluation, where the object is to improve 
upon the understanding of the telecom policy-making process in neo-patrimonial states 
rather than provide a ‘summative’ evaluation where the object is to give a score (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989) to the GATS policy being evaluated. The self-reflexivity of the research is 





3  C h a p t e r  t h r e e  
THE JOURNEY OF LEARNING 
Knowing what you want to find out leads inexorably to the question of how you will get that 
information  
Miles and Huberman 
( 1984 p.42).  
Introduction 
Following on from the preview of the research methodology outlined in chapter 1, this 
chapter provides additional detail on the methodology and fieldwork undertaken to collect 
data and analyse the research questions. It describes the way the research project 
unfolded, the approaches employed to select the research case study and the research 
sites, the selection of respondents and the protocol used. The findings and discussion 
follow in chapters 4 to 7. The aim of this chapter is to describe my process of learning 
from the state of tentative questioning to the point where possible answers to the research 
questions have been obtained.  
3.1 Research questions: 
As indicated in chapter 1 and developed in chapter 2, the main research inquiry which 
dictated the study’s research was to explain Kenya’s telecom reform outcomes through an 
analysis of the political and international context shaping the framing and implementation 
of the KCA. In order to draw out answers, four subsidiary questions were formulated, 
namely: 
1) What is the nature of policy making in Kenya? 





3) How has Kenya’s approach of policy making influenced the telecom outcomes? 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the research strategies used to gain the primary 
data. 
3.2 Considerations for research design 
The choice of research questions for this study was chosen through a consideration of a 
number of issues raised in chapter 1. This relates specifically to the positioning of the 
study as discussed in chapters 1 and 2 and my own previous background working in the 
telecom sector in Africa as explained in chapter 1.  Apart from the assumptions raised in 
chapter 1 which influence this research, this study was also influenced by five 
methodological inadequacies highlighted in chapter 1. First, there is an unfair privileging 
of telecom outcomes over the telecom policy process itself. Second, the framework used 
is inherently techno-deterministic in the way it views actors as ‘machines’ that do not play 
a role in the policy process. Third, there is a preoccupation with perceiving telecom as the 
solution to development problems in developing countries. The corollary that telecom will 
create development has thus normalised the concept of poverty as static. Fourth, there is a 
tendency for telecom literature to focus on diffusion patterns and therefore place 
emphasis on structure over agency. While this study acknowledged in chapters 1 and 2 
that structural issues are an important explanatory variable for outcomes, telecom 
diffusion rates are inadequate in explaining how agency and structure operate. Fifth, while 
there are obvious differences to what constitutes telecom policy or the term ‘digital 
divide’, there is an inherent assumption to view the term ICT as neutral concepts that 
needed no elaboration.  
The privileging of the above issues has therefore sustained a narrow view of the world of 
telecom, which has mainly employed the use of quantitative analysis in the study of 
telecom policy outcomes. In this respect, Singh (1999), Wilson (2004) and Mosco (1996) 
acknowledge that quantitative studies have plagued the telecom research and are ill suited 





inadequacy, most studies accept that quantitative studies lend a focus on structural issues 
such as teledensity, number of mobiles in a country and the number of internet users. 
This is not to say that these authors reject quantitative statistics or that these indicators are 
not useful. However, in employing these indicators in their research these authors use 
them illustratively rather than as the focus of creating meaning. 
This study lends particular weighting to a qualitative framework as it seeks to understand 
the role of actors in the policy process. This means that the research methods employed 
were based on the underlying premise that the use of research methods that collect 
baseline data on variables such as the number of telephones in the country and other 
useful macro-level information are secondary to the research methods that ascertain 
meaning and context. A qualitative methodology was thus chosen to explore meanings 
and gain understanding of the deeper issues that operate in the policy arena. It has also 
been argued that qualitative research can overcome the implicit problems of context 
stripping, exclusion of meaning and purpose, inapplicability of data to individual cases, 
and the exclusion of the discovery dimension often found in quantitative studies (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2003). All these issues are central to this study. Indeed, this is not to suggest 
that qualitative research solves the problems of quantitative research. Rather than trying to 
find ways to reduce the effects of uncontrollable social variables, quantitative research 
investigates them directly. In addition, Holliday (2002, p.4)) notes that qualitative research 
describes actions within a specific setting and invites rather than tries to control the possibility of a rich 
array of variables. Data from different sources is used to collaborate, elaborate and 
illuminate the research. This is seen to strengthen the research’s usefulness within the 
setting of telecom policy.  
The research plan was further influenced by one study imperative - the need to locate the 
data collected within critical political theory. A dialectic (Lincoln & Guba, 2000) 
framework in methodological approach is therefore commensurate with this study. 
Moreover, it serves as a secure base from which to gain an understanding of the particular 





theories view social research as the analyses of social meaning (Hall, 2004). Knowledge of 
a phenomenon is better understood as something that emerges from a discursive 
interaction or dialectical clash of competing interpretations. As a result, explanations of 
phenomena are not limited to one view but are subjected to a range of analysis that seek 
to explain the phenomena from different standpoints. The aim is to not see the advantage 
or disadvantage of one viewpoint over another but rather to seek to explain the issue 
from all angles and give a full account of how and why events took place.  
An interpretive interaction is thus sought in this study. As Fischer (2003) points out: only 
by examining data through conflicting frameworks or standpoints can unrecognised and hidden 
suppositions that give it meaning be uncovered or exposed (p.131). Taking this view on board, data 
and data findings in this study are viewed as the products of a chain of interpretive 
judgments (Toulmin 1990). This, Fischer (2003) argues is especially appropriate to the 
study of politics and policy. More significantly, this study provides a detailed analysis of 
telecom policy making as it engages directly not only with the institutions (actors) directly 
engaged in the telecom policy-making process in Kenya (domestically and internationally), 
but also with the GATS framework and its implementation in Kenya through the KCA. 
With these underlying principles identified, the research design was determined.  
3.3 Case study design 
Yin (1994) argues that the selection of a case study should confirm, challenge or extend 
the research and should provide revelatory information that has not been privy to 
previous observers. The analysis of Kenya’s telecom policy-making process therefore fits 
this criterion in which the main purpose of the research is not only to extend theory but 
to reveal information about the nature and process of policy making.  In addition, with 
the exception of South Africa and Egypt, Kenya’s role as a leader in political issues in 
Africa stands out not only regionally but internationally.  
The choice of the term ‘case study’ in this research is used to refer to three contexts: 





meso level refers to Kenya’s participation in telecom policy issues through the WTO and 
finally, a micro-level analysis refers to the case of telecom policy making in Kenya. The 
focus on Kenya is used not as the main purpose of the study but rather as an instrument 
(Stake, 2004) to provide insight into the telecom policy arena. Yin (1994) calls this method 
an ‘embedded case study design’ in which sub-levels of the case are analysed (as opposed 
to holistic design which deals with examines only the global nature of a problem). 
However, he argues that the rationale for the case study should fit in with the criterion of 
a case study. While both have strengths and weaknesses, he argues that an embedded 
design facilitates a focusing on sub-units of the study. He also warns that there is a danger 
in focusing on the sub-units and forgetting to return the study to the larger unit of 
analysis. Taking head of this warning, this study has endeavoured to provide a detailed 
analysis of Kenya’s policy-making process and in doing so ensures that the focus on all 
sub-unit analysis remains on the issue of Kenya’s application of the GATS framework. 
The focus on sub-units such as institutional relationships serves to enrich and provide 
further detail. 
Originally I had intended to provide a comparative case study across countries in Africa. I 
had limited my framework to two countries, one in West Africa and the other, Kenya.  As 
the research proceeded, it became clear that this was going to prove impossible for the 
nature of a PhD. Confirmation that this method would not suffice was provided by the 
review of the literature, which prompted the focus on a single country. In addition, my 
initial letters to the Ghanaian Government in the initial five months of study revealed that 
I would need a lot of patience and some help in gaining access to the respondents. As a 
consequence, a different (but related) approach was chosen - to focus on Kenya as the 
country of case study and provide an in-depth analysis of the events that took place.  This 
proved to be a better choice as my knowledge of the political terrain, my relationships 
with Government political leaders and bureaucrats, my working knowledge of the telecom 
and my ability to ‘piggy back’ on my network of friends in the sector, would facilitate my 
access inside the corridors of power. In spite of this, I was later to find out that 





I choose to mention the above issues as I consider them an important feature of 
fieldwork analysis particularly in African countries. Unlike the West where information is 
often readily available, in Kenya, the provision of information can be equated to 
rescinding ‘power’. Thus information is tightly held and elites wield this to their political 
advantage. Lee (1995), in his book ‘Doing research on sensitive topics’ discusses issues on 
collecting data from sites or on topics considered sensitive and notes that it is important 
to understand the subtleties of the terrain of investigation.  Fuller (1988) on the other 
hand draws attention to the role of the state in creating and maintaining what she calls 
‘forbidden research terrains’. While I would not consider Kenya’s telecom policy making 
terrain a ‘forbidden research landscape’, I was aware that the state was weary of 
researchers drawing any attention to them. This was evidenced by the fact that I had to go 
through long and sometimes unnecessary bureaucratic process to get permission to 
interview policy participants and members of Parliament.  
Since I could not anticipate the exact numbers of interview participants or meetings and 
observations that I would be allowed to attend, my initial attempts to gaining access were 
broad, with letters sent to every institution partaking in policy (as depicted from the policy 
document itself (KCA, 1998), readings from the press and contacts with colleagues in 
Kenya). As noted in chapter 1, I was keen to locate myself within the policy and 
regulatory offices which I had hoped would provide me with data and a spin off into my 
research. The details of that process are discussed in the methodology section in chapter 1 
and require no further repeating here. 
I also requested to attend international meetings; more specifically I was keen to attend 
the WTO regional meetings in which Kenya took part, as well as the World Summit on 
the Information Society (WSIS)63 meeting. I considered that such meetings would provide 
                                                 
63 The UN General Assembly Resolution 56/183 (21 December 2001) endorsed the holding of the WSIS in two phases. 
The first phase took place in Geneva from 10 to 12 December 2003 and the second phase took place in Tunis, from 
the 16th to 18th November 2005. Its aims and objectives were to find solutions for creating an Information Society for 
all. While WSIS as a subject is not covered in this study, it is noted that participation in the WSIS has implications for 





a broader access to individuals I may not have met in Kenya, more so, in meeting 
personalities involved in the WTO negotiations. This proved useful as shall be later 
discussed in the analysis chapters. Uncertain of the reply I would receive, I also sent 
supplementary letters to both the WSIS organising committee and WTO respectively. In 
the WSIS letter I asked the organising committee (UNECA and ITU) if I could attend the 
conference under the banner of civil society (academic), explaining that I was there to 
observe and interview participants taking part in the deliberations of Africa’s position on 
the WSIS issues as part of a wider study on policy making. 
The responses I received from the Kenyan Government were pleasant, asking me to 
present myself in Kenya before further negotiating details and formalities in attending the 
WTO meetings. In the meantime, UNECA confirmed that I could attend both the 
Bamako (November 2003 conference) and Ghana WSIS (February 2005) regional 
meetings. The discussion in chapter 7 thus in part draws on the issues of participation 
observed while attending those meetings. Moreover the meetings also provided further 
opportunity to interview individuals such as the WTO representative with whom I had 
been communicating on email. While there were no WTO meetings relevant to the study 
while I was in the field, I had first hand interviews with the Kenyan participants in WTO 
meetings and the NCWTO team as well as email discussions as shall be discussed later in 
this chapter. In addition, the research involved observations of two key telecom policy 
meetings in Kenya, one commissioned by the Government and the other by stakeholder 
interests groups. In addition, I talked to most of the participants in the telecom reform 
process. This was done through attending meetings and visiting sites with staff members 
of KCA and Telkom.  In total, I interviewed 70 individuals representing all sectors of 
Government and non-government involved/and or interested in the telecom policy-
making process of Kenya (domestically and internationally). 
I was also fortunate that once in the field, the network of contacts I had built over the 
years as a Kenyan professional facilitated unstructured interviews with past and present 





regional meeting as a representative of Kenya under the banner of the Women’s Gender 
Caucus which then provided further meetings with senior Government policy-makers 
who had initially proved difficult to meet with. In addition, CCK (the regulator of the 
telecom sector) sent letters to all its networks letting them know that I would be 
conducting interviews and making observations of the policy-making process. This 
proved to be a key aid in my access to several organisations and individuals. Nonetheless, 
as briefly noted in chapter 1, it was difficult to find current statistics on the telecom sector 
and the Kenya Bureau of Statistics, had little to offer where telecom statistics were 
needed. Interviews with the policy unit of CCK (the regulator) later revealed that they too 
had difficultly collecting data from service providers.  
3.4 Multi-method data collection 
In seeking to understand the nature of policy making in Kenya, the use of a multi-method 
design was deemed appropriate. Multi-method or triangulation (as it is also called), is used 
to ensure transferability and conformability (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). Data from 
different sources is thus used to corroborate, elaborate and illuminate the research. This is 
seen to strengthen the study’s usefulness within the setting of policy. Qualitative 
researchers in the field acknowledge this, noting that qualitative research is inherently 
multi-method in focus (Brewer and Hunter 1989; Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). In addition, 
Yin (2003) and Bryman (2001) confirm that triangulation is a process common to most 
types of case studies and provides a strategy that seeks to add rigour, breath and depth to 
the investigation of the study.64 Among the types of instruments considered for this study 
are documents and archival records, statistical information, direct observations, 
participant observations and interviews. The methods used are discussed in the following 
sections of the chapter. 
                                                 
64 For further discussion see Flick, U. (1992). Triangulation revisited: strategy for validation or alternative? Journal for the 





3.4.1 Interviews and participant selection 
The participants were identified based on the reading of policy-documents, their coverage 
in the main local papers – the Standard, Nation and The EastAfrican and their role in policy 
making as depicted through the KCA and my knowledge of the players in the industry. In 
addition, the ‘snowball’ technique which combines positional and reputational criteria in 
the identification of elites was used to identify potential respondents and institutions. A 
list of formal policy makers in core committee meetings was compiled as well as a list of 
titular heads of each organisation.65 Other executive personnel as well as bureaucrats 
involved in assisting these elites and working in the institutions were also contacted.  In 
total I had the names of 20 actors involved in the policy process. Positional respondents 
were then asked to identify those they considered to have been involved in the telecom 
policy-making process. On the basis of this, a further 52 respondents were included in the 
sample.66 A list of main respondents, incorporating reference to the organisations with 
which they are affiliated is provided in table 1 on the next page. 
                                                 
65 Their actual titles vary from organisation to organisation for example, Director in the case of CCK and 
Communications Coordinator in the case of the National Communications Secretariat. (NCS). 






While many were contacted by letter and telephone, the success rate of those who agreed 





behalf from CCK and the Ministry of Education explaining the nature of my study. 
Approximately 90 percent of those approached agreed to the interviews, the remaining 10 
percent declined.  
The above decline rate is based on the lack of response and the lack of access to certain 
individuals as no formal letter of decline was received. Notable among those who did not 
respond, despite numerous phone calls and personal calls to his office was the then 
Minister of Communication (2003-2004) who asked me to talk to the NCS. Nonetheless I 
did manage to interview the Minister of Education and the Minister of Transport and 
Information. As luck or fate would have it, Ministry of Communication and Ministry of 
Transport and Information were later to merge into one institution, with the then 
Minister of Transport and Information (whom I had interviewed) taking the lead role as 
Minister. In addition, my attendance at the Bamako and Ghana WSIS regional meetings, 
further allowed me to interview WTO representatives of Kenya.  
As well as identifying respondents using positional and snowball techniques, informal 
discussions with fellow professionals in the field as well as media reporters and political 
grassroots leaders were contacted. I conducted the interviews using a conversational style 
format that guided the interviews by questions and discussions. Un-rigid structured 
interviews were employed (Hall, 2005; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003), whereby I conversed 
with the respondents concerning the general topics and themes in which I was interested. 
Moreover, the lack of rigidity allowed the respondents to structure and define the issue 
and problem within telecom policy making as they saw it. Open-ended questions were 
used in soliciting answers. In some cases, where elites requested questions in advance, the 
provision of a list of open ended questions proved useful in making them feel at ease. 
While this ensured that the core issues were covered, the interview content was otherwise 
shaped by respondents’ answers and no attempt was made to constrain respondents to a 
predetermined line of questioning unless the topics swayed away from the main issue of 





In the review of my first few interviews, I noted that many of the respondents preferred 
an open style forum discussion in which they could just talk. This review then allowed me 
to structure the questions more appropriately. In addition, while the intention had been to 
record all interviews via a digital recorder, the majority of the Government respondents 
were not keen on this and requested that I switch it off. Rather then provide an initial 
ground of hostility, I ceased to carry the digital recorder for the remaining Government 
interviews and instead made notes as the discussion proceeded. Perhaps the attitude to 
digital recording had something to do with the nature and view of information. As noted 
earlier, soliciting information is an issue that is linked to the lack of a fully democratic and 
‘open society’ in which information is freely given. While Kenyans would like to think of 
themselves as democratic, Government control is still very much present. This is an issue 
that Singh (1999) notes in his view of the role of the state in developing countries as 
reviewed in the previous chapter. Another possible explanation for the fear of digital 
recording lies in the fact that where respondents were based within an institution, some of 
their views were contrary to the institutional goals. As a result they would in many cases 
request that I not record their personal views where a critique was made of the 
organisation for which they worked. The interviews covered a range of topics in policy-
making processes.  For example: the actors involved and how decisions were made. 
The richness of the data collected in these interviews did not vary considerably. However, 
where they did, this could be traced back to two factors. In the first instance, the amount 
and extent of experience that the interviewee had in telecom policy making over the years 
1997 - 2005 impacted on the depth and expansiveness of their contribution. This can be 
attributed to the change in Government which took place in December 2002 when the 
former ruling party, KANU, was defeated by the Opposition party. As a result, new 
members of Parliament and various bureaucratic offices were appointed. Being aware of 
this, I ensured that interviews were also conducted with previous office bearers. 
Moreover, a change in position in most cases was at senior level and others in the 
organisation were usually left intact. These individuals provided continuity where response 





was also influenced by their perceptions of organisational expectations and political 
correctness. The interpretations of the data therefore bear on these limitations.  
I took the opportunity to also conduct interviews at the end of telecom meetings and 
participated as an observer during the sessions. In as much as I was in Kenya and 
international meetings in my capacity as a researcher, many of the Kenyan participants as 
well as the members of the Organising Committee and other participants some of whom 
I was familiar, regarded me as one of their own. This was because I had initially presented 
a paper at the pre-WSIS meeting as a guest panel speaker and had associated with many of 
the respondents on different levels. In the Ghana WSIS conference I was asked to speak 
as a panel speaker in the ministerial conference. I spoke on the role of women in telecom 
and thus veered away from the issues in my thesis which I felt would make me biased. 
Doing so led to many more contacts for interviews as well as conversations with many 
African delegates that provided deeper insight into the nature of policy making at the 
regional level. The WSIS meetings provided a microscopic assessment of the decision 
making process at international and regional level. The analysis also augmented interviews 
conducted in Kenya, in which mythology about a process was enacted. Interviews were 
conducted with five Kenyan Government and two private sector participants present at 
the conference. A standard format questionnaire was administered to the interviewees 
with discussions on issues of the participation.   
In Kenya, I attended two telecom meetings. The Government through CCK in 
September 2003 sponsored one and the other was sponsored by IDRC in February 2004. 
In both meetings, I was merely an observer jotting down notes and mingling informally 
with various participants during the session breaks. Both meetings facilitated contacts for 
subsequent interviews. In the main, insights drawn from attendance to these conferences 
have been used to add colour and depth to the nature of telecom policy making. This 
supplemented the interview material and shifted the focus onto the structure and nature 





of the main tensions and schisms that Africa (and Kenya) is dealing with in international 
decision making. 
3.4.2 Email interviews and discussions 
Apart from face-to-face interviews, email group discussions provided complementary 
information. Most notable of these email discussions was the Kenya telecom policy 
network. This email group discussion proved a key source of information and also 
produced a number of key interviews via email (the email list was begun in late 2004 after 
I had left Kenya). The range of participants in the email list comes from stakeholders 
(Government and non-government) and is administered by IDRC. As such, permission 
has to be gained to join and consideration given to those mainly involved in telecom 
projects. The majority of the participants in the email listing are both from the 
Government and the NGO community. My request to have a list of members provided 
was denied based on policy protocol of the IDRC. However, I made myself known to the 
group not only as a professional in the field but as a researcher. I channelled my questions 
to various individuals who had made their contacts known and the ‘snowball’ technique 
was used to gather more names of participants on the list. Where I had questions to ask 
participants in the group email, I emailed them individually. The questions asked were 
similar to the questions already raised. The significance of this group email is that it 
provided information on the telecom process as perceived by telecom civil society 
participants. In addition, I was later made a key participant of the Kenya telecom policy 
group which therefore facilitated further interaction into the issues of policy making from 
a civil society perspective. 
3.4.3 Proposed survey 
I also attempted to compile a list of all Kenyan Government representatives who had 
attended international WTO telecom meetings from 1997-2005. I had wanted to compare 
who they were, their role, the organisations they came from, the frequency of attendance 





want to emphasise that while it would have been useful to have this data to complement 
the interviews, the fact that this was not possible does not negate the study. Instead, as 
with all interviews, I inquired of the nature of participation in regional and international 
meetings and, in turn, was also provided with more names from their institutions to 
whom I could refer. In many cases, the positional respondents were the very same 
delegates who attended these meetings.  
3.4.4 Documentary analysis 
An array of primary source documents pertaining to telecom policy issues as well as policy 
documents and meetings notes from many of the institutions involved in policy were used 
to gather the data analysed herein. They include: 
• Meeting minutes from several Government offices as well non-government 
organisations 
• Policy and legislation documents from Parliament. Apart from the KCA, several 
different versions of the draft telecom policy exist which were also availed to me 
• Kenya Bureau of Statistics data and local newspaper data as well as emails from 
reporters on what was happening on the ground 
• Personal documents - a number of respondents gave me personal documents and 
copies of their minutes in Government policy meetings which provided further detail.  
• Confidential reports - these were mostly ‘in-house’ documents prepared by members 
of various committees of the telecom policy team. The most notable of these were 
those drafted by CCK (the regulator) and NCS (the Government policy adviser). As 
with personal documents, these were given to me by respondents who did not want 
to be identified, but who gave me permission to use them for doctoral research. In 
some cases, however, I was only allowed to read the information and not take it out 





A wide array of secondary material was also used extensively. Notable here are academic 
publications (books and journals), telecom websites and policy forums. While documents 
are stable, unobtrusive and can have broad coverage (Yin, 2003), they do have some 
weakness. More specifically, where websites are concerned, they can be selectively biased 
and can contain reporting bias. However, at face value information from government 
websites as well as international governance institutions (such as the WTO) have to be 
presumed to be accurate in relation to statistics, value statements and publicity of 
government projects.  
In particular and worth noting was the documentary evidence gained from newspaper 
articles and listening to the online radio broadcasts through the internet.67  The 
broadcasts, along with relevant reports and newspaper articles sent to me from Kenya, 
enabled me to follow the telecom reform process while in Australia. 
3.4.5 GATS and KCA reading 
In addition to seeking legal expertise as discussed in chapter 1, an understanding of the 
GATS framework was made possible through the WTO website which has endeavoured 
to break down all legal documents with supplementary readings. In addition, through 
online purchase of WTO readings, I was able to read WTO interpretations of legal issues 
and the various issues with the GATS framework, which is reflected in this study.  
As noted in chapter 1, the KCA analysis was achieved with the help of CCK staff and Mr 
Bernard Sihanya, one of the original consultants in the drafting of the KCA. In addition, I 
ordered my own hard copies of the KCA through the Government of Kenya printers as 
well as all subsequent gazetted amendments.  
                                                 





3.5 Data analysis 
The data analysis in this study emulates the grounded theory approach. This approach is 
concerned with the development of theory from the data and is iterative or recursive in 
that the data collection and analysis are in reciprocal relationship that is mutually affective. 
Debates about grounded theory approaches are vibrant and its use not easily contained or 
defined (Silverman, 2005). The tools of grounded theory used in this study are informed 
by the neo-patrimonial literature which seeks to analyse how the nature of neo-
patrimonial relationships affected the telecom reform process. As such, the analysis of the 
data is grounded in political critical/constructionist theory that seeks to understand the 
world of policy making. This process enhances the triangulation approach while also 
bridging the gap between theory and empirical research. Further discussion on this is 
provided through the themes of ethics, validity and the role of the researcher. 
3.5.1 Ethics 
The ethical questions reflected in the process of collecting, collating and presenting this 
study included issues such as: informed consent, confidentiality, and bias. Formal ethics 
clearance were obtained from both the University of New South Wales (UNSW) and the 
Government of Kenya. In addition, all participation was voluntary and every effort made 
to ensure confidence was maintained by the signing of a confidentiality agreement.  Some 
respondents required a guarantee of confidentiality before they would allow me to 
interview them. Most requested that I did not acknowledge the origin of particular 
comments, while others were quite happy to have the rest of their remarks attributed to 
them. Approximately 60 percent of respondents expressed concerns about confidentiality.  
Majority of those who did, however worked for various Government ministries.  
In order to respect and protect the identity of those who did not wish to be identified 
(either in whole or in part), numbers have been attributed to all respondents including 
those who were happy to have all their comments formally cited. Proceeding in this 





arising based on respondents citing comments ‘on the record’ and ‘off the record’. The 
only exception to the use of numbers however was when comments or opinions were 
cited as a matter of public record. For example, as cited in written documents or 
expressed in speeches.  
3.5.2 Validity and reliability 
As indicated earlier, the interview data has largely been used qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively. Silverman (2005), notes that the issue of validity has been one thorny issue 
within various paradigms and suggest that it be viewed within the constructs of 
authenticity (fairness) and ethical relationship. This study therefore upholds the 
perspectives, claim, concerns and voices of all interviews (as stakeholders) in the policy 
process. The recollections recorded in the interviews have not been semiotically 
interrogated or systematically deconstructed, but rather have been used in a more straight 
forward manner, as albeit value-impregnated descriptions of events as remembered by 
respondents. Thus, some of the information has been treated as ‘fact’. For example, 
statements made of the type x, y and z were involved in policy A, or a given meeting 
occurred at such and such a time and at such and such a place. Other information on the 
other hand has been treated not so much as ‘fact’ but as a ‘perspective’ on events-most 
notably when respondents attempted to give reasons or explain why this or that 
happened.  
‘Perspective’, as is used above, has a good deal in common with Weber’s notion of 
‘motive’ which he defined as a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor himself or to 
the observer as an adequate ground for the conduct in question (1947 p.98-99). As already explained, 
many of the interview questions were intended to elicit ‘perspective’-type information 
because gaining some understanding of why respondents took the positions they did, or 
why a process happened the way it did, was a high priority for the intended outcomes of 
this research. It should be reiterated that is not the intention of this study to provide an 





unquestionable ‘truths’. Rather, the aim of this study is to understand telecom outcomes 
through the political and international context that shapes its identification and 
implementation. I have thus tried to include the range of perspectives or explanations 
proffered so as to highlight the variation in the goals, values and frames of reference that 
informed the strategic political choices made by the major actors in the telecom policy 
process.  
3.5.3 The role of the researcher 
The issues of validity raised above therefore imply an acknowledgment of my role as 
researcher as partly discussed all through this chapter and in previous chapters. In keeping 
with critical theory, self-reflexivity was a key part of my criterion of analysis (Kincheloe, 
2003). The use of reflexivity as applied in a methodological sense had two outcomes. The 
first was in relation to the interpretation of my ‘findings’. While making every effort to 
acknowledge the perspectives of the interviews, approaches to my analysis of the research 
were framed by my interpretation of occurrences. These interpretations reflect the social 
interaction between the participants and I and is therefore, not a simple reflection of what 
exists.  
It is also correct to assume that my background, gender, age and cross cultural marital 
status (Kenyan, western educated, female, aged between 30 and 40 and married to 
someone from a different ‘tribal’ group) and my previous professional background in the 
industry did play a role in shaping the study and communication with participants. Lee 
(1993) notes that these are issues linked to a perspective of power that may shape the 
dynamics of the interview process. I was therefore aware that gender issues as well as age 
and my names and ethnic background (which in the Kenyan context automatically link 
you to certain communities) shaped the way participants responded to me. For example, 
at times some participants would inquire of my tribal affiliation given that I carried both 
my maiden and married names. At other times many of the male participants (who as 





comment on my female status as well as view me in their words as ‘the new Kenyan 
woman’. I had prepared myself for such situations, and did not let it get in the way of 
discussions. My previous professional background in the industry and further training in 
the university as well as my role as teacher and tutor at UNSW, helped me facilitate 
smooth discussion in the interviews.  
The second outcome of reflexivity involved an awareness of my impact on the research 
and an acknowledgement of any bias that may emerge. This included the analysis of the 
literature that was read and its interpretation as well as the way in which the questions 
where phrased.  My role in the research process from its inception to completion is 
therefore seen as one of a bricoleur68 (Levi-Strauss, 1966 p.17; Grossberge, 1997) hoping 
to produce a bricolage (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003 p.5). 69 In seeking to gain understanding of 
the telecom policy process then I am aware of the great social researcher’s privilege in 
trying to shed ‘light’ on an issue so that the researcher and readers alike may gain an 
understanding of the problem. By exploding the myths of ‘objectivity’ and/or ‘value 
neutrality’, I make no claim to have been an ‘all seeing spectator’ (Carter, 1988 p.xv). 
While I have been aware of my creative presence in the research process, as highlighted 
above, I have not acknowledged my creative presence in the body of the text primarily 
because critiquing the disciplines and making a contribution to the sociology of 
knowledge is not my primary objective. My problematic is different. For my purposes, it is 
sufficient that the critiques of conventional approaches applied to the study of policy 
research which rightly highlight the inevitably creative subjective presence of the author in 
any text are acknowledged as affecting the way this analysis proceeds. 
                                                 
68 Levi-Strauss (1966, p.17) define a bricoleur as a “Jack of all trades or a kind of professional do-it yourself person 
69 A bricolage is a “pieced together set of representations that are fitted to the specifics of a complex situation” (Denzin 





3.6  Conclusion 
This chapter has described the paradigm that has informed the choice of methods for the 
empirical data of the research. The choice of method was found to best correlate with the 
theoretical framework and the central research inquiry shaping the study. Seeking to 
provide a different approach to the methodological inquiry of telecom, it was argued that 
qualitative methods respect the diversity of human experience and are best suited to 
creating comprehensive understandings of various perspectives. In doing so, the 
relationship of research methods to research questions was affirmed. The following 
chapter seeks to present the ‘findings’ of the study. In order to analyse the analytical 
universe of Kenya’s policy-making process as well as to present the outcomes of the 
policy process, the next chapter begins by evaluating the GATS framework in light of the 





PART TWO: THE GATS AND 






4  C h a p t e r  f o u r  
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 
(GATS) AND THE INTERNATIONAL AID CARTEL 
Trade and commerce, if they were not made of India-rubber, would never manage to bounce over the 
obstacles which legislators are continually putting in their way; and, if one were to judge these men by 
the effects of their actions and not partly by their intentions, they would deserve to be classed and 
punished with those mischievous persons who put obstruction on the railroads 
Henry David Thoreau (1962 p.85) 
 
Introduction 
In Civil Disobedience, Thoreau (1962) bemoaned the increasing role of government in 
commercial matters. His assessment, underscored by his view of legislation and 
regulations as hindrances to trade and commerce, positions Thoreau as an early 
proponent of deregulation. In many ways, the multilateral trading system, boosted by the 
establishment of the WTO in 1995 with relationship to the IMF and World Bank, has 
become the modern equivalent of Thoreau’s railroad in centrality, influence and 
importance to national and international economics. And depending on which perspective 
on the contemporary discourse one aligns themselves with, the debates have no shortage 
of protagonists, pessimists and protestors whose actions rather than intentions are the 
yardstick by which they judge and are judged. Indeed, the rules-based regime has become 
a norm rather than an exception. The WTO, as the main international institution of global 
trade, sets the framework for market entry, establishes the terms and basis for reciprocity, 
requires a system that respects safety for users or concessions to entrants and provides for 
the conditions of exclusion and inclusion. Moreover, as it expands its reach through new 
treaties and further member accessions, its significance as a regime for co-operation in 





Of the various agreements that constitute the global trading order, the GATS may well 
become the most significant of all as commercial services become the ambit upon which 
the global world is based. Equally to this prominence is its counterpart, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is primarily concerned with the overall 
elimination of tariff barriers on manufactured goods. Nonetheless, the monitoring and 
implementation of an agreement on service liberalisation is by far a more complex 
enterprise, given that most trade barriers in services are inextricably linked and tied to 
domestic regulatory choices and objectives. These domestic objectives pose considerable 
challenges to liberalisation efforts, enforcement, compliance and the implementation of 
WTO treaties. This chapter draws on the framework developed in chapter 2 in 
understanding the value of the GATS as a commitment in exchange for credibility.  
The purpose of the chapter is twofold. First I will establish a background understanding 
of the WTO and its relationship to IFIs. I examine the GATS framework, its norms, and 
procedures and the set of financial institutions that have together with the WTO carved 
out a monetary system of aid lending and trade policy advice. The second purpose is to 
show how the GATS rules, norms and principles in an attempt to reduce transaction costs 
inherent in reaching agreements provides a flexibility for scheduling commitments for 
developing countries. The argument here, is that while the GATS serves as an institution 
to reduce the transaction costs of negotiating complex multilateral trading agreements, the 
commitments undertaken also increase the costs of discretionary action that may follow 
over time (opportunism) (Shepsle, 1991). This chapter is of particular importance as it 
allows the chapter to establish an internal context for Kenya’s accession to the GATS. 
While obvious, it is worth noting here that a detailed treatment of the entire WTO 
agreements is outside the scope of this study. For purposes of this study; the analysis 
provided herein deals mainly with the framing of the GATS telecom agreements and the 
wider financial structure that embodies the ‘aid-trade’ relationship and its related 





this study. Understandably, this chapter draws on the legal instruments of the GATS70 
framed within the WTO Agreements.71 As the WTO Agreements comprise several 
annexes and articles, an attempt has been made to provide footnote references to the 
specific WTO articles or sections within the WTO Agreements.  
4.1 Understanding telecom trade services in context: the WTO, GATTS AND GATS 
The WTO began life on 1 January 1995, but its trading system is half a century older. 
(WTO, 2005). Prior to the completion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 
1994, which resulted in the creation of the GATS,72 the trading system was geared solely 
towards the elimination of both tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions affecting trade 
in manufactured goods. This system operated under the general agreements known as the 
GATT. Since 1948, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had provided 
the rules for the system. Over the years GATT evolved through several rounds of 
negotiations. The last and largest GATT round, was the Uruguay Round which lasted 
from 1986 to 1994 and led to the WTO’s creation with a membership of 148 countries in 
2005 (WTO, 2005). A growing international paradigm shift to telecom deregulation 
(discussed in chapters 1 and 2) and the perception that trade in services would generate 
comparative advantage given the increased role of service industries provided by 
technological advances, saw increasing attention turn to trade in services that would 
eventually lead to the creation of the GATS. The GATS was essentially inspired by the 
same objectives as its counterpart the GATT: creating a credible and reliable system of 
                                                 
70 The GATS comprises of 6 sections, 29 articles (32, with 3 Bis Articles). The totality of documents includes 7 other 
Annexes in addition to Telecommunications and a number of related instruments, including various Ministerial 
Decisions and national Schedules of Specific Commitments detailing undertakings in various service sectors and 
subsectors. 
71 As noted earlier, the WTO Agreements refers to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation {hereinafter WTO} and the substantive multilateral agreements attached thereto, April 15, 1994, in 
WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) 
72 WTO, General Agreement on Trade in Services, contained as Annex 1B to the Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organisation, 15th April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 





international rules; ensuring fair and equitable treatment of all participants; stimulating 
economic activity through guaranteed policy bindings; and promoting trade and 
development through progressive liberalisation.  
Nonetheless, two issues emerge as highly significant to this study in the creation of the 
GATS. First, the creation of the GATS saw the emergence of a service agreement which 
underscores the ideological shift away from the historical view that services are largely 
non-tradable. As noted in chapter 1, because this study engages in the analysis of the 
WTO from the perspective of African states, this shift in services as a tradable good has 
implications for developing countries like Kenya whose telecom industry lacks 
appropriate basic infrastructure and is discussed further in the following section. 
Nonetheless, the WTO’s Appellate Body has stated that GATS is applicable to ‘all’ service 
sectors with two exemptions:  
4) the GATS excludes ‘services supplied in the exercise of government authority’ and must 
be supplied neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with other suppliers. 
Examples include heath, education and any other public services. 
5) the Annex on Air Transport Services exempts from coverage measures affecting air traffic 
rights and services directly related to the exercise of such rights. (WTO, “The Legal 
Texts”, 1994)73 
And while the GATS itself is silent on what constitutes a service , it defines it by reference 
to four modes of supply, the characteristics of service industries and the nature and type 
of barriers confronting their free exchange, namely;  
                                                 





Mode 1 - cross border: where service is provided in one country to consumers in 
another 
Mode 2 - consumption abroad: where the service is provided in one country to consumers of 
another 
Mode 3 - commercial presence or affiliate trade: where a foreign supplier offers services in 
another country by establishing a commercial presence in that country 
Mode 4 - presence of natural persons: where the service is supplied by a foreign supplier by 
being physically present in the consuming country (WTO, “An introduction to the GATS” 
2005). 
The above method of definition may eventually suggest some interpretation over the 
scope of services, leaving the precise ambit of the agreement reasonably wide. In applying 
to all measures affecting services, the agreement encompasses laws, regulations, rules, 
procedures, decisions and administrative actions taken by national, provisional and local 
governments, as well as non-governmental bodies who exercise powers delegated by 
different government bodies (GATS , Article 1:3). Even at the very early stages of 
negotiations it was recognised that while the dominant means of cross-border trade would 
likely be telecom, the obstacles to trade would thus be embedded in domestic policy, laws 
and regulations as well as the practises of local operators (Tuthill, 1996 p.90-92). 
Distinguishing these modes is crucial to recognising that different forms of trade in 
services have implications at the domestic level and will be affected by the forms of 
regulatory instruments and thus create specific regulatory concerns for cross-border 
application. These issues have shaped both the principles and rules embodied in the 






4.2 Understanding the aid-trade relationship in context: The WTO, IMF and World 
Bank 
The relationship between aid and trade begins with the structure of the WTO. While this 
is now a formally institutionalised process, the following section briefly highlights the 
symbiotic relationships that the three organisations (the IMF, World Bank and WTO) 
share in maintaining what this study conceptualises as the ‘aid cartel’.  
The relationship between the IMF74 and the World Bank75, the two main global funding 
institutions, is a continuation of a long standing relationship between the two institutions 
and the Contracting Parties to the GATT,76 as modified by new developments associated 
with the establishment of the WTO. In July 1944, participants in the Bretton Woods 
Conference77 agreed that, in addition to the IMF and the World Bank, an international 
trade organisation to liberalise trade would benefit the world. Together the IMF, the 
World Bank and this organisation, would work towards the expansion of international 
trade; the trade organisation would have jurisdiction over the underlying transactions and 
IMF over exchange controls and the World Bank would have jurisdiction over 
development and sectoral issues. Several provisions in the WTO agreements provide the 
legal basis for the co-operation of the three institutions and specifically address its 
relationship to the IMF and the World Bank. For example, Article III.5 of the WTO 
charter provides: with a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy making, the WTO 
shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and with the International Bank 
                                                 
74 See supra note 36 
75 See supra note 37 
76 The contracting parties to the GATT are styled “CONTRACTING PARTIES” in the GATT documents when acting 
jointly. General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. XXV, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 194. The term 
will simply be capitalised (“Contracting Parties”) in the study when used in this sense, except for quotations of GATT 
materials. The current version of the GATT is in Annex 1A to the WTO charter, THE LEGAL TEXTS, see supra 
note 53 and 11{hereinafter GATT}. 
77 The Brentton Woods conference was the first international conference that sought to find mutual solutions on 






for Reconstruction and Development {the World Bank} and its affiliated agencies (WTO, “The Legal 
Texts”, 1994). In addition the Declaration on the Contribution of the WTO to Achieving 
Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking states: 
the interlinkages between the different aspects of economic policy require that the international 
institutions with responsibilities in each of these areas follow consistent and mutually supportive 
policies. The WTO should therefore pursue and develop cooperation with the international 
organisations responsible for monetary and financial matters, while respecting the mandate, the 
confidentiality requirements and the necessary autonomy in decision-making procedures of each 
institution, and avoiding the imposition on governments of cross-conditionality or additional 
conditions (ibid,  Para 5).78  
In addition, the IMF and the WTO signed a formal cooperation agreement79 which 
implements the legal relationship between the organisations established in the WTO 
agreements because it is based on authority and mandate to cooperate in the respective 
charters. The Cooperation Agreement includes, for example, several provisions on 
document exchange, reciprocal attendance at meetings and other routine ‘bureaucratic’ 
matters that facilitate cooperation. The role of the IMF and World Bank are however 
guided by their mandates which sets out the primary responsibilities of the two 
institutions. The Concordant between the MD of the IMF and the World Bank President 
states that each institution must be allowed to explore their legitimate concerns with regard to 
macroeconomic and structural issues80 albeit relying as much as possible on the monitoring of 
the other institution with the primary responsibility. In relation to the WTO, the IMF and 
World Bank perform two key interrelated functions. First, the IMF and the World Bank 
have regular consultation. Both have observer status in the WTO and participate actively 
                                                 
78 Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organisation to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global 
Economic Policymaking, Para 5, THE LEGAL TEXTS.  
79 For a useful historical view see Dukgeun, A. (2000). Linkages Between International Financial and Trade Institutions: 
IMF, World Bank and WTO, Journal of World Trade. 1, 3-5.  





in meetings of the WTO committees working groups and bodies. The WTO secretariat 
attends meetings of the IMF and the World Bank executive board on matters of common 
interest such as the surveillance activities of the IMF. In addition, the WTO is required to 
consult the IMF when it deals with issues concerning monetary reserves, balance of 
payments and foreign exchange arrangements. For example, the WTO agreements allow 
countries to apply trade restrictions in the event of balance-of-payments difficulties. The 
WTO Balance-of-Payments Committee (BPC) bases it assessments of restrictions on 
IMF’s determination of a member’s balance-of-payments situation. 
Second, the IMF, the World Bank and other international donors work together to 
improve their ability to trade through the technical assistance and training programme 
known as the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Program for Selected Least 
Developed and other African countries  (JITAP).81 As shall be discussed later in the 
chapter, technical assistance was identified as a core area for developing countries in the 
framing of the GATS agreements. Key to this relationship is the development of the 
Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least-Developed 
Countries (IF),82 discussed later in this chapter, which seeks to strengthen the capacity of 
countries to formulate policy and negotiate trade agreements. In addition and of specific 
interest to this study is the Poverty Reduction and Strategy papers (PRSP) which seek to 
ensure that poorer member countries incorporate appropriate trade reforms which forms 
the basis for concessional funding by the IMF and the World Bank under the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). As shall be evidenced in chapters 5 and 6, the 
PRSP has been the main tool used to decide Kenya’s funding structure under the PRGF 
and is a key tool of conditionality for funding. The PRGF and PRSP were established in 
1999 by the World Bank and IMF. The aim of the PRSP is to provide the link between 
national public actions, donor support and the development outcomes needed to meet 
                                                 
81 See chapter 7 for a review of  JITAP activities in Kenya 
82 The IF was inaugurated in October 1997 at the WTO High Level Meeting on Integrated Activities for least Developed 
Countries Trade Development by six multilateral institutions (IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank and the 





United Nations Millennium Goals (MDGs),83 which are centred on halving poverty 
between 1990 and 2015. The PRSP operation basis for IMF and World Bank concessional 
lending is done through a process of reviews which are prepared by individual member 
governments. These reviews are used by the Executive Boards of the IMF and the World 
Bank to make decisions about concessional lending. The PRSP focus is on strengthening 
governance and reforms and in particular, improving public resource management. When 
appropriate, the IMF draws on World Bank expertise in designing PRGF supported 
programmes and the staff of both the IMF and World Bank cooperate on conditionality. 
Given the high level coordination between the IMF, World Bank and WTO during 
GATS negotiations with developing countries, it seems that the relationship between 
these three institutions will continue to intensify. An analysis of this negotiation is set out 
in later sections this chapter. Table 2 84 below provides a guideline of the delivery vehicles 
of the three institutions as it relates to the ‘aid-trade’ relationship. 
                                                 
83 In September 2000, all the 191 Member States of the United Nations adopted the Millennium Declaration (GA 
Resolution A/54/2000) which outlined measures necessary to attain peace, security and development. This was 
further elaborated in the subsequent UN Secretary –General’s Report titled “A Road Map Towards the 
Implementation of the UN Millennium Declaration (GA, Resolution A/54/2000). The importance of the Millennium 
Deceleration is that it mainstreamed a set of interconnected and mutually reinforcing goals into the global agenda. In 
subsequent meetings, an agreement was reached among UN, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD through its  Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC) (referred to as OECD –DAC), 
World Bank and IMF on key elements of a framework of this global agenda in the context of goals, targets and 
indicators, collectively referred to as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
84 Diagram reproduced from IMF (2005) Review of Fund Work on Trade, prepared by the Policy development and 






In light of the various agreements between the IMF, WTO, World Bank and their 
respective member states, various provisions in the WTO Agreements require that the 
three institutions work together to address overlapping jurisdiction and to avoid imposing 
conflicting obligations upon a common membership.85 While various other legal aspects 
of the relationship between the IMF, World Bank and the WTO exist, it serves to note 
that the IMF and the World Bank engage in substantial day-to-day collaboration 
significantly as relates to structural and macroeconomic implications of reforms and 
lending, key of which is the PRGF discussed earlier. Specifically, the reader is directed to 
the conditionalities section which elaborates on the structure of funding and its 
relationship to trade.  
Having provided evidence of the ‘aid and trade’ framework established within the 
formation of the WTO, the following section elaborates on the GATS itself. Drawing on 
                                                 
85 Agreement between the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation, Dec. No. 11381-(96/105), 





the broad NIE principles discussed in chapter 2 regarding credible commitments, specific 
attention is drawn to the norms and practise and how this structures the telecom sector 
more so for developing countries such as Kenya. Given the divergent tension between 
domestic goals and international goals, it is argued that the GATS telecom instruments 
were structured to facilitate this tension. Inherent in the GATS telecom instruments 
therefore is the availability for countries to schedule commitments based on their 
domestic goals while still committing to international best practice. However, as suggested 
in the introductory note of this chapter, this flexibility inherent in the GATS also increases 
the cost of discretionary action. As shall be evidenced in chapters 5 and 6, while the 
GATS provided credibility for the Kenyan Government at international level, the 
flexibility inherent in the GATS also allowed the Kenyan Government to structure its 
agreements pursuant to its own goals. 
4.3 The GATS: rules and principles 
The GATS was concluded in Marrakesh on April 15th 1994 and came into effect on 
January 1st 1995. Its primary aim is to reduce, and, where possible, eliminate measures that 
prevent services from being freely provided across national borders. In addition, the 
GATS aims to prevent measures that discriminate against foreign-owned companies from 
providing services locally where market access has been granted. In doing so, the GATS 
establishes the framework (norms, rules and principles) for trade liberalisation in the 
telecom sector. In addition, by instituting this framework, the GATS creates, as argued in 
chapter 2, some degree of certainty for foreign investment and negotiates the rules of the 
‘playing field’. The main elements of the GATS are contained within the document ‘The 
results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts’ and is a large and 
daunting document covering 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and understandings. 
Although  complex,  the major components of the GATS can be located within six main 
sections of the document: an umbrella agreement (establishing the WTO); agreements for 





intellectual property) and dispute settlement and reviews of governments’ trade policies. 
Figure 1 below depicts this framework, the details of which are explained below. 
 
Good and services share the broad principles of the GATT and the GATS respectively. 
The third area, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), also falls in 
this category, but has no additional parts. Both agreements (GATT and GATS) are 
supplemented with extra agreements and annexes which deal with special requirements of 
specific sectors or issues. Finally, there are detailed and lengthy schedules (or lists) of 
commitments made by individual countries which provide details on how the telecom 
market within a specific country is structured. These commitments correspond to what 
this study argues is the transaction cost inherent in the GATS framework. For example, 
the commitments allow countries to state how much access foreign service providers are 
allowed for specific sectors. This is further discussed below. Drawn from the GATT 
framework, the GATS is similarly threaded with, and predicated on, the canon of non-
discrimination. This imperative is comprised of the complementary principles of the 





4.3.1 The GATS: credibility, commitments and transaction costs 
Drawing both the GATT and GATS framework together is the canon of non-
discrimination and is the foundational bedrock of the agreements. This imperative of non-
discrimination is comprised of the complementary principles of the Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) and National Treatment86.  Article II of the GATS states that: …each 
member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country 
(GATS, Article II).  
This principle seeks to prevent favouritism in trade arrangements between foreign services 
and service suppliers, and between foreign and domestic services and suppliers. Basically, 
the principle requires that a country treats its trading partners equally on the principle of 
non-discrimination. Therefore, if one country favours another country, it must apply the 
same principle of favouritism across all the other countries. As a general obligation, the 
MFN applies to all member states of the WTO irrespective of whether a country has 
made commitments to the GATS. However, because preferential treatment between 
countries pre-existed GATS87, exemptions were made subject to conditions and provided 
it was noted at the time of scheduling. Senunas (1997) points out that those conditions 
were not particularly onerous and were only there to ensure that exemptions were not to 
last more than 10 years. Suave (1995) concurs, suggesting that the formulation of this 
clause does not preclude the extension of exemptions beyond the 10-year period, 
although he questions the ease with which the Services Council would allow this to occur.  
                                                 
86 For a deeper discussion see ”Understanding the WTO” Chapter two - ‘The Agreements”: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap2_e.pdf, p.34; Also see WTO legal texts 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm 
87 A number of bilateral, regional and sectoral agreements predating GATS remain in place. For a deeper analysis see:. 
Grey, R. (1990). The Service Agenda. Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy. Also see Trebilock, M. J. & 





It is somewhat of an anomaly that the mechanism primarily devised to ensure a level 
playing field allows for exemptions to the general rule of fair treatment among nations. 
Indeed, the original fundamental condition of the GATS and GATT was that 
commitments should not be conditional on reciprocity (Arup, 2000). The MFN is 
therefore a rapprochement reflecting a compromise that was struck to overcome 
concerns by the United States and other members who threatened to derail the 
negotiations (ibid, 2000). In brief, the US was anxious that insufficient members of 
member states were committed to pursuing market liberalisation goals. And other 
members were worried that the US, dissatisfied with the outcome would pursue bilateral 
sectoral deals. 
By allowing a system of exemptions, it meant that the US and others wishing to seek 
liberalisation arrangements based on reciprocity may do so, and hence withhold these 
concessions from others at the time, but cannot continue to justify ongoing refusals to 
extend these arrangements to all other members (ibid, 2000). The need to secure 
membership commitment was therefore established through the MFN. Securing a 
commitment therefore became part of the negotiating process. A specific 
commitment in service schedule is therefore an undertaking by a government to provide 
market access and national treatment for the service activity in question on the terms and 
conditions specified in the schedule. Thus contrary to what the GATS name suggests, 
there is no single basic agreement on Services or telecom at the WTO. The 
consensus as it has evolved in the international trade regime since 1994 is reflected in a set 
of interrelated Agreements, Annexes and Ministerial Decisions, whose whole of which is 
comprised of the sum of its parts. Thus for example, Article XVIII of the GATS allows 
members to negotiate commitments with respect to measures affecting trade in services not 






When making a commitment a government stipulates88 the specified level of market 
access and national treatment and undertakes not to impose any new measures that would 
restrict entry into the market or the operation of the service. National treatment is 
provided for in Article XVII. Under the GATS, by virtue of Article II exemptions, a state 
can determine who is allowed to enter its borders and provide services. However, once 
they enter the market, they must be treated in the same manner as every other service 
provider. This access is dictated through the transparency clause89 which is contained in 
Article III:1 and states that: 
Each Member shall publish…all relevant measures of general application which pertain to or 
affect the operation of this Agreement. International agreements pertaining to or affecting trade in 
services to which a Member is signatory shall also be published (WT0, 1994 Article III:1).  
The idea behind the transparency clause is to engender predictability and provide 
information on domestic regulatory environments. It also aids the Council for Trade in 
Services (CTS) in its mandated assessments of the system.  
Through rules of transparency, the WTO aims precisely at restraining the unilateralism of 
discretionary Hobbessian power politics in international economic matters…There is conflict but 
there is also cooperation, based on a comprehensive process which stems from the rationality and 
functionality of the reciprocity of interests {which} can only be perceived and judged adequately if 
public disclosure makes them visible (WTO, 1994 Article 111:1) 
This issue of negotiating specific commitments is of particular importance to the 
argument of this study which contends that the GATS provides the Kenyan Government 
the ambit upon which to legitimise the actions taken within the domestic arena and at the 
same time facilitate it with credibility to access funds from international institutions. 
Specific commitments thus have an effect similar to a tariff binding. This is what this 
                                                 
88 The terminology often used in this case is ‘binding’ and is the more common word found in the reading of the GATS. 





study constitutes as a transaction cost. They guarantee economic operators in other 
countries that the conditions of entry and operation in the market will not be changed to 
their disadvantage. Moreover, commitments can only be withdrawn or modified after the 
agreement of compensatory adjustments with affected countries, and no withdrawals or 
modifications may be made until three years after entry into the Agreement. 
Commitments can however be added or improved at any time.90 Several types of 
commitments exist, but these are usually limited to:  
1) market access commitments: this seeks to guarantee operators in other 
countries that conditions of entry into the ‘said market’ will not be changed or 
cause a disadvantage to their operation in that country. For example, a 
government can commit to allow foreign banks to operate in the domestic 
market.   
2) market-access limitation: This allows governments to limit the number of licences it 
will grant in that market while the exemption to national treatment principles allows 
governments to, for example, limit the incorporation of companies requiring that 
companies have partnerships with local companies or limit the number of branches a 
foreign bank can have. (WTO, “Understanding the GATS”, 2005). 
The MFN and exemptions principles are, however, not something that a country can 
easily manoeuvre from once it has been ‘bound’ as noted earlier. Like bound tariffs in 
trade for goods they can only be modified after negotiations with affected countries. As 
such, the MFN exemptions make it difficult to unbind and in effect are guaranteed 
conditions for foreign market entrants into any domestic market. These conditions have 
direct bearing on Kenya’s compliance to the GATS. As noted in chapter 2, the aim of a 
transaction cost as is evident in the GATS rules is to try and limit market irregularities. 
However, precisely because of the ability to have MFN exemptions, the GATS provides 
                                                 
90 This applies in Kenya’s case where the first schedule of specific commitments was signed in 1994 and improved upon 





enough leeway for countries to slowly adapt the agreements. For African neo-patrimonial 
countries the MFN accords them the opportunity to comply with the agreements while 
still having the ability to dictate domestic patterns of policy through the schedule of 
specific commitments. The importance of the flexibility that these exemptions provide to 
African nations, as shall be observed through Kenya’s adoption of the GATS in chapter 6, 
underscores the importance of the exemptions that this offers to Kenyan policy making. 
Nonetheless, the negotiations of specific commitments is underpinned by the obligation 
that members enter into successive rounds of negotiations within five years of the GATS 
agreement to achieve ‘progressively higher levels of liberalisation’. While this provision is 
discussed later in this chapter, it warrants a brief introductory note here as it establishes 
the framework and conditions relevant to developing countries for ongoing and 
subsequent negotiation rounds (GATS, Article XIX). While setting substantive goals in 
the form of further liberalisation and the reduction of any adverse effects of market access 
on trade, it also prompts an ‘exchange’ standard or what this study conceives as a 
‘transaction cost’. Its inclusion in the GATS agreement is thus of central importance. So 
too is similar provision in the Annex which authorises developing countries to place 
reasonable conditions on access to and use of public networks and services where 
necessary to strengthen domestic telecom infrastructure and service capacity (GATS, 
Annex, Article 5 (g)).91 
As noted in the preceding section, the conditions informing the bargaining context have 
direct bearing on the prospects for future compliance. The importance of this is 
underscored by arguments advanced in chapter 7 which suggest that African states such as 
Kenya  are able to negotiate what seems on the outside an ‘acceptable’ degree of reform. 
                                                 





4.4 Further telecom agreements in the WTO 
As suggested earlier, contrary to what the name suggests, there is no single basic 
agreement on telecom at the WTO. The consensus as it has evolved is reflected in a set of 
interrelated Agreements. Each part, however has significance in itself and will be 
considered here briefly to clarify their interaction and set the context for assessing the 
efficacy of their implementation. Three documents comprise the core texts relating to 
trade in telecom services and are crucial in interpreting the GATS objectives: the Annex 
on Telecommunications (Annex) signed in April 1994, the Fourth Protocol which was 
entered into force in February 1998 and the RP adopted during the negotiations of the 
Fourth Protocol. Analysis of the Annex, the Fourth Protocol and RP as they relate to 
telecom application in Kenya is provided below. 
The main aim of the Annex is to ensure that suppliers of all liberalised commercial 
services, be they financial or professional services or any other service falling within the 
GATS ambit, can have reasonable and non-discriminatory access to public telecom 
networks and services, for communications and commercial purposes.92 Tuthill 
characterises the Annex as a document balancing user rights and regulator rights as it 
guarantees access, whether the networks are privately or government owned and whether 
or not they are monopolies, while conditioning access in certain prudential circumstances, 
for example, to protect the public operator, to restrain companies from illegal competition 
or preserve network integrity (Tuthill 1996, p.90-92). In so doing, the Annex provides 
important supplementary provisions to the framework agreement.93  
It warrants highlighting, however, that the GATS accession imposes the Annex 
obligations on all members, regardless of whether they have begun to liberalise domestic 
                                                 
92 The Annex offers a definition at 3:b and 3:c which essentially incorporates access to the public telecom infrastructure 
which permits services offered to the public generally , eg telegraph, telephone, telex and data services. 
93 The Annex does not apply to measures affecting the cable or broadcast distribution of radio or television 





telecom markets or scheduled any commitments. Nonetheless, irrespective of the 
imposition on all members, the Annex itself is not a sine qua for liberalisation without the 
inclusion of a specific commitment in a particular sector. Effectively, the Annex was 
designed to try and standardise conditions of behaviour for members and ensure that 
domestic regulation would target monopoly abuses, in order to create a ‘level playing field’ 
for all service suppliers who depend on access to telecom networks. A review of Kenya’s 
market access commitments in chapters 5 and 6 highlights the difficulties in this regard.  
4.4.1 The Annex on Telecommunications, Fourth Protocol and the Regulatory 
Reference Paper 
At the close of the Uruguay Round in 1994 only an ‘in principle’ commitment between 
members to ‘freer market access’ and liberalisation of basic telecom was reached. 
Meaningful gains, however, had only been secured in the supply of value-added or 
enhanced services.94 The Annex95 on Telecommunication was therefore primarily focused 
on rectifying this problem by ensuring that suppliers of all liberalised commercial96 
services had reasonable and non-discriminatory access to public telecom networks and 
services for communications and commercial purposes. However, specifically because 
very few countries showed willingness to open their markets to basic services whether to 
domestic or foreign competition, voluntary negotiations took place to try and rectify this 
problem. Not surprisingly, the source of the problem rested with the MFN exemptions as 
countries could list the market access limitations as reviewed above. The source of 
conflict was therefore that countries with closed markets could list market access 
limitations while having access to other open markets. As an indication, initially only 48 
                                                 
94 The Schedule of commitments has its own system of classification for distinguishing services. VANS include: e-mail; 
voice mail; online information; facsimile and database retrieval; electronic data interchange; enhanced facsimile 
services (including store and forward, store and retrieve fax); code and protocol conversion; online information 
and/or data processing (including transaction processing).  
95 For a concise history of the Annex on Telecommunications, see: Tuthill, L. (1996) “Users Rights? The Multilateral 
Rules on Access to Telecommunications” Telecommunications Policy, p.90 






governments were prepared to schedule access to basic services (Bronckers & Larouche, 
1997). To this end, a further transaction cost was needed, the aim being to ensure that all 
members participated in the process. A set of regulatory principles (RP)97 crafted by the 
USA and Canada were therefore designed to limit problems with market access. The 
guidelines amount to a framework for designing national regulatory rules and institutions 
to ensure some degree of domestic compatibility with the rules of the GATS. 
Simply put, the legacies in monopolies in telecom industries creates complexities for the 
introduction of competition in a market that has structural advantages for dominant 
players. This advantage arises when liberalisation occurs from a status quo where the 
former monopoly, as a dominant player, has an established network in place, an existing 
and often apathetic customer base and political access to policy processes. As shall be 
evidenced in chapters 5 and 6 these factors acted as key advantages for the main telecom 
provider in Kenya. Thus, the RP was seeking to curb these so called incumbent 
advantages, as, if not carefully monitored, would result in the monopoly of engaging in a 
variety of strategies to delay or even refuse access to facilities and interconnection requests 
by new entrants, promote unfair cross–subsidisation between services and engage in 
predatory behaviour (Ayogu & Hodge, 2001). Bronckers & Larouche (1997) confirm the 
RP as further institutional rules seeking conformity and reducing transaction 
problems by creating the requisite safeguards in domestic law for market access 
and foreign investment commitments and ensuring that the non-compliance of 
these rules at the domestic level becomes challengeable through the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System.   
The main components of the RP are outlined below and further detailed in appendix C, 
which shows Kenya undertakings of the RP. Structurally, the six principles are divided 
into six sections. All underscore the importance of transparency and non-discrimination 
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in regulation. The first two apply to regulation of ‘major suppliers’, while the remaining 
four pertain to general regulatory issues. A ‘major supplier’ is defined as one that can 
materially affect the terms of participation (having regard to price and supply) in the 
relevant market for basic telecom services as a result of its position in the market, or its 
control over ‘essential facilities’98 (GATS, RP). Proceeding with this clear understanding of 
the monopoly legacy, the RP’s six key principles articulate a number of safeguards that 
attempt to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and ensure fair regulation. In many ways, 
as noted in chapter 1, these principles are drawn from the existing best practise in telecom 
regulation mainly from western countries such as the USA and serve as the minimum 
basic requirements for any regulatory reform project.  
The RP99 commits those members who signed to: 
• Establish competitive safeguards to prevent anti-competitive practices, For example: 
major suppliers using information gathered from competitors with trade-restricting 
results 
• Provide for interconnection: PTOs are required to provide (non-discriminatory) 
market entrants with interconnection at any technically feasible point in the network 
while ensuring that costs are limited and where possible unbundled 
• Apply USO in a neutral and transparent way: services are to be administered in a 
transparent, non-discriminatory and competitive neutral way 
• Make licensing criteria publicly available: where licences are needed, information and 
decision making procedures are to be transparent 
                                                 
98 Essential facilities are defined in the RP as those of a public telecom transport network or service that are exclusively 
or predominantly provided by a single or limited number of suppliers, and cannot feasibly be economically or 
technically substituted in order to provide a service.  
99 At the time, 57 countries made full commitments while 63 countries in accordance with Article XVIII of the GATS, 





• Establish an independent regulator: they should specifically be separate from the 
actual suppliers and employ impartiality in all cases. 
• Allocate scarce resources fairly: eg allocate frequencies in a timely and transparent 
manner (WTO, 1996). 
In sum, the principles require that national governments do not engage in historical 
practices common to telecom monopolies by virtue of their position in the market, such 
as anti-cross-subsidisation and unfair interconnection fees. This is to be effected through 
creating appropriate regulatory institutions that provide for a separate regulator 
independent from the provision of services. Notably, and recognising the historical 
process of most countries’ transition from monopoly to competitive service provision and 
accommodating the myriad ways in which such institutions might be designed, the 
requirement for independence extends only to suppliers of basic services, and is silent on 
the need for autonomy from government. This is particularly important to note, as the 
study argues in chapter 5 that the line between major suppliers and government blurs in 
Kenya where the latter retains majority ownership of the former and where neo-
patrimonial tendencies in management tend to exacerbate the relationship between the 
incumbent and the Government.  
Nonetheless, the RP, as a starting point for approaching liberalisation, recognises the 
tendency for existing monopolies to dominate their markets and hence seeks to provide 
measures to limit the incumbent’s position in the market. It is for this reason that the 
widespread adoption of the RP is arguably the most important lubricant to the mechanics 
of the GATS and the realisation of the objectives of telecom trade. It is also significant for 
its role in altering the framework for co-operation. Drake and Noam (1998 p.33) 
summarise the paradigm shift as follows: 
the incorporation of regulatory principles into a trade policy framework was a remarkable 
achievement. After all, the entire history of global telecommunications has involved states 





negotiated in the ITU positioned sovereignty as an overarching principle, and governments sought 
to insulate the markets from foreign influence. …With the shift to a trade framework of global 
governance, the new forms of international service delivery require what have been called beyond-
the border and deep integration measures…Members have bound themselves to make their 
domestic regulatory institutions and rules consistent with multilateral trade disciplines and 
transnational market forces. 
As is evidenced in the next section, new service negotiations were introduced to 
accommodate developing countries which had made minor changes in their telecom 
sectors under the initial GATS agreements. Notwithstanding the stringent measures that 
were developed, it was obvious that controlling domestic environments in developing 
countries would prove more difficult. In part, the new service rounds were specifically 
incorporated to find solutions for developing country states and, in turn, to provide 
credibility to the WTO trade process. By locating the discussions in the context of 
developing countries the following section examines how the negotiations of the GATS 
sought to incorporate agreement from developing country states and thus create a 
transaction cost. 
4.4.2 New Service negotiations: Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and the ‘aid-cartel’  
Article XIX of the GATS embodies a commitment by member states to progressively 
liberalise trade in services through subsequent negotiations. The first round known as the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) was launched in Qatar in November 2001100 and for 
the first time placed developing country interests at the centre of multilateral trade 
negotiations. These arrangements were not meant to be static with the latest rounds of 
taking place in Hong Kong SAR in December 2005 and subsequent meetings scheduled 
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for January 2006.101 In terms of telecom services, the DDA simply seeks to reaffirm the 
already existing guidelines of the GATS DDA. 
One significant issue which emanated from the Doha rounds is important to this study, 
namely: the continued acknowledgment of the relative position of strength possessed by 
developing countries and the concurrent constraints faced by developing countries such 
as those in Africa. For these reasons, the Doha Ministerial Declaration reaffirms the 
WTO’s commitment to differential treatment for developing countries and least 
developing countries.102 The architecture of the WTO and its various agreements repeats 
throughout its texts the importance of acknowledging the needs of developing countries 
(who form the bulk of the number of members in the WTO) while proceeding with 
progressive liberalisation. The second paragraph of the Preamble to the GATS (WTO, 
1994 “GATS Objectives, Coverage & Discipline”) states: 
 Wishing to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in services with a 
view to the expansion of such trade under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalisation 
and as a means of promoting the economic growth of all trading partners and the 
development of developing counties {emphasis added} 
Additionally, Articles IV.1, IV.5 and IX of the Marrakesh Agreement to establish the 
WTO, speaks of the need to be mindful of the increased importance that members attach 
to the participation of developing countries and the need to ensure that the system fully 
responds to the needs and interests of all participants. In response to this need, it was 
recognised that developing countries, and more so those from Africa, faced major hurdles 
in realising the potential offered by increased trade. Most notably, three main issues were 
identified 1) the need for increased capacity, 2) the need for investment and economic 
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102 The WTO separates developing countries from least developing countries. Kenya, according to the WTO, is classified 





stability and 3) the need for infrastructure. Moreover it was argued that to reach the 
MDGs,103  growth was to be accelerated through the liberalisation of trade services and 
goods (WTO, 1994).104 In this light, it was argued that aid for trade, which comprises 
technical assistance, capacity building, institutional reform, investments in trade related 
infrastructure, and assistance to offset adjustment costs, such as fiscal support to help 
countries make the transition from tariffs to other sources of revenue become a key part 
of the negotiation.  As noted earlier in this chapter, key in this framework was the creation 
of the ‘aid-cartel’ which sought to provide assistance to developing countries105. Together 
both these institutions combine resources from various multilateral institutions and 
include the World Bank, IMF, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), European Commission (EC), United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), ITU and WTO. This in respect, as argued in chapter 2 forms an ‘aid-cartel’, in 
which all fund agencies co-operated to release funds within the agenda of helping 
developing countries liberalise their markets. Box 1 (IMF & World Bank 2005)106 below 
summarises the key aims of the IF or what this study terms as the ‘aid cartel’.  
                                                 
103 See surpra note 82 
104 WTO, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 
105 The WTO separates developing countries from least developing countries. Kenya, according to the WTO, is classified 
as a developing country 
106 Aid for Trade: Competitiveness and Adjustment, Joint Note by the Staffs of the IMF and World Bank, April 12th 






The ‘aid-cartel’ was therefore institutionalised within the WTO negotiations and 
specifically through the Doha round. While the different roles and the relationship of the 
IMF, WTO and World Bank were discussed earlier in this chapter, of particular 
importance is their role in the DDA. In this respect, the IMF and the World Bank took a 
lead role in DDA in two main areas: first, helping to catalyse a Doha Round outcome that 
promotes developing country objectives of poverty reduction and growth to the 
maximum extent. In this area, the joint IMF-World Bank initiatives have particularly been 
prominent, including communication by the two institutions on a joint paper on market 
access. Second, helping developing countries to integrate pro-poor trade policies into their 
national development strategies with specific emphasis on trade reform, capacity building 
and structural adjustment programmes (IMF, 2004). 
To this end, a ‘New Strategy for WTO Technical Corporation for Capacity Building, 
Growth and Integration’ was adopted to support domestic efforts for mainstreaming trade 
into national plans for economic development and strategies for poverty reduction (WTO Ministerial 
Declaration, Para. 38). The stated aim of the technical assistance programme is  
to assist developing and least-developed countries….to adjust to WTO rules and 





the benefits of an open, rules-based multilateral trading system (ibid, paras 21 and 39-41) 
{Emphasis added}  
Notwithstanding the content and quality of the technical assistance rendered, or 
differences in expectations by developed and developing countries of its meaning107, it is 
however argued in chapter 7, that while the GATS telecom instruments afford developing 
countries such as Kenya, effective tools with which to balance competing needs to 
participate in telecom reforms, the ability to do so is entirely dependent on the increasing 
capacity of countries. This applies to both human and capital capacity resources. In 
particular, it is argued that rather than provide a means in which to enhance reforms, the 
aid for trade mechanism under the ambit of PRGF provides more stability for neo-
patrimonial practises in Kenya. Future agreements and negotiations thus build on this 
acknowledgment. A summary of the progress to date on the ‘aid for trade’ collated from 
various sources is set out below. 
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• The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) through 
its Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC) database indicates that resources 
devoted to trade-related capacity building and technical assistance increased 
significantly in 2003. Between 2001 and 2002, trade policy and regulations support 
increased from US$ 660 million per year in 2001-2002 to almost US$ 1 billion in 
2003. Commitments for trade development activities increased from US$ 1.35 billion 
per year in 2001-2002 to US$ 1.8 billion in 2003. (OECD website, 2005)108 
• The World Bank has scaled up its activities, with lending for trade increasing from 
US$ 0.8 billion in the financial year (FY) 1998-2000, to US$ 1.4 billion in FY 2001-
2003, to a projected US$ 3 billion in FY 2004-2006109.(IMF & World Bank, 2005) 
• So far there are 28 countries out of the 39 identified countries in Africa receiving IF 
assistance and 4 countries receiving IDA financial assistance. (WTO Secretariat, 2005, 
“Integrated Framework”) 
• According to the World Bank DDA report, annual development aid is expected to 
increase by US$ 50 billion between 2005 and 2010. (IMF & World Bank, 2005) 
It is against the above background that it is argued that developing countries such as those 
in Africa acceded to the GATS negotiations specifically the RP. Kenya is one GATS 
signatory whose actions thus far indicate a wholesale identification with this approach ie. 
the GATS telecom framework in totality as discussed in this chapter. It is argued 
therefore that the GATS framework and the donor role in ensuring implementation have 
institutionalised the ‘aid for trade’ relationship. As will be depicted in the following 
chapter, Kenya has continued to rely on donor funding since the early 1970s. Through the 
guise of development and reforms, the ‘aid-cartel’ has progressively transformed itself into 
a stable international regime, with its norms, institutions and myths. The GATS 
                                                 






framework therefore provides a unique study in which to understand how neo-
patrimonial states have adjusted themselves to the new institutionalised framework in the 
telecom sector. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was twofold. First, it sought to show the role played by the WTO 
within the broader ambit of the ‘aid-cartel’ and second, it sought to understand how the 
GATS instruments act as transaction costs in structuring the conditions and behaviour of 
members in the telecom sector. The chapter described the GATS framework showing the 
primary aim of the GATS as a credibility tool to reduce and where possible, eliminate 
measures that prevent services from being freely provided across national borders or 
where market access has been granted, to prevent measures that discriminate against 
foreign owned companies providing services. In doing so, it has located the argument that 
committing to the GATS was both a credibility issue for all members and a transaction 
cost, which sought to structure the ‘rules of the game’. The relevance of this aspect of the 
GATS becomes more evident in the context of Kenya as discussed in chapters 5 and 6.  
Drawing on the broad principles of NIE and specifically the concept of transaction costs, 
this chapter has shown how the GATS sought to structure market uncertainty and issues 
of opportunism. While the complex way in which this was structured was not detailed, the 
broad principles of the GATS such as the MFN; allowing countries to schedule their 
commitments and the RP, provide a basis from which to understand the value of the 
GATS as a transaction tool.   
Locating the evolution of Kenya’s telecom sector within its historical neo-patrimonial 
context, the following chapter begins the analysis by showing how Kenya’s historical 
patrimonial relationships, as well as its relationship with the international community, 
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have come to shape the telecom sector. I emphasise the role played by the IMF, World 
Bank and WTO in creating an institutionalised system of ‘aid for trade’ in Kenya and 
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The purpose of this chapter is to set out the history of telecom reform in Kenya. Drawing 
on the framework developed in chapter 2 on neo-patrimonial states it applies this to the 
Kenyan state, locating how the Kenyan economy has developed within the broader political 
transformation from colonisation to independence. This chapter provides a canvas upon 
which the significance and distinctiveness of Kenya’s telecom reform process is sketched 
and is crucial to understanding the themes of both the importance of credibility – enhancing 
measures to attract foreign aid for the Government of Kenya and for assessing compliance 
with Kenya’s GATS commitments. It is also important to understanding the central place 
that redistributive policy goals (such as universal service) hold within the broader political 
and economic environment. 
The chapter is discussed within two sections. Part I provides an overview of Kenya as a neo-
patrimonial state. It examines the evolution of the economic sector in Kenya, the links to the 
‘aid-cartel’ and, focuses on the political adjustments that state elites have made in the 
evolving development of Kenya since independence. I show that the need to reform was 
pegged on the aid-dependency relationship that Kenya had with IFIs. In addition, I show 
that this legacy of economic development in Kenya is both cause and effect of its historical 
political context. The neat separation between economic and political growth is artificial but 
necessary for narrative purposes. Part II focuses on the telecom sector. The analysis is 
organised through a periodisation of events in both the political and economic context. 
While this at times may present challenges for the reader, as political and economic 
developments overlap one another and, in addition, that telecom reform takes place in both 
contexts, there has been an attempt made to flag this where it occurs. 
Part I: Context and Perspective 
5.1 Overview 
Touted as the ‘gateway to Africa’ and the political and economic hub of eastern Africa, 







West and Tanzania to the South. The population was estimated at 28.7 million in the 1999 
census and was projected to have grown to 31 million in 2002 (RoK, 2002-2008). Like most 
of the landscape of the African continent, Kenya is ethnically diverse, with at least 42 distinct 
main tribal groups110 (Okumu, 1970). As discussed in chapter 2, ethnic identification is very 
strong in Africa, and this is no less so for Kenya where, as Collier & Hoeffler (2001) 
observe, tribe and kin groups are the most powerful levels of social identity. The tribal factor 
in Kenya dates back to British Colonial rule, which subdivided the Kenyan landscape into 
districts, locations and provinces based on tribal regions and today remains the same. The 
concept of city and rural area delineates Kenya’s socio-economic stratification with the 
capital towns of the provinces growing to cities and has significant ramifications in the 
Kenyan political landscape as shall shortly be explained.  
While historically Kenyan communities were religious with traditional beliefs based on the 
relationship between God and nature, the colonial period brought Christianity to the region. 
Today, 80 percent of the Kenyan population can be classified as Christian (the majority of 
whom are Catholic) and 20 percent as Muslim (RoK & UN, 2005). This difference can 
mainly be explained from a historical perspective. The coastal region is mainly Muslim with 
the influence of Arabic and Portuguese settlements during the 14th to 17th century. It was 
not until the late 18th and early 19th centuries that the first British settlements were 
established in the coastal town of Mombasa.  
The issue of class was not evident during pre-colonial times, this changed after colonialism 
and independence (Homlquist et al., 1994). According to the Kenya Economic Survey, 
almost one in every two Kenyans is poor and three quarters live in the rural areas of the 
country (RoK, 2001). Of the poor, subsistence farmers account for 47 percent while the 
remaining 46 percent are agricultural farmers. In spite of this, most poverty reduction 
interventions have not managed to bring an end to poverty and its manifestations (Omosa, 
2002). The HDR (UNDP, 2005) thus ranks Kenya’s Human Development Index (HDI) as 
154 out of 177 countries. In terms of education, Kenya boasts one of the regions top 
                                                 







educated population though this only amounts to 40 percent of it population (Alila & 
Omosa, 1999).  The official languages are Kiswahili and English though tribal languages 
remain prominent within the communities and geographical boundaries of tribal groupings. 
Kenya became a multi-party state in 1991. The then ruling party won the two subsequent 
elections in 1992 and 1997. However, in December 2002, a coalition of Opposition parties, 
the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), won the elections and ushered in a new 
administration that vowed to rid the country of poor governance.  
Drawing on the framework of neo-patrimonial states in African countries developed in 
chapter 2, the following section seeks to provide evidence of Kenya’s neo-patrimonial 
structure. My starting point draws on the assumption made in chapter 2, namely; that the 
Kenyan state is neo-patrimonial in which Kenyan elites utilise forms of clientelism to 
maintain their political authority and positions.  
5.2 Political development 
Kenya was a colony of Britain between 1895 and 1963 and the country inherited an 
economy whose structure and direction were shaped by British colonialism. During this 
period, social and economic policies heavily favoured British interests, with the country 
mainly managed as a source of raw materials for British industries and a market for their 
products (Brett, 1973; Mwega & Ndungu, 2004). As briefly noted in chapter 1 and discussed 
further in chapter 2, the neo-colonial context of Africa is situated within the transition from 
colonisation to independence and the concept of nationalism. The fact that this transition 
was not undertaken properly is apparent by the fact that social, political and economic 
structures of colonisation were retained at independence in Kenya.  After independence, the 
new government moved quickly to monopolise the concept of nationalism, making certain 
that only institutions authorised by the state were allowed to pursue so called nationalist 
themes. As part of that process, Kenya’s first President, Jomo Kenyatta, implored white 
settlers to remain in Kenya and Kenyans were told to forgive them but not to forget 
(Kimenyi, 2002). During the Kenyatta regime (1963-1978) no formal attempts were made to 
overhaul the colonial institutions and structures or empower popular African constituencies. 







governance and ethnic exclusivism, the Kenyatta era further politicised ethnicity. The 
democracy eulogised at independence was crafted on abstract Western principles but 
operationalised ethnically in Kenya under Kenyatta. As noted by several policy analysts in 
Kenya, the state was constructed as an exclusive entity whose structures were utilised by 
various class and ethnic interests to enrich themselves at the expense of greater Kenyan 
society (Barkan, 1984; Makau wa Mutua, 1994; Cohen, 2001; Murunga, 2002). There was 
also apparent Kikuyu nationalisation (the President’s ethnic community) at the expense of 
the greater Kenyan society. This was the beginning of various ethnic alliances and class 
formations not only for attention but also to reap maximum benefits through careful and 
deliberate plundering of the economy (Murunga, 2002).  
The Kenyatta regime had correctly identified illiteracy, poverty and disease as the country’s 
foremost enemies. At the level of political rhetoric, these were verbally combated through 
public ‘harambee’ (meaning to gather) rallies which were organised to raise funds for illiteracy, 
poverty and disease. Although ‘harambee’ was an innovative approach to tackling local 
problems, it was abused and manipulated to serve personal whims and interests of ethnic 
bossmen. Harambee served the interests of patronage relationships because through them 
the ordinary citizens could see who contributed more money at public rallies (Murunga, 
2002). The rallies therefore turned into a campaign strategy for one to ascertain their 
position and power, and became a tool for deciding who represented a community in 
Parliament. As Muruga (2002 p.92) notes the idea of harambee soon acquired a compradorial tag and 
changed the role and meaning of the term MP in Kenya. While harambee did not tackle effectively 
the problems of illiteracy, poverty and disease, Kenyans came to believe that the best MP 
was one who made more contributions during public fund raising meetings and was 
therefore more able to deal with society’s problems.  
Moreover, because Kenya had inherited the political structures of the British colonial 
empire, Kenya’s pattern of politics mirrored this system. In the colonial Government, state 
administration was the focus, creating a division between urban and rural. When the Kenyan 
Government took over, MPs became elected members from their local tribal communities, 







As such, these legislators were perceived to have power because they played the unique role 
of linking the community to the state Government (Ndegwa, 2002). While, as Barkan (2002) 
points out, they may never be an important factor in the actual making of policy they often 
have the opportunity to affect the pattern by which resources allocated to a given problem 
are distributed across society, in this case the tribal communities. Subsequently, during the 
Kenyatta regime and into the Moi regime (1978-2002) it became fashionable to elect an MP 
because of her/his wealth and not on the basis of her/his ability, principles and 
forthrightness as a leader. Thus, as Murunga (2002) argues, it was in the interest of the 
incumbent governments to maintain issues of development to ensure that the patron-client 
network function continued to work. Thus, during the 1960s and 1970s economic resources 
were allocated through tightly knitted patron-client relationships. With the ascension of Moi 
to the Presidency in 1978, this system of competitive resource allocation became more 
regulated to ensure that the ruling groups won the public resource allocation game (Mwega 
& Ndungu, 2004).  As is evidenced in the following section, between 1980 and 1990, little 
progress was made in terms of trade liberalisation as politics became the name of the game 
played between donors and political elite in order to decide what reforms would be 
introduced. 
Shortly after taking over as President in 1978, Moi introduced a programme to de-Kikiyunise 
the Government and its supporting structures. During the Kenyatta years, members of 
certain ethnic groups had dominated the Government, notably the Kikuyu ethnic group of 
which Kenyatta was a member. Moi’s intention was to reduce the influence of the Kikuyu 
on the Government and allow members of his own ethnic group to take over positions 
vacated by Kenyatta’s men. This process was a gradual one and included questioning the 
integrity of senior Kikuyu politicians and civil servants to force them to resign (Throup & 
Hornsby, 1998). The Kalenjinisation programme unleashed by Moi after his election as 
President in 1979 did not go unopposed. Often violent and bitter struggles erupted between 
the Kikuyu and Kalenjin over the allocation of resources. For example, Murunga (2002) 
notes that during Kenyatta’s regime, land was allocated in the Rift Valley to the Kikuyu 
community. This land was considered ancestral land by the Kalenjin and therefore 







independence struggle was to resist Kikuyu domination. The Rift Valley issue continues to 
remain an important policy issue in Kenya. In fact, in October 1991, violent land clashes 
erupted between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin. There is evidence to suggest that the 1991 land 
clashes were orchestrated by the Government at a time in which it was under immense 
pressure to liberalise the economy and introduce multi-party elections.  
Multi-partism was introduced in 1991 and the Opposition groups ran against Moi for 
Presidency. However, Moi won elections in December 1992. The votes cast largely followed 
ethnic lines with those communities who supported Moi giving him their vote. Despite 
having an Opposition party, Opposition leaders also remained essentially ethnic with the 
primary interest of capturing the Government for the benefit of community members 
(Muigai, 1993). Thus, none of the Opposition parties presented the Kenyan people with a 
genuine alternative agenda for social, political and economic transformation. Nor did any of 
them effectively articulate to the people of Kenya how they were going to deal with poverty, 
marginalisation and deteriorating economic conditions. Instead of providing the country 
with a genuine reconstruction plan, the Opposition spent most of its time fixated on ousting 
Moi from office under the popular slogan ‘Moi Must Go’. Professor Julius O. Ihonvbere 
refers to this as the abnormal fixation on the incumbent leaders. (Ihonvbere, 1997, p.5) 
The telecom reform process enters into the political scene at a time when President Moi was 
getting ready for elections in 1997. As noted by van de Walle (2001, p.274), patterns of non-
reform and reform have to be understood in the context of African rulers attempting to protect and adopt their 
mechanisms for rule to the increasingly stringent fiscal situation and the exigencies of the international donors. 
As shall be shortly depicted, Moi’s bid for his re-election in Government was based on the 
promise of sweeping reforms in telecom given the pressure from the international 
community to change the governance structures that had been shown to slow down the 
progress of the economy (Nasongo, 1993).  
In sum, as has been evidenced in this section, the political development of Kenya is 
predicated on historical neo-patrimonial roots. Locating the discussion within the theme of 







assumption made in chapter 2, namely that the Kenyan state is co-dependent on the 
international community for financial assistance.  
5.3 Economic development 
After independence, Kenya like most African countries tended to emulate development 
strategies of western industrialised countries. The policy stressed the role of major agents of 
change: entrepreneurship and capital accumulation (Holmquist et al, 1994). In a sense, the 
role of the market mechanism was believed to work in order to transfer entrepreneurial 
talent or attributes from the developed countries to Kenyan entrepreneurs. Second, the 
emphasis was placed on a massive injection of capital into the economy to accelerate the 
formation of strong market links both in product and financial markets which was to 
accelerate the pace of economic development (Mwenga & Ndungu, 2002). Because the pre-
colonial economy was mainly a subsistence one, after independence Kenya’s ‘white 
highlands’ were allowed to grow cash crops allowing agricultural growth to expand rapidly. 
Between 1963 and 1970 most of the restrictions to farming by Kenyans during the colonial 
period were lifted and farming land transferred from Europeans to Kenyans (Omosa, 2002; 
Alila & Omosa, 1999). There was also an attempt to push production to small-holder 
farmers who made up the majority of the population. But the small-holder population has 
some peculiar characteristics in Kenya. Over 80 percent of the population in Kenya live in 
rural areas and almost 70 percent are to be found in small holdings. The integrated rural 
survey of 1979-1983 shows that about half of the small-holder population were less than 15 
years old and the other half were over 50 (RoK, 1979-1983). While rural farming was 
encouraged, those who engaged in it faced volatile incomes as a result of volatile export 
prices, weather cycles and falling terms of trade. All these factors combined to make rurality 
a major consideration for policy development in Kenya as shall later be observed in part II 
of this chapter. 
Nonetheless, Kenya experienced a relatively stable economic environment in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, with a GDP growth rate of 6.5 percent per annum between 1964 and 1971 
(Nasibi, 1992). The situation changed rapidly however between 1970 and 1980 when the 







Kenya experienced its first major payments problems. This was followed by the oil crisis in 
1973/74. The Government reacted to this crisis by tightening the trade regime and seeking 
external finances whose general policy conditionalities were spelt out in the 1974-1978 
development plan (RoK, 1974-1978) and the 1975 sessional paper No. 4 on Economic 
Prospects and Policies (RoK, 1975). Thereafter the country opted for direct controls in its 
economic planning. 
The introduction of SAPs that took place in Africa as discussed in chapter 2 can be traced to 
the late 1970s and early 1980s in Kenya (Kabubo-Mariara & Kiriti, 2002). By 1980 Kenya 
had received its first loan from the IMF to finance structural changes in the industrial sector, 
promote efficient use of external resources and enhance the competitiveness of public 
investment (ibid, 2002). Nonetheless as Mwenga & Ndungu (2002), note that these loans 
and policies were geared towards enhancing competition, whereas market reforms started in 
the 1980s and with a slow pace, they were not geared towards institutional reform until the 
late 1980s early 1990s. During this period (1980-1990), trade liberalisation commenced but 
with little success because of the lack of coordination with macroeconomic policies (ibid, 
2002). The logical conclusion by the World Bank and the IMF was that if Government could not 
make enterprises run efficiently, and if it could not afford to subsidise operations, it would have to divest 
(World Bank, 1992). The Working Party on Government Expenditure in 1982 had argued 
that Kenya’s economic crisis was attributable to the proliferation of commercial activities by 
Government, which diverted scarce management talent away from the central function of 
Government. The solution then required a firm decision by Government to focus public expenditures 
and management talent on the essential functions of Government in order to ensure that they are performed 
efficiently and that available resources are used for essential and productive services (RoK, 1982). In order 
for Government to acquire a more constructive role, it was recommended that …Government 
investment should be reduced to a minium, some existing investments disposed of and those parastatals and 
other investments considered essential be operated efficiently and more effectively by Government... (RoK, 
1982 p.41). The process received more lip service than action and the dilution of the privatisation 








Between 1986 and 1991, SAP with various sectoral loans were directed towards reforms as 
follows: industrial sector (1988), financial sector (1989), agricultural sector (1990), and export 
development (1990 and 1991) (World Bank, 1992). These loans had little impact with slow 
growth rates registered in all sectors attributed mainly to weak reform efforts on the part of 
the Government. As noted in chapter 2, there are divergent views on the impact of reforms 
on poverty and growth in Africa. In Kenya critics have argued that economic reforms have 
contributed to even worse economic and social outcomes, only exacerbating the conditions 
that lead to poverty and vulnerability (Mwega & Ndungu, 2002; Murunga, 2002; Ndegwa, 
1998). Others maintain that while macroeconomic adjustment programmes have not been 
directly deleterious to the poor, they have not proved sufficient to generate substantial 
economic growth and have thus failed to contribute in a large way to poverty alleviation 
(Sandbrook, 1991). In Kenya the failure of the SAP was later attributed to weak institutions 
(World Bank, 1992; 1994) and in 1990, the push for institutional reforms had begun. Several 
types of reform programmes were therefore implemented and include: Institutional Change 
Oriented Policy Reforms, Parastatal Reform Programme, Public Sector Reform Programme 
and Financial Liberalisation Programme (Kabubo-Mariara & Kiriti, 2002). This period began 
a phase of dependence on financial aid for development, with aid pegged on the degree of 
institutional reform. As discussed below, the role of foreign aid and the conditionality 
programme attached to foreign aid have continued to dictate Kenya’s reform process.  
5.3.1 The role of foreign aid in Kenya 
Between 1970 and 1999, the flow of donor funds to Kenya averaged about 9 percent of 
GDP, accounting for about 20 percent of the annual Government budget and financing 
slightly over 80 percent of development expenditures (OECD & AfDB, 2005). Though aid 
flow to Kenya has increased over time (from an annual average of US$ 205 million in the 
1970s to slightly over US$1 billion in the 1990s before the standoffs with the donor 
community this flow has not been smooth (RoK, 1975; RoK, 1998). Donor assistance in 
Kenya comes in two forms: grants (recorded as revenues) and loans (recorded as 
expenditure). Donors have two broad options of disbursing their funds, as Appropriations-







community in Kenya since it gives them direct control of funds. Under the revenue 
disbursement system, donors disbursed funds directly to the Treasury through special 
accounts at the Cental Bank of Kenya (either in advance or on a reimbursement basis). The 
donor community avoids this system as it has been open to abuse as a result of weak 
accounting systems at the Treasury and has led to corruption and misappropriation of funds. 
The result of this has been the accumulation of donor funds in special accounts. An 
estimated half of the committed programme funds are disbursed but most of the external 
assistance lapses before the accounts are fully drawn. 
The main donors to Kenya are bilateral donors with key sources of funding (mainly project 
and technical assistance). The UK was the major source of foreign aid in Kenya until the 
1980s, when Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Japan and others significantly 
increased their contribution. Japan has since become a major bilateral donor to Kenya. Since 
the 1980s however, multilateral sources have increased in importance with a shift in 
emphasis from project aid to programme aid. The major donors now include the World 
Bank, IMF, EU and the OECD-DAC. Despite being among the first African countries to 
receive structural adjustment funding from the World Bank and later the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) loan from the IMF, Kenya has experienced two major 
aid freezes. These freezes occurred in 1992 and 1997/1998, and a minor suspension in 1982 
due to issues of corruption and dissatisfaction with the Kenyan Government’s 
implementation programme (IMF, 2002). It is worth noting that although major donors 
withheld their funds to Kenya after November 1991, aid for ongoing projects, technical 
assistance and emergency relief (humanitarian aid) from other donor agencies continued to 
flow as before. After three years of successful implementation of donor conditions, more 
donor funds were released. Unfortunately, in 1996/1997, the Government backtracked on 
its reform agenda, which resulted in a new standoff between the donor community 
eventually in the suspension of funds from the IMF, World Bank and the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) (ibid, 2002). 
Attempts to end the stalemate between the Government and the donor community heralded 







the private sector and international organisations (popularly known as the economic 
recovery team or the ‘Dream Team’) were recruited into the civil service to initiate the 
economic recovery and ensure economic reforms and good governance at Treasury. In 
response, the IMF and the World Bank agreed to release the funds initially cancelled in 
1997/1998. Six months later however, in December 2000, funds amounting to US$198 
million were withheld when the Government backtracked on the agreed conditions. In 
addition, other lending institutions (the World Bank, EU, ADB and Department for 
International Development of the United Kingdom (DFID)), withheld about US$300 
million in budgetary support (RoK, 2005). Between 2000 and 2005, donor aid has been 
uneven only resuming when there is significant progress in the fulfilment of donor 
conditions. While the subject of foreign aid is beyond the scope of this study, Njeru (2003) 
confirms through his analysis of foreign aid and public expenditure in Kenya that the 
country’s economy is sustained to a large extent by its dependence on foreign aid. In 
addition, his study confirms that the relationship between the share of Government 
expenditure and GDP is based on foreign aid ‘income’. 
5.3.2 The conditions: the privatisation programme 
The lack of credibility that African nations such as Kenya exemplified in the 1980s in part 
led to the conditionality programme. Before the 1990s, very few government reform 
programmes had been implemented. In fact, as Elbadawi & Helleiner (2004) note, the IMF 
was relatively inactive as a source of balance of payments for finance. And while the World 
Bank provided support for the SAPs, these were not pegged on conditionalities. However, 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s the IMF and the World Bank institutionalised the 
conditionality programme as a means to force African governments to adhere to 
commitments they had made (Mkandawire & Soludo, 2003). Under the conditionality 
programme, key conditions for aid were pegged on reform and governance as noted in 
chapter 2. In Kenya the key conditions for aid were pegged on the privatisation programme 
and begun in 1991 under the Public Enterprise Reform Programme (PERP) (RoK et al., 
1996). The main objective was encouraging private sector development, improving 







budget by loss-making SOEs and raising revenue for Government. The key areas earmarked 
for privatisation and for aid conditionality were key public institutions, namely: Telkom, 
Kenya Railways Corporation, Kenya Ports Authority and KenGen - Kenya’s electricity 
company.  
These conditions thus began to shape not only the nature of what took place in Kenya but 
also the nature of decision making in Kenya. Government planning as shall be evidenced 
was based on calculations of how much money would be received and what conditions 
needed to be seen to be fulfilled in order to receive aid. Nonetheless, as van de Walle (2001) 
points out, neo-patrimonial rulers such as those in Kenya could not have resisted pressure to 
reform had they not had the assistance of the international community. As shall be shortly 
evidenced, Kenya received large amounts of financial aid with conditionalities of reform but 
was still able to detract from actually fulfilling the conditions.  
5.4 Summary 
While a discussion on Kenya’s neo-patrimonial state in relation to the framework developed 
in chapter 2 is further borne out in chapter 7, two key issues require mention here. First, 
from the analysis in this chapter, it is obvious that the political and economic sector of 
Kenya is closely intertwined with patrimonial tendencies. Clientelist practises thus spill over 
from the political to the economic sector. Second, the ‘aid-cartel’ through its conditionality 
programme has generated a norm in which little actual progress on policy reform has to be 
achieved to remain in good standing of the regime. As was evidenced in this section, the 
flow of aid between 1970 and 1999 accounted for over 20 percent of Kenya’s budget. Thus 
the rhetoric of ‘aid based on condition’ has simply facilitated a norm that pressure to reform 
is not really contingent to aid flow. Focusing specifically on the telecom sector, the 
remainder of the study locates the above argument within Kenya’s telecom reform process 
and the economic and political events happening in the country which led to Kenya’s 







Part II: The Kenyan Telecommunications Reform process  
Since their emergence as recognised entities, states have been concerned with their role in the international 
order with increasing their stature therein. Economic strength is one clear indicator of state power. To 
enhance their position, states throughout history have entered into legal and other arrangements to 
protect and further their economic interest 
Celia Taylor (1997 p.775) 
Drawing on the third assumption premised in chapter 2, namely that instead of committing 
to reforms, neo-patrimonial elites instrumentalise systems of conditionalities to evade forms 
of policy reforms that would dilute their control on state resources; the remainder of this 
section and chapter 6 presents evidence of this characteristic in the telecom sector. This 
suggests that an understanding of the importance and nature of the telecom sector in 
African countries as public institutions merits our understanding. As shall be evidenced in 
the remainder of the study, the telecom sector in Kenya not only provides employment for a 
large portion of its citizens but acts as a power base for many political elites therefore 
making liberalisation an issue of contestation.  
While it is difficult to accurately characterise and artificially construct distinct telecom policy 
eras, this study classifies these periods based on a number of factors that underlie and 
facilitate their ‘classification’. It should however be noted that there is some degree of 
overlap. This study therefore uses themes as a means of conceptualising the periods. While 
dates are provided they are only a means of indication of the period in which the events took 
place. The first period - colonial heritage (pre-independence to 1970) evidences the nature of 
the landscape of the telecom sector that the Kenyan Government inherited. Articulating the 
needs of the country, the second period - pressure to reform (1970-1997) evidences the 
initial steps towards reforms and the issues of contest between state interests and 
international conditions for reform that were articulated through the GATS.  The third 
period - accession to the GATS (1997-1999), articulates the policy legislation, with the 
promulgation of the KCA in 1998, the establishment of an independent regulator and the 
licensing of telecom which afforded Telkom a five-year period of exclusivity on all basic 
services and supply of facilities. The fourth period – dancing to tunes, which starts in 1997 







conditions. While all four periods are significant, the period – dancing to tunes, is discussed 
in chapter 6 as it lays out the events that took place in implementing the GATS. Appendix D 
provides a summary of the main events in the telecom sector in Kenya as discussed in this 
chapter and Chapter 6. 
5.5 Overview 
As noted, it is difficult to artificially construct distinct policy areas that would delineate the 
shifting balances from monopoly to privatisation. Running parallel with the broader political 
and economic transformation in the country reviewed in part I of this chapter, the process 
of reform in the telecom sector has evolved gradually, increasing in the late 1980s in line 
with international trends and technological advances. Nonetheless, viewed from a legal 
policy perspective, change for most telecom analysts in Kenya occurred following the 
enactment of the KCA. This Act constituted the framework for exclusive Government 
provision of all telecom services. While this study has chosen to classify four main policy 
periods commencing prior to independence, this is done within the context of the broader 
political changes taking place at the time. At the risk of repetition, this interplay is crucial to 
understanding the unique policy milieu that set the framework for examination of the 
current telecom policy and understanding its implementation. Moreover, as noted earlier, 
locating Kenya’s telecom reform process within the broader international context of telecom 
reform as framed within the WTO provides the basis upon which to examine the way in 
which neo-patrimonial states interact with IFIs. 
5.6 Colonial heritage (1895-1970) 
The history of the telecom sector in Kenya can be traced back to 1895 when Kenya was part 
of the East African Protectorate. Records of 1895 indicate that the British East Africa 
Trading Company operated the telecom route between Mombassa and the then Sultanate of 
Witu (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2005). The submarine cables linking Zanzibar, Mombasa 
and Dar es Salaam laid by the Eastern and Southern African Telegraph Company in 1888, 
were Kenya’s earliest telecom connections to the outside world. Within the country, the 







of Mombasa with Lamu. Further linkages to other parts of the country began in 1896 in 
conjunction with the building of the railway system, forming a dual ‘backbone’ for Kenya’s 
telecom infrastructure. The telegraph line reached Nairobi (which later became Kenya’s 
capital city) in 1898 and Entebe in Uganda in 1900. In the same year 18 telephone 
subscribers were connected (ibid, 2005). The East African Railways later built and operated 
telecom facilities to the hinterland. In 1948, the East African Posts and Telecommunications 
Corporation which covered Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania all under British colonial control 
was incorporated (East African Posts and Telecommunications Act, 1951). Like all aspects 
of the colonial regime, any form of telecom infrastructure was constructed for the benefit of 
the British Government and its allies, rather than for the people of Kenya. The main 
purpose of the telecom infrastructure then was to facilitate communication between trading 
routes from the coastal region around the Indian Ocean to the hinterland.  
Indeed, even with Kenya’s independence from its colonial master in 1963, existing telecom 
infrastructure reflected British interests with access to telecom restricted largely to the main 
trading hubs.  The main impact of this infrastructure was the creation of cities that followed 
similar patterns as the trade routes established by the British. Thus, although Kenya has one 
of the better developed infrastructures in Southern Africa (not including for South Africa), 
its underlying social context developed within the classification of rural and city has meant 
that telecom infrastructure is concentrated more in urban than rural areas.  
Rurality (rural conditions in Kenya) has inherent structural challenges which impose a 
penalty on Government and telecom service providers to expand access to rural areas. This 
penalty is expressed in two ways in Kenya. First, rural areas have a lower socio-economic 
development and, consequently in many cases, a lower purchasing capacity for telecom 
infrastructure and services. Second, the nature of work in the rural areas is oriented towards 
farming and therefore any telecom policy would have to provide mechanisms that allow 
these technologies to complement rural socio-economic development and therefore benefit 
from both synergies. The challenge of economic and social development therefore required 
detailed Government policy to develop rural areas. Mantra-like, the idea of changing the 







subsequent policy and later amendments. Development objectives and the promotion of 
small and medium sized enterprises all enshrined in the spirit of ‘harambee’ were later to 
jockey for priority with more pedestrian aims often given the highest priority in western 
countries, such as the promotion of competition and industry stability.  
5.7 Pressure to reform (1970-1990) 
In 1977, telecom services which were managed under the East African Community (EAC) 
collapsed.111 In response, the Kenyan Government established the KP&TC under the 
Kenya Telecommunications Act, which came into force on December 31st 1977. Until 1999, 
KP&TC was vertically integrated into postal services, telecom services and regulatory 
functions and operated under the traditional functions of a PTT organisation, under the full 
control of the Postmaster General (PMG). It was a statutory monopoly provider in the 
postal and telecom services.112 Predictably under that structure it was a Government 
department with its finances controlled by the Treasury; revenue was paid into and expenses 
paid from the exchequer. It operated an internal system of cross-subsidies from telecom to 
postal services and coupled with its historical budgetary dependence on the Government, 
suffered from a perennial shortage of capital required for expansion. As a regulator it easily 
locked out competitors as it also owned the network in addition to providing telecom 
services. The inequity in this was manifest as it charged competitors and consumers 
exorbitant fees with limited regulatory oversight from the Ministry of Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications. All communications functions, from post, to telephone and telegraph, 
were owned, operated and regulated by the state. As a Government entity, Moi’s regime 
used KP&TC to employ people from his community. So entrenched was the employment of 
the Kalenjin community in KP&TC that the joke was that to get good services at the 
KP&TC one had to speak the ethnic language of Kalenjin. Like all other public institutions, 
the head of KP&TC was a Presidential appointee and not surprisingly came from the 
Kalenjin community. On the operational side, KP&TC was heavily bloated with personnel, 
                                                 
111 East African Posts and Telecommunications Act, 1951, Laws of the East African Community. For further insight see 
Bernard Sihanya, Transferring and Regulating Telecommunications Technology in Kenya (1995) (Unpublished LL.M 
thesis, Warwick Law School) (Given to author for review). 







exhibited little evidence of concern for consumer interests and was highly inefficient with 
long waiting lists for line installation (Sean, 2002). In addition, KP&TC, along with other 
parastatals, had accumulated enormous foreign debt through loans on the international 
capital markets to fund its network expansion in the preceding years. With the rapid decline 
of the Kenyan shilling in the international market in the late 1980s these debts escalated 
dramatically.  
In spite of the problems besetting the telecom sector, Kenya’s telecom capacity grew from 
an exchange capacity of 88,000 lines for population of 15 million in 1977 to 310,000 by 
2001. Payphones increased from 100 in 1977, 588 in 1981 to approximately 5000 in 2001 
(CCK, 2005). In the years between 1980 and 1990 the growth and change of the telecom 
sector internationally was reflected on the changes taking place domestically. While slower, 
the changes were the start of the reform process of the telecom sector in Kenya and the rest 
of Africa. The main users of the then new technologies such as internet and electronic 
communications were civil society organisations (CSOs) led by international organisations 
such as the UN which had many of its main offices for the African region in Kenya. But 
given the high costs of access and lack of competition in the sector, internet access remained 
the privilege of a few. In 1982, Kenya hosted the first ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in 
Sub-Saharan Africa that recognised the critical inadequacy of telecom in the continent. The 
Plenipotentiary Conference established a Commission113 to identify and recommend ways of 
stimulating the expansion of telecom across the world. Three years later in 1985, Tanzania 
hosted a global conference on telecom - the first World Telecommunications Development 
Conference (WTDC) to evaluate and make recommendations on the way forward based on 
the Commission’s report. For the first time, world governments, including the governments 
of Africa (Kenya included), made a declaration to ensure that there was a telephone line 
within ‘easy reach’ by the early part of the twenty first century (Mureithi, 2002). This set the 
pace for the reforms in the telecom sector in Kenya with the priority hinged on rural access 
or what then later become known as Universal Access.  
                                                 







Coupled with pressure from the international community and technological developments in 
the late 1980s, especially cellular communications which heralded a serious challenge to the 
rationale for a single operator to most efficiently supply all basic telephony, Kenya joined the 
WTO, placing its membership on April 15th 1994. Accession to the WTO was ratified on 
December 23rd 1994 and Kenya became a member of the WTO on January 1st 1995 (WTO, 
2005). Under the Single Undertaking, all WTO Multilateral Agreements became binding 
upon Kenya. As a developing country, Kenya utilised the flexibility inherent in the GATS 
and made its first schedule of specific commitments to the GATS on April 15th 1994 
(GATS/SC/47 (94-1045)). While the need to reform the telecom sector in Kenya was 
obvious, no commitments in relation to the telecom sector were made with the focus instead 
chose to make commitments in the banking, transport and insurance sectors. This was based 
on the conditions of privatisation programme that had begun in 1991 as discussed in the 
previous section. As shall be argued, the Moi regime had no intention of reforming the 
telecom sector. Nor did they have any intention of institutionalising the WTO trade process 
within Kenya’s institutional structure. Nonetheless, NCWTO114 was formed in 1995. Its 
main mandates were to raise issues of Kenyan interest at the WTO (Ikiara, 2000). In spite of 
pressure from the donor community, interviews with KP&TC management in this period 
reveal that the Government had no intention of ever selling its main asset as noted by one 
interviewee: do you think Moi was willing to sell Telkom? Oh no! there is no way he would sell or even 
privatise parts of it, that was part of his political power base (interview #20).  
In 1991, frustrated by the off-track movement of the economic reform as well as the 
Government’s anti-democratisation posture, the World Bank and IMF cut off the aid 
programme. This lead to a major economic and political crisis in 1992 which was an election 
year. Seeking to pacify the donor community, the Government under the Moi regime 
announced that it had provided for partial liberalisation of telecom allowing other players to 
enter only the terminal equipment market in 1991 and was therefore abiding by ongoing 
negotiations at the WTO (KP&TC, 1992). Under the new regulations, consumers could 
secure the services of qualified engineers. What was not said, however, was that the terminal 
                                                 







equipment market was already an open market registered by KP&TC (interview #12). This 
was to be the first of much political rhetoric on the intended reform process. 
Nonetheless, due to technological changes sweeping the global market, Mobile phones were 
introduced in 1992. They were provided through an analogue system that was widely known 
as the Extended Total Access Communication System (ETACS), and was commercially 
launched in 1993. During this entry period telecom services were so expensive that only a 
few elites within the upper echelon of society could afford them. The cost of owning a 
mobile handset was as high as Kshs.250,000115. This resulted in a marginal mobile subscriber 
growth of less than 20,000 for a period of seven years (from 1993 - 1999) (interview #17). In 
1995, a second international gateway project was completed at Kericho Earth Station. In the 
following year, KP&TC launched a high-speed digital data circuit service known as 
KENSTREAM. Other services were to happen in due course including very small aperture 
terminal (VSAT)116 known as KENSAT. All value added services such as VSAT, packet 
switching and leased lines were under the control of the monopoly - KP&TC, while paging 
was made a private monopoly. There was virtually no competition with the KP&TC except 
international services offered by call-back operators which Kenya had declared illegal 
through a notice to ITU. In 1995, a workshop organised by the Telecommunications 
Foundation of Africa to understand the use of internet and the new opportunities it offered 
attracted more than ten email service providers. Attendance was high reflecting a growing 
interest in the sector. Nevertheless, immediately after the workshop, KP&TC declared 
internet services an illegal use of leased lines, thus ensuring that the KP&TC and therefore 
the Government had a firm hold on the sector (interview #15).  
                                                 
115 The equivalent to the monthly earnings of a senior manager in a private organisation.. 
116 A VSAT is “an earthbound station used in satellite communications of data, voice and video signals, excluding broadcast 
television. A VSAT consists of two parts, a transceiver that is placed outdoors in direct line of sight to the satellite and a 
device that is placed indoors to interface the transceiver with the end user's communications device, such as a PC. The 
transceiver receives or sends a signal to a satellite transponder in the sky. The satellite sends and receives signals from a 
ground station computer that acts as a hub for the system. Each end user is interconnected with the hub station via the 
satellite, forming a star topology. The hub controls the entire operation of the network. For one end user to communicate 
with another, each transmission has to first go to the hub station that then retransmits it via the satellite to the other end 







Moi stood for re-election under the newly formed multi-party system with the promise for 
change and liberalisation of the telecom sector. But between 1992 and 1997, the status quo 
remained in the telecom sector. By 1997, there were only 290,000 telephone lines to serve a 
population of about 30 million people. Only about one percent of the population was served 
with fixed-line telephone lines and there were only about 9,000 mobile telephones in the 
country due to relatively high installation and running costs. Kenya’s teledensity (telephone 
lines per 1000 people) in the second half of the 1990s was therefore lower than the African 
average (ITU, 1998).  
Meanwhile discussion with the World Bank and the IMF had been taking place with the aim 
of resuming aid that had been cancelled in 1998. With the help of the World Bank, as already 
noted, a team of experts from the private sector and international organisations (popularly 
known as the Economic Recovery Team or the Dream Team) was recruited into the civil 
service to initiate economic recovery and ensure economic reforms and good governance at 
the Treasury. The negotiations that took place between 1997 and 2000 led to agreement to 
continue to further liberalise the telecom sector which was still a Government owned 
monopoly. With the freeze on all aid by the IMF and the World Bank in 1996, the Kenyan 
Government acceded to the World Bank and IMF conditions, confirming their intention to 
fully liberalise the telecom sector. In doing so the IMF granted Kenya a three-year loan as 








According to the IMF press release (IMF, 1996) the main objectives of the new loan were to 
achieve  
…progress in privatisation and restructuring of a number of key enterprises (eg., completion of the 
privatisation of Kenya airways, commercialisation of the National Cereals and Produce Board, the 
contracting out of management of the container terminal of the Kenya Port Authority in Mombasa, 
and partial privatisation of the telecommunications functions of the Kenya 
Posts and Telecommunications Corporation{Emphasis added}. 
Seeking to meet the new funding framework under the ESAF, the Kenyan Government in 
1996 adopted a policy framework paper known as the Economic Reforms 1996-1998 (RoK, 
1996-1998) and included a draft telecom proposal which was formulated partly to respond 
to pressure from the World Bank, IMF and WTO. It largely reproduced the suggested RP 
framework of the GATS which Kenya was yet to commit to. The key elements of the 
telecom proposal related to reforms in restructuring and liberalising the telecom sector 
namely: the separation of postal and telecom services, the selling of 30 percent of KP&TC’s 
shares to a strategic investor through public flotation, an introduction of joint ventures for 
cellular phones; and liberalisation of pay phones and VSAT  (RoK, 1996-1998). This draft 
telecom proposal was never formally published as the broader negotiations of the draft 
policy were mainly hindered by Kenya’s second multi-party elections which took place in 
1997. Telecom priorities took a back seat while other political priorities such as the 
introduction of small and medium financing, agricultural support and accessibility through 
the construction of roads rose to the fore. Between the first and second multi-party elections 
(1992 and 1997), very little in terms of telecom policy was achieved. This is not to suggest 
that telecom objectives were lacking in importance but rather that the delay in telecom 
reforms was evidence of more pre-eminent political priorities. The 1997 elections reflected 
the differing opinions on developmental priorities as each aspiring party ranked telecom 
reforms as first and or second in their objectives. For example: the main political party - 
KANU in their development programme, noted that telecom would be the first issue they 







Immediately after the 1997 elections, the Ministry of Transport and Communications wrote 
a Postal and Telecommunications Policy statement that was drafted as a Bill and published. 
The Bill proposed to map the orderly expansion and modernisation of the telecom sector up 
to 2015 by including, for example, specific targets for telephone penetration, privatisation 
and market structure (KCA, 1998).117 The Bill reflected intended changes as proposed 
through the GATS.  However, because MPs felt that the Bill would reduce monopoly of 
Telkom and hence their perceived benefits, the Bill received heavy criticism (interview #17). 
In addition, MPs complained about the broad definition of telecom that would have 
regulated almost all electronic equipment (interview #17). In the end, Parliament was 
prorogued before this Bill could be passed. Finally after much political debate, another Bill 
was drafted that largely reproduced the 1997 Bill. The Bill known as The Kenya 
Communication Bill was passed and some of its provisions became law on February 15th 
1999. The KCA118 provides the framework for the regulation of the communications sector 
in Kenya. Enacted by Parliament in 1998, the Act was a deliberate attempt to give legislative 
teeth to the Postal and Telecommunications Sector Policy Statement (the Policy Statement).  
Nonetheless, it must be recognised that consultation in the KCA was not part of the 
process. No stakeholders were invited to the drawing board and as interview informants 
reveal, we were not considered and neither were we invited…the industry has mainly been a non-participatory 
sector, with Government as the final say in all issues (interview #56) Thus, key actors participating in 
the writing of the KCA came from KP&TC under the stewardship of the then Minister of 
Posts and Telecommunications (interview #16, and #17). The Government appeared 
content for telecom reform to steam-roll without stakeholder deliberation. 
                                                 
117 The draft bills later become known as the Kenya Communications Act 1998, discussed shortly in this chapter. 
118 Sometimes referred to as KCA No. 2 of 1998. While officially known as the Kenya Communications Act 1998, others 








5.7.1  1999 - Entering into a transaction cost: Kenya utilises the flexibly in the GATS 
telecom instruments and makes commitments 
Against this background, Kenya made amendments to its schedule of specific commitments 
(GATS/SC/47)119 of 1994 (see Appendix B) specifically as they related to the telecom sector 
on November 18th 1999. Kenya thus expanded its offer on basic telephony made in 1994 to 
include both facilities-based and public switched telephone network (PSTN) services.120 
Together this would include voice telephone services, telex services, telegraph services and 
private leased lines under public use and Value Added Network Services (VANS)121 
(excluding Voice over VANS), email, paging and electronic data interchange services (EDI). 
A further limitation on the horizontal level was placed on foreign investment to a maximum 
of 30 percent to encourage local investment in the sector (interview #23). However, on all 
the above services, monopoly of the supply was left to exclusively to Telkom until 2003. 
This would mean that by December 31st 2003 the feasibility of an additional network 
operator and or the addition of more PSTN suppliers would be possible. In terms of PSTN, 
Kenya retained its market access limitation on cross-border supply limiting service only 
through Telkom. This also applied to mobile services and satellite services in which Kenya 
placed a limitation on the gateway operator as Telkom. In all cases international call back 
services were not permitted. It was noted however, that a subsequent operator would be 
licensed after December 2003.  
In making commitments, Kenya’s Schedule of Specific Commitments adopted 
through the KCA reflected an intention to limit the extent to which foreign 
investment in the telecom sector could take place and therefore retain Government 
control in the sector. Thus, the Kenyan Government utilised the flexibility inherent 
                                                 
119 Kenya schedule of specific commitments in Basic Telecommunications- GATS/SC/47/Suppl.2; which replaced pages 2 
and 3 of GATS/SC/47 of 1994. 
120 PSTN refers to the international telephone system based on copper wires carrying analogue voice data. This is in contrast 
to newer telephone networks base on digital technologies. Telephone services carried by PSTN are often called Plain Old 
Telephone Services (POTS). 
121 In general, VANS include cellular telephony (either mobile or fixed), cable television, email and web-based services. In 
this particular case however, VoIP was not included. Nonetheless there is still a lot of controversy surrounding the precise 







in the GATS to specifically ensure that the incumbent provider KP&TC would retain 
exclusive monopoly under the new framework. This commitment as shall be discussed 
was to undermine any progress in the telecom sector. Nonetheless as one former member of 
the Moi Government noted future course of action in the telecom ensured that the Government of Kenya 
had a stream of revenue from Telkom that was guaranteed (interview #10). In addition, the new 
services to be licensed would provide Kenya with added long-term revenue in which to 
invest in the sector. However, as shall be shown, this process was delayed even after 
accession to the GATS.  
Kenya also adopted the RP in its entirety (see appendix C). As discussed in chapter 4, the 
adoption of the RP and the scheduling of commitments, was done after long and protracted 
negotiations in which African countries as a block argued that their commitment would only 
be made if they were allowed to ensure that they could limit competition for a while so as to 
ensure that the provision of USOs were met. Chapter 4 detailed the main premise of this 
document, which requires broadly that competitive safeguards constraining major operators 
are developed, including mandatory interconnection; that licensing, spectrum allocation and 
USO are transparent, any obligations are effected in a non-discriminatory manner, and an 
independent regulator is established. Although all the principles in the RP were specified in 
the KCA, as noted in chapter 4, a telecom sector in transition from monopoly to 
competitive service supply infrequently lends itself to the smooth introduction of 
competition. The endorsement and adoption of these principles at international level is 
enormously instrumental in sustaining what constitutes the minimum regulatory elements 
within the domestic regulatory environment.  
As discussed in chapter 2, the institutionalisation of these principles at international level 
created certainty and uniformity for all potential investors. But this left the Government in a 
difficult position. Not adopting the WTO agreements would signal a lack of commitment on 
its part not only to other nations (which would endanger its other GATT commitments) but, 
more importantly, to the ‘aid-cartel’ of which the WTO was part. Acceding to the GATS 
was therefore based on the need to assert Kenya as a credible country to invest in and also as 







standards. Not surprisingly all 6 members of the NCWTO interviewed were in agreement 
that Kenya’s accession was to show that Kenya was committed to the reform. As eloquently 
put by one of the NCWTO members: 
Even if we were not so sure of what we were doing, really, at the end of the day there was nothing to 
lose, we had merely articulated the Governments intended interest as specified through the ongoing 
discussions of reforming the {Kenyan} sector (interview #60). 
In signing the Fourth Protocol, Kenya had now committed to opening its domestic market 
in basic services over a phased in period. It has been suggested elsewhere in this study that if 
one were to overlay the Fourth Protocol commitments on to the KCA, it is evident that the 
augmented schedule was fashioned directly from the structure and tenor of the KCA. As 
noted by the members of the NCWTO, the overarching theme remained the preservation of 
Telkom’s exclusivity on basic services and concomitant protection of its revenue stream. A 
novel feature, however, concerned the motivation for this protection as articulated in 
previous policy development reports and canonised in the Act through the objective of 
providing affordable telecom access. Thus, in scheduling commitments, Kenya was merely 
utilising the flexibility of the GATS which provided for it to ensure that the reasons given 
for closing and limiting market access to other service providers was based on the need to 
ensure that it was committed to first and foremost providing basic telecom services to the 
majority of the Kenyan population rather than creating market competition.  
The details of how the GATS schedules were canonised in the Act are discussed below. 
Specifically, the discussion of the KCA remains limited to the telecom policy goals under the 
Act. 
5.8 The Kenya Communications Act (KCA)  
Structurally, Kenya’s Schedule of Specific Commitments breaks down telecom into four 
main themes, namely: operating procedures, market structure, financial provisions, 
regulation (licensing and competition and interconnection) and universal service obligations, 







Commitments provides a number of thematic focal points. The first is the recognition that a 
careful balance had to be struck between the phased introduction of competition in the 
telecom sector with its emphasis on the free market on the one hand, and the protection of a 
regulated monopoly in order to secure access to telecom services for under-serviced areas 
(mainly the rural community) (KCA, 1998). Underlying this assumption, arguably correctly 
reasoned at the time, was that exclusivity would best serve the goal of expanding the national 
telecom infrastructure; the development of universal access as well as overall economic 
growth; be conducive to customer focus and would enhance Kenya’s international capacity. 
In his address to Parliament following the enactment of the KCA, the then Minister for 
Transport and Communications, Mr Musalia Mudavadi emphasised the role to be played by 
the new Act in providing service to the entire country. He noted that:  
The Government of Kenya has embarked on a series of initiatives to revitalise the economy into a 
modern market oriented one. The aim is to improve the economic well-being of Kenyans by 
establishing Kenya, in the medium term, as the centre of industrial and financial activities in the 
region. The sector policy statement aims to define the framework within which telecommunications 
and postal services will be provided (Postal and Telecommunications Policy Guidelines, 
2001).  
The KCA therefore reflects the development priority of providing telecom service to all 
parts of the country (more so the rural areas). The KCA thus articulates it as: 
…to best promote the goals of the sector, which include: the expansion of the telecommunications 
infrastructure and attainment of universal service, the promotion of growth within the sector and as 
an enabling infrastructure for economic growth in other areas…Telkom should be granted a period 
of exclusivity to provide basic public switched telecommunications services …Particularly during the 
period of exclusivity, the central goal is the building out of the basic network as quickly and as 
extensively as possible (KCA, 1998  Part III) 
The second thematic focal point provided by the Act is that competition is necessary to 
ultimately advance the delivery of high-level services that are capable of meeting the needs of 







interest objective underlying exclusivity. This is reflected in the KCA through the exclusivity 
clause for Telkom (KCA, 1998). Thus drawing on the discussions in chapter 2, specifically 
Melody (1997b), any reference to competition was taken to mean ‘regulated competition’. 
Competition was to be a means to an end, not an end in itself. So, for example, services-
based competition such as resale was only to be permitted in year four of the exclusivity 
period. This would translate to 2003. It was accepted that peripheral competition would 
begin and indeed continue in enhanced services but the core of the PSTN was to remain 
protected until Telkom could prepare itself to compete effectively. This approach was in line 
with international developments at the time, outlined in chapter 1 and 2. Globally, in 
applying the GATS framework, countries were promoting competition, reducing 
monopolies, increasing private and in some cases foreign investment, while introducing 
independent regulation.  
Independent regulation is the third emerging theme and was crucial to managing the reform 
process in the sector. Outside the market structure question, other provisions in the KCA 
envisaged the deregulation of customer premises equipment, the rebalancing of tariffs by 
year four of the exclusivity period and the establishment of a Universal Service Fund (USF) 
to collect contributions from all operators. These contributions were to be collected to 
subsidise the costs of universal service. The failings in the implementation as shall be 
discussed are however, as it is suggested, not only as a result of the GATS provision which 
provides for the ability to schedule limitation on the sector, but also a lack of independent 
regulation to implement effective regulation.  
In line with the above themes, the KCA made three main structural changes to the telecom 
sector. First, it repealed the KP&TC Act of 1977 (Cap. 411). Second, it separated postal and 
telecom services (KP&TC), establishing the Postal Corporation of Kenya as a statutory 
monopoly.122  Telecom services were to be provided by Telkom, which would be the 
network owner and service provider and was to have an interim monopoly of five years. At 
least, that was the intention on paper. As shall be evidenced later on; this is still a thorny 
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policy issue to date. Third, the KCA created a separate regulatory agency - CCK123 to 
regulate both postal and telecom services. To accommodate the provisions of the Act, which 
required the separation of both the postal and telecom sectors, KP&TC was split into three 
legal entities in July 1999, namely Telkom, Postal Corporation of Kenya (POSTA)124 and 
CCK. This mode of implementation, namely: splitting KP&TC to create three policy sectors 
was to provide regulatory problems as shall be discussed.  
Telkom was incorporated under the Companies Act (Cap.486) as a limited liability company 
with the Government of Kenya as the shareholder. However over time the Government 
intended to offload 49 percent of its shareholding. Consequently, Telkom was issued with 
licences in all areas as reflected through Kenya’s Schedule of Specific commitments. Figure 3 
(adapted from Mureithi, 2002) below depicts this policy framework as it stood between 1999 
and 2004.125 
                                                 
123 Communications Commission of Kenya abbreviated as CCK. First referred to in chapter 1. 
124 Understandably, this study does not enter into a discussion on POSTA which was established under the Postal 
Corporation of Kenya Act (No 3. of 1998) to provide postal and postal financial services. 
125 In late 2004, the Ministry of Transport and Communications was merged with the Ministry of Broadcasting to create the 








To the extent that it is possible to graphically represent the relationships in the sector, the 
graph shows the main features of the policy framework. Three main sectors are evidenced. 
First, the policy sector-responsible for making policy and creating a framework upon which 
the sector would develop with a policy adviser - NCS. Second, the service sector responsible 
for supplementing Government resources and expanding infrastructure – Telkom and other 
service providers. Third, a market referee - CCK, responsible for ensuring the operations of 
the Act. This fulfilled the mandates of the RP and became effective on July 1st 1999.  
While regulatory practice does not always dichotomise neatly into policy creation and 
implementation, the latter inevitably shapes and contours policy. The Act, in separating 
policy formulation, operations and regulation, accords with Melody’s (1997b) three-tier 
model and definition discussed in chapter 2. It is important to note, however, that Kenya’s 
legislation does not fully limit the regulator to mere implementation by setting out precisely 
what it must implement. In implementing a broad policy mandate, it is argued that the 
regulator is also making, rather than merely implementing policy, and indeed shaping it 







between policy formulation and implementation is not fully possible. This, as we shall see, 
provided a source of tension between NCS and CCK. 
As will be illustrated, however, while assigning various responsibilities to individuals and 
institutions seemed relatively easy on paper, the actual mechanics of this implementation 
proved less than easy. In this regard, Howlett & Ramesh (2003), suggest that an analysis of 
domestic outcomes starts at the relationship and linkage between the executive, legislative 
and judiciary provided under a country’s constitution which affect institutional design and 
public policy making within the domestic arena. Thus, because of the special interest that the 
Government had over the telecom sector, political wrangles were manifest. Moreover, 
because power resides with the President who appoints all Cabinet Ministers and heads of 
Government and parastatal offices it was all about who the President wanted for the position and any 
case the President wanted to make sure his own men would be running the show given the important nature of 
Telkom to the Government (interview #4).  
Thus, with members of Parliament trying to get their opinions heard over who should head 
the new offices, political disagreements became manifest through various reports in the 
press (“Big changes expected”, 1999; Omari, 1999; Akumu, 1999). In the end, the four 
positions of Executive Director of Telkom, CCK, Posta and NCS were appointed based on 
affiliation to the President (interview #45) and all came from the same tribe as the President. 
In addition, it has been argued by some interviewees that the appointments were based on 
specific ethnic ties and friendships between the four heads (interview #12). This is not 
farfetched given that all appointees (CCK, NCS and Posta) were at the time working with 
the KP&TC and held different managerial positions prior to the split. The new MD of CCK 
was the then former Company Secretary of Telkom, the new MD of Telkom was the former 
head of the KP&TC and the new PMG was the former head of the Postal Services 
Department. The fourth, - the new head of the NCS was a former colleague and friend of 
the Minister of telecom. The Ministry of Transport and Broadcasting and the Ministry of 
Communications and Tourism were retained and as indicated earlier merged in late 2004.  
The regulatory body for the sector, CCK, was mandated by the Act to discharge the 







principles and manage the radio frequency spectrum. The development priority of the sector 
was ‘set in stone’ through the KCA’s stated objective to provide; efficient, reliable and affordable 
communication services throughout the country (KCA, 1998 Part I). For example, in the area of 
telecom services, it intended to improve penetration in the rural areas from 0.16 lines (in 
2001) to five lines per 100 people by 2015 and  increase service penetration in the urban 
areas from four lines (in 2001) to 20 lines per 100 people by 2015 (KCA, 1998). These 
targets translated to an installation of 1.5 million fixed-lines in rural areas and 2.4 million 
fixed-lines in urban areas. This would amount to a total investment US$ 5.85 billion over 15 
years at an estimated cost of about US$ 1,500 per line. This means that, on average, the new 
annual capital requirements for Telkom would have to amount to an estimate of US$ 390 
million. It was within this context that the restructuring of Telkom and a step by step 
liberalisation of the sector was undertaken with a view to attracting capital from the private 
sector and, in turn, enhance the development goals.  
The telecom policy strategy to achieve this was divided into two sections: developing a 
regulatory framework and creating competition. First, like the terms of the RP, the KCA set 
out a modern regulatory regime suitable for a multiple-operator environment necessary to 
support the revitalisation of the telecom and postal sectors. The Act’s regulations are defined 
in line with the roles of the Commission and are divided into two main areas which address 
all six principles discussed in chapter 4, and can be summed up as competitive neutrality - 
which refers to the fair treatment of business and persons involved in the telecom sector. 
The KCA articulates this as: the commission shall, in performance of its duties under the Act and these 
Regulations, promote, develop and enforce fair competition and equality of treatment among licensees in any 
business or service relating to communications (KCA, 1998 Part II). In addition, telecom licensing 
procedures governs the commission’s role in providing licences based on the Act. (KCA, 
1998) 
The second aim of the telecom policy strategy was to create competition in the sector. 
Bearing in mind that KP&TC was a monopoly as were most telecom sectors in Africa 
before liberalisation, competition was seen as the key solution to the sector’s progress. As 







telecom services to all areas particularly those that were un-served or under-served. In 
seeking to promote a liberalised sector and at the same time provide telecom services, the 
Kenyan Government, through the KCA, placed the objective of USO as a burden on all 
players in the market. The KCA states that all players will be expected to contribute towards this goal, 
however, where the service is deemed to be uneconomical the Government would undertake to avail appropriate 
subventions (KCA, 1998 Part III). This is in line with the RP which states that: 
 any member has the right to define the kind of Universal Service obligation it wishes to maintain. 
Such obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per se, provided they are administered in a 
manner and are not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of Universal Service defined by 
the Member (WTO, 2001). 
The idea of taxing a potential would-be player in the market was, however, not fully 
operationalised as shall be discussed in chapter 6. Nonetheless, in spite of asking other new 
potential players to participate and enshrining this in their licences as shall be evidenced, the 
main burden of USO was in the hands of the incumbent operator - Telkom as a 
Government-owned company. In line with its horizontal commitments placed on the 
schedules, Kenya’s equity participation in the telecom market was canonised in the KCA to 
ensure that the wider Kenyan populace was part of the liberalisation process and that 
Government would continue to have some stake in the processes. 
The Government would continue to encourage Kenyans to actively participate in the sector through 
equity ownership. Consequently, it will be a requirement that any firm licensed to provide services in 
the liberalised market segments should have at least 30 percent of its equity owned by Kenyans. 
However for all listed companies, the equity participation shall conform to the equity rules and 
regulations of the Capital Market Authority (CMA). This policy would be reviewed from time to 
time in line with the country’s investment and socio-economic needs (Postal and 
Telecommunication Policy Guidelines, 2001).  
Finally in opening up the sector and complying with the GATS, the KCA made provisions 







SNO.126.Thus in adhering to the Schedule of Specific Commitments as well as policy 
development priorities such as ensuring local investment opportunities, the KCA 
enshrined the limitations of market access. In doing so, the importance of the GATS 
framework is depicted not only as a credibility enhancing framework for Kenya in 
the international arena and for its donor community but also in structuring the 
outcomes of the telecom sector in Kenya.  
In placing limitations on market access, Kenya made the following segments exclusive to 
Telkom to December 31st 2003 after which time all areas would be subject to competition. 
Nonetheless, as a service provider in the telecom market, Telkom was granted a licence for 
25 years in each of the below sectors. However, market access was restricted to Telkom until 
its expiry on 31st December 2003, (KCA, 1998) with the following sectors restricted only to 
Telkom: 
• Global mobile Communications by Satellite (GMPCS); 
• International Commercial VSAT networks; 
• Internet Node Backbone; and 
• Local Network Operators covering the geographic region of Nairobi (all other areas 
would be licensed immediately). 
As indicated in the Postal and Telecommunications Policy Guidelines, 49 percent of the 
Kenyan Government shares would be sold and a second national operator also licensed 
(Postal and Telecommunications Policy Guidelines, 2001). The following sectors were 
therefore restricted to Telkom until a second national operator was licensed:  
• National Long Distance Telephone Service; and 
• International long Distance Telephone services. 
                                                 







Kenya’s Schedule of Specific Commitments also placed limitations on Mobile Satellite 
Service including the GMPCS citing previous global agreements made under the GMPCS 
memorandum of understanding (GMPCS-MOU) with the ITU. The following telecom 
services were given full market access for liberalisation with no exclusivity to Telkom: 
• Value added services (this includes electronic mail, voice mail, store and forward fax, 
Internet Service Provision, Video Conferencing and EDI); and 
• Public Telephone Service Resale (this includes customer Telephone Service Resale and 
Internal and External wiring) and Paging. 
It should be noted, however, that the precise length of exclusivity was negotiable. Telkom’s 
licence stipulated that if the roll-out and quality of service targets specified in its licence were 
met, exclusivity could be extended by an additional year (KCA, 1998). However, as shall be 
discussed, the legality of this was challenged. This unresolved issue caused conflict in the 
telecom sector as is indicated in chapter 6. Nevertheless, the commitments made under the 
Fourth Protocol reflect a minimum undertaking. As long as there is compliance with the 
principle of non-discrimination, Kenya may freely engage in autonomous liberalisation and 
open markets beyond that committed. The WTO Trade in Services Council has also 
subsequently addressed the modalities and procedure for ‘giving credit’ to countries that 
have autonomously liberalised their services.127 As a signatory, Kenya was obligated to 
implement its schedule without delay and any violation is subject to determination under the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Moreover, full breach is not required to prompt 
redress: the GATS (Article XXIII(3)) contemplates nullification and impairment of a specific 
commitment or benefit as grounds for recourse to the DSB.128  
As has been described, it is obvious that the KCA was fashioned directly from the GATS. It 
is however contestable whether the issue of liberalising the telecom sector for many 
                                                 
127 WTO, Modalities for the Treatment of Autonomous Liberalisation, Adopted by the Special Session of the Council of 
Trade in Services, 6 March 2003.  
128 GATS, Article XXIII(3). See also: Jackson, J. H. (1998). Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems” Journal 
of International Eco. Law 329 p.821. Jackson notes the ambiguity inherent in this term, and documents how DSB panel 







developing countries provides the ambit upon which to provide the corollary argument of 
the GATS that telecom services are a necessity to economic development. This, as was 
discussed in chapter 1 and developed further in chapter 4, forms the bedrock upon which 
most African states such as Kenya enter into the telecom reform process. While it is 
accepted that trade in services is firmly within the WTO and that there is no need to engage 
in the best method debate, an analysis of Kenya’s implementation of the KCA in the 
following chapter provides an opportunity to evaluate this undertaking in light of this 
argument. 
5.9 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was twofold. First it sought to draw together the host of factors and 
events explaining Kenya’s political and economic landscape as a neo-patrimonial state. In 
doing so, the chapter framed the discussion of Kenya within the neo-patrimonial literature 
discussed in chapter 2. The findings reveal that a pervasive political clientelism largely 
structures Kenya’s economic development. Over the years this has resulted in a co-
dependency relationship with what the study calls the ‘aid-cartel’. While, this ofcourse is not 
a full account of the causes of Kenya’s economic and political crisis, it bears noting, that the 
interaction between economic ideas of SAPs and the political clientelism within the state, 
structures to a large extent, Kenya’s decision making process. Alluded to earlier is also the 
allied argument that this co-dependency has created a peculiar norm - a ‘culture of approval’ 
based on meeting conditions specified on paper. The relevance of this, is portrayed in 
chapter 6. 
Having located the discussion of Kenya’s telecom reform within the background of its 
political and economic neo-patrimonial history, the chapter was able to proceed with its 
second aim, namely: to discuss the development of the telecom reform process. What is 
revealed here is that Kenya’s Schedule of Specific Commitments was based on its ability to 
utilise the flexibility inherent in the GATS framework discussed in chapter 4. Thus, in 
specifying its market access limitations, the Kenyan Government was simply abiding by 
international standards. However in doing so, it was also, - underpinning the schedules 







compliance with the GATS agreements, lending support to Chayes and Chayes’ (1995 p.4) 
contention that compliance {with an international treaty} is the normal organisational presumption. 
However, although this appears to be the case, the notion that compliance follows simply 
because it is in the country’s interests to do, as shall be shortly examined, is a contested one. 
As was discussed in chapter 2, there is a need to evaluate how state agents and international 
regimes affect calculations of a state’s self-interest.  
That said, the criticism levelled against the Kenyan Government for not pursuing an 
alternative liberalisation model by various policy analysts of the Kenyan sector (Murithi, 
2003, Sane, 2002) as well as various industry players have largely been without foundation. 
As at 1999, Telkom needed a return on an uncertain investment over the period of 
exclusivity. The Government needed the capital infusion and had little to offer in return. 
Whether competitive tenders for USO, like those carried out in Chile, would have met 
national policy objectives, remains open to question (Wellenius, 2000). Nonetheless, the 
Government sought to preserve and maximise the value of a potentially lucrative state 
enterprise by applying the ‘rules of the game’ played in the WTO. Namely: Scheduling 
Specific Commitments.  
Proceeding with the discussion on telecom reform, chapter 6 locates the telecom reform 
process in the fourth policy period - dancing to tunes. It examines the implementation of the 
GATS telecom commitments undertaken by Kenya as described in this chapter through its 
legal framework the KCA and, considers the evidence of the country’s compliance with 
those undertakings. It should be noted that literature on undertakings in Kenya and even 
Africa’s compliance with international treaties and obligations is scant and although 
implementation of the GATS is not necessarily comparable to executing those treaties 
focused on human rights or the environment, it bears repeating that in so far as 
implementation is concerned, Kenya largely planned its Schedule of Specific Commitments 







6  C h a p t e r  s i x  
THE GATS IMPLEMENATION: DANCING TO TUNES 
We have to decide whether we want to be a country that embraces ICT or consign ourselves to 
backwardness. 
Raphael Tuju129 
Liberalisation of ICT, and indeed, any other market must be done in an orderly manner in order to 




Drawing on the framework developed in chapter 2, the aim of this chapter is to provide 
evidence of the main hypothesis that in applying commitments as a form of credibility, neo-
patrimonial states necessarily only partly conform to the conditionalities and have instead 
instrumentalised the reform process as platforms for their own underlying interests. Having 
confirmed the implicit assumptions inherent in this hypothesis in the previous chapter, this 
chapter analyses the GATS telecom commitments undertaken by Kenya since 1999 and 
considers the extent of the country’s compliance with those undertakings. 
To organise and circumscribe the analysis, this chapter draws on the structure of Kenya’s 
Schedule of Specific Commitments submitted at the time of accession to the Fourth 
Protocol131 (attached in appendix B and C) as reflected in the KCA. Nonetheless, this 
approach is inherently limited in that it focuses only on those aspects with regard to market 
access limitations in the telecom sector (refer also to Appendix D which provides a summary 
of the telecom process in Kenya). Compliance therefore needs to be evaluated within the 
                                                 
129 Minister for Ministry of Information and Communication 2004, speaking at a meeting on the ICT policy draft paper –
July 2004. (The Standard, July 20, 2004).  
130 Mr Mutua Muthusi, CCK Assistant Director of Communications and Public Relations, reacting to criticisms of the 
Government’s policy process of licensing. (The Standard, 12th March 2004). 







divergent needs of neo-patrimonial states and the conditionalities of the GATS as reflected 
through the RP.  
As this is a complex and lengthy chapter, the material is organised in accordance with the 
Kenya’s GATS telecom commitments undertaken in 1999. As noted earlier, by structuring 
the chapter in line with the Schedule of Commitments, sequencing of events chronologically 
at times presents challenges for easy following as sectoral developments overlap between 
different commitments. Where this occurs this is flagged. 
6.1 The mechanics of monopoly under corporatisation and the Moi Regime (1999-2002) 
The corporatisation, effected by the KCA in 1998 ensured that the enterprise would remain 
wholly state owned, but would be formally registered as a company and reoriented according 
to market principles. That is, state subsidies were to cease and the company could declare 
profits and pay dividends. It was to be responsible for its own funding and pension policy 
and was required to pay taxes (Omari, 1999). Save for these changes on paper, Telkom was 
simply still the KP&TC. This is not surprising given that, as Lane & Lubatkin (1998) argue, 
institutions display inertia in relation to attempts to reform as they resist change focusing on 
their core operations in order to safeguard what is typical for them. Moreover, as noted 
earlier, Moi’s Government had no intentions of implementing the new KCA framework 
(interview #20). Thus in every respect it would be a corporate entity, but with only one 
shareholder, the state. Subject to the supervision of a board of directors with regard to 
strategic direction, the company Telkom then replaced the KP&TC as the sole vehicle 
through which all telecom services were to be provided.  
However, given the wrangles that went on with the employment union over the issue of the 
separation of KP&TC (“Big changes”, 1999; “Most Telkom Workers”, 1999; “Court extends 
Telkom Injunction”, 2001) the Government in order not to lose votes and political standing, 
was forced to mandate that a large number of employees would not be retrenched (interview 
#19). As a result 70 percent of the 26,000 employees were seconded to Telkom and 5,200 
were retained by the Postal Corporation. In addition, 26,000 were deployed from the former 







the remaining employees to the newly created regulatory office (interview #12; “Most 
Telkom Workers”, 1999). Telkom therefore retained the exclusive power it always held as 
the KP&TC and continued to maintain exclusive monopoly on all listed services as 
discussed in chapter 5.  
It is important to note that beyond structural changes affecting financial operations and 
corporate governance, the locus of power and mechanics of monopoly remained completely 
unchanged. The former senior manager of KP&TC and a close friend of President Moi, Mr 
Augustine Cheserem, was appointed as the first MD of Telkom. He was required to 
administer, control and manage the provision of telecom services subject to the authority of 
the Minister of Transport and Communications, who retained power to determine tariffs 
and fees levied for services. The core authorising provisions of the KCA under the Postal 
and Telecommunications Policy Guidelines continued to give Telkom the exclusive power it 
had always held as the KP&TC to construct, maintain and use PSTN, lease out facilities and 
to prohibit others from offering any service except under Telkom’s explicit authority and 
subject to any terms and conditions it deemed fit (Postal and Telecommunications Policy 
Guidelines, 2001) as discussed in chapter 5.  
Commercialisation of KP&TC to create Telkom was never a panacea. The report (KP&TC, 
1997) on commercialisation which was not published in the press highlighted a number of 
legacies the new company would inherit, including excessively high debt and other structural 
problems endemic to PTT organisations at the time (see Melody, 1999b). As noted earlier, in 
having an exclusive monopoly Telkom also had four years from 1999 in which to address 
the shortfall in connectivity in the country. However, it is argued, that the four years was not 
sufficient and Telkom did not have the capacity or the funds to provide the needed services. 
In spite of this, this reflected Kenya’s specific commitments and was similar to many other 
developing country commitments in which monopoly periods of the incumbent service 
providers were granted for a period of four years (Cohen, 2004). The provisions in the KCA 
allowed the Government, at least for at time, to retain control. There was wide 
acknowledgment by most players in the sector that Telkom intended to reap huge profits 







deadline, several external consultants were hired in 2000 to evaluate the impending cost of 
the sale as well as reforms needed in Telkom. Moreover, politically, President Moi needed to 
pacify aid donors who had begun pressing the Government to fulfil its obligations under the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Funding (ESAF) programme. 
In early 2000, the Kenyan Government produced an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (IPRSP) claiming that a consultation on the strategy with civil society was to take 
place, especially through the National Stakeholders Consultative Forum. The Stakeholders 
Support Group (SSG) that included Members of Parliament contradicted this report. Led by 
Dr Apollo Njonjo, the SSG in March 2000 warned the IMF and the World Bank not to 
enter into any new loan agreement with the Government unless it met conditions it had 
breached since 1997 (Pettifor, 2001). However, on July 12th 2000, the Government of Kenya 
wrote a letter to the IMF (RoK, July 12th 2000). The letter ( highlighted in box 3 below), 
aimed at requesting funds from the IMF, described the policies that Kenya had established 
and those it intended to introduce, key of which was the intended sale of Telkom.  
 
The classified report of the evaluation of Telkom, which was never published despite 
persistent calls for its publication by the Opposition and local press, became a thorny issue 
for the Government. By the end of 2000, several leaked statements of the report were 
published in the local newspapers with varied statements on the number of job-cuts in 







noted that 1,000 jobs would be cut. (“Telkom Kenya to cut 10,000 jobs”, 2000; “Resolve 
Telkom Debt”, 2000). Confirmation with those close to the consulting team noted that the 
report indicated that the first phase of the programme would see about 1,000 employees 
retrenched at an estimated cost of US$ 26.6m (interview #12). The staff cuts were intended 
to achieve a staff-to-telephone ratio of 1:55 from 1:14 and reduce the employees from 
19,800 to 18,000 (“Telkom Kenya to cut 10,000 jobs”, 2000). The proposed lay offs raised 
alarms in the public with media reports calling for a review of the intended sale (“Telkom, 
Ownership is not the Key”, 2000) 
In August 2000, 20 international firms pre-qualified to bid for the 49 percent stake in 
Telkom after the launch of the privatisation process in April (CCK, 2000). According to 
interviews with members of the bidding team, of the 20 firms, SA telecom company MTN 
South Africa132 had been the favourite contender (interview #12 and #13). However, 
interview sources familiar with the privatisation process noted that when the five 
consortiums bidding for the 49 percent shareholding carried out due diligence studies on 
Telkom, they indicated they would like to operate a business where the ratio of personnel to 
connected lines was at most 1:55 with about 9000 employees (interview #15, 2003; “Telkom 
Kenya to cut 10,000 jobs”, 2000) 
Of concern in this process was the Government’s ‘closed door’ policy on matters pertaining 
to the sale. Like the split of the KP&TC, a largely state run process took place away from the 
public, with developments only appearing in press reports. No press releases were issued by 
the Government. As shall be seen, the shift away from a time-table of a process that was to 
end by 2000 to one marked by ministerial discretion is monumentally significant for its 
continued impact on the sector in the years to follow as it largely reduced the independence 
of the regulator as soon as it was established. While the provisions that allowed the Minister 
                                                 
132 MTN is a South African cellular network operator and is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange under the umbrella 
of the M-Cell Group. Launched in 1994, MTN now has close on five million subscribers. MTN's GSM network is one of 







to approve all major licences and regulations raises alarm bells on the issue of regulatory 
independence, the Act did make provision for the Minister to enact Part V133  which states: 
Any policy guidelines, rules and regulations issued by the Minister shall maintain the role of the 
Commission ...and no monopoly or duopoly licence to operate a telecommunication system or provide 
any telecommunication services shall be granted by the Minister or the commission (KCA, 1998 
Part V).  
This meant that through a simple gazette notice by the Minister, the regulator would be able 
to licence other operators in the market. It is argued extensively in later parts of this chapter 
that this provision lies at the heart of the failings within the regulatory environment to date 
and of great concern, its immediate remediation is not forthcoming.  
In August 2000, pending an announcement of the privatisation process, the IMF approved a 
three year PRGF arrangement for an amount equivalent to SDR 150 million (about US$ 
198m) of which SDR 13m (about US$ 18m) was available to Kenya immediately (IMF, July 
28th 2000). As indicated in box 4 below, the funds were to be made available immediately 
and were based on the letter of request made by the Kenyan Government in July 2000.  
 
Like other previous loans, interview sources reveal that there were indications that the Moi 
team had convinced them that they would tackle corruption (interview #40). This was 
evidenced by the fact that in July 1999, Moi appointed Dr Richard Leakey as head of civil 
service. Richard Leakey, previously known for digging up fossils, saving elephants and 
opposing the Moi Government, was given similar power to the Vice-President and was 
                                                 







asked to work with a team of technocrats who were posted to key financial departments 
(Mbatua wa Ngai, 1999). As noted earlier, the ‘dream team’ was put in place essentially to 
purge the civil service of corruption and make it more efficient and set the country on a 
recovery path (Kjaer, 2004). The ‘dream team’ immediately began to address the 
mismanagement and corruption that had plagued the public sector. Many public enterprises 
never paid taxes, and failed to remit revenues collected for Government. But any team 
appointed for this task is faced with the difficult and potentially dangerous task of reducing pervasive 
inefficiency and corruption in these organisations as a condition for receiving further source transfers (Miller & 
Yeager, 1994 p.176). Those who knew Moi well, however, saw the appointment of Dr 
Leakey and his team as a tactic designed to keep the ‘white world’ off his back while he 
managed his politics (interview #43).  
After receiving the funding from the IMF and the World Bank, in August 2000, the Minister 
of Finance, Mr Chris Okemo, announced that he hoped to name the winner of the 49 
percent Government stake by November of the same year (Mutizwa, 2000). However, 
November came and no announcement to effect the sale was made. In addition, as predicted 
by the SSG, the governance mechanisms put in place began to unravel. Richard Leakey was 
replaced just as quickly as he was appointed. In a bid to threaten the Government, the World 
Bank announced that aid would be stopped. The local newspaper, the Standard headlines on 
3rd November 2000 read: 
 
In December 2000, after securing the loans, the judiciary ruled that the Kenya Anti 
Corruption Authority (KACA), a centrepiece of the conditionalities, was unconstitutional. 
The KACA had been created in 1997 after the Parliamentary Accounts Committee revealed 
that US$ 10 billion in public funds had been lost between 1994 and 1995 including funds 
from the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), former KP&TC (now Telkom), and the Kenya 
Railways Corporation (all key Government institutions) (“Graft so entrenched in Kenya”, 







task. Its first director, who was seen as a key ally of President Moi, was dismissed after a year 
and faced a judicial tribunal examining his competence. Interviews with subsequent directors 
(interview #65 and #67), suggest that working conditions remain just as hard, each claiming 
that the Attorney General (AG), was blocking their attempts to prosecute well connected 
suspects.134  
At the end of 2000, with no deal struck on privatisation, the World Bank and IMF cancelled 
the loan disbursements that had earlier been agreed (“Cash crunch looms”, 2001). On 
January 2001, it was reported that the President was trying to reverse the changes made in 
2000 ahead of the return of the IMF team in February and in particular to jump start the sale 
of Telkom (Wahome & Orlale, 2001; “Moi to Push Through”, 2001). Yet, at the end of 
January 2001, Moi was quoted as saying he was not in a hurry (“Kenya agrees to sell”, 2001) to 
privatise the company and would not sell it to foreigners at a throwaway price (President Moi as 
quoted in Kisero, 2000). In addition, he announced that the Government would not meet 
the conditions for the privatisation of key public assets, namely: Telkom, Kenya Railways 
and Kenya-Reinsurance. He stated that caution must be exercised in devolving the state-owned 
corporations to the private sector lest the Government loses its assets (President Moi as quoted in Kisero, 
December 14th 2000). 
This cancellation of the loan facility was a set-back for Moi’s Government who had hoped 
to use it to support its public expenditure (Kabubo-Mariara & Kiriti, 2002). The cancellation 
presented a political opportunity for the Moi Government to rally the Kenyan public against 
the IMF and the World Bank, suggesting that Western donors were infringing on Kenya’s 
sovereignty by attaching loan conditions (“Telkom, WB stand queried”, 2000).  This was 
easy to do, given that in August 2000 the Opposition partly led by Mwai Kibaki had argued 
that the IMF and World Bank were imposing strict conditions to their loans (Kelly, 2000). 
This prompted an IMF press release published in the Economist on September 16th 2000 (box 
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6 below) which noted that conditions were a key feature of the IMF and the World Bank 
lending. 
 
Ultimately, the principal reasons cited for the delay of the sale of Telkom were the global 
downturn in telecom markets and the domestic squabbles over the amount of money 
needed for the sale to go through (Mureithi, 2004). With an election looming in December 
2002, it was obvious that prospects for the sale proceeding were minimal. By November 
2002, with little progress, Mr Musalia Mudavadi, Kenya’s Communications Minister 
admitted to the press that the prospect of the privatisation programme happening within 
2002 were not good and would take place after elections in 2003 (“Telkom privatisation 
restarts”, 2002). While a delayed sale meant higher returns for Moi’s Government; lack of 
clarity as to who the new entrant would be created uncertainty and threatened future gains in 
credibility for the Kenyan Government. The privatisation of Telkom was a key indicator of 
Government commitment to privatisation; the two year delay from 2000 to the end of 2002 
threw into question the Government’s ability to adhere to the time-frames it developed and 
whether the policies required to attract investment by fostering faith in local markets and the 
regulatory landscape were in place.  
The delayed sale of Telkom requires further elaboration on a number of issues that were 
linked to the lending process of the IMF and World Bank. First, the privatisation of Telkom 







local press reported that both the Opposition and Government had thrown out the 
‘Corruption Bill’ a key criterion for the resumption of aid (“We can’t afford to rejoice”, 
2001).  The Corruption Bill was to be a significant Bill as the Moi Government had been 
linked to the biggest corruption scandal in the country known as ‘The Goldenberg Scandal’. 
In brief, a private company, the Goldenberg Corporation, had received large Government 
export subsidies for gold and diamonds which Kenya did not produce. The Corruption Bill 
was therefore significant given that the Goldenberg scandal had won the Opposition mileage 
in its campaign for new elections. It seems evident that the Opposition did not want to make 
any commitments on the privatisation hoping to negotiate their own terms if they won the 
December 2002 elections. Out of the total 240 enterprises that were under the control of the 
Government, 207 formed the core of the privatisation programme and were earmarked to 
be sold by 2000. By 2002, the Government had divested 174 enterprises mainly to local 
investors (97 percent) and a few to foreign investors (3 percent) (AfDB & OECD, 2003). 
However, in spite of the significant reform, these Government enterprises had already been 
earmarked for privatisation were not considered core to the reform programme. 
Second, in early 2001 the Government had also promised to table a Privatisation Bill aimed 
at streamlining and accelerating the reform programme. However, this draft Bill was delayed 
and was only ready by mid 2002 after extensive consultations with a broad section of 
stakeholders within Government. Nonetheless, the Bill was never to become law given the 
looming elections in December 2002. The protracted delays over the sale of Telkom 
therefore seem intentional on the part of the Government. The evidence accorded so far in 
the sale of Telkom shows that the Government was fairly independent from social pressures 
and was not keen to see the development of the sector. It seems evident therefore that the 
sale of Telkom was never a means for development in creating access to telecom for a wider 
populace but rather as a means for the Government to derive as much monetary value as 
they could.  
6.2 Summary: 
With regards to Moi’s reform efforts in the telecom privatisation process, then, it seems that 







without shaking up the existing system or hurting influential interests. This strategy places 
Moi’s leadership and Government in the category of African neo-patrimonialism discussed 
in chapter 2, which Christopher Clapham (1996, p.176) has described as the formal acceptance of 
adjustment programmes coupled with attempts to subvert them by failing to implement their least desirable 
provisions.. While more appropriately the subject of discussion in chapter 7, this phenomenon 
requires introduction here. The case of Kenya’s aid-reform package seems to confirm the 
hypothesis drawn from Easterly’s arguments in chapter 2 that IFIs and neo-patrimonial 
states simply depend on one another for self-preservation. 
The saga of the Telkom privatisation process continued under the new Kibaki Government. 
As noted earlier, the telecom reform process overlaps both economic and political contexts. 
This should be borne in mind when reading the remainder of the chapter. Dates have been 
utilised to flag this. For easy note, the Moi regime within the telecom sector dates between 
1997 and the end of 2002 while the Kibaki regime begins from 2003 to date. The following 
section also provides an opportunity to test the issue of new Presidents and their ability to 
implement reforms as discussed in chapter 2.  
6.3 A change of Guard: the Kibaki Government (2003-2005) 
Following elections in December 2002, Moi’s political party under the leadership of Uhuru 
Kenyatta lost the Presidential seat to the Opposition under a coalition party – NARC - with 
Mwai Kibaki as the new President. The idea behind the name NARC came from the fact 
that it was meant to be a party of many ethnic communities (rainbow) who had joined forces 
to oust Moi. Nonetheless, Kibaki’s new cabinet was made up of previous members who had 
defected from the former ruling KANU party. In his election campaign, the President 
declared himself personally responsible for the fight against corruption.135  Wanting to 







show his new position as a leader, Kibaki met the IMF African Department Director and his 
delegation on January 15th 2003, less than one month after assuming office. In their press 
release (IMF, Press release 2003 (03/07)), the IMF confirmed that: 
the staff will continue to work closely with the authorities to facilitate an early re-engagement to support the 
Government’s efforts. In the meantime, the IMF stands ready to provide the Government with the technical 
assistance that may be necessary.  
After talks with the IMF, the Kibaki Government proceeded with launching the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and submitted it to the IMF on September 12th 2003 
(RoK, 2003). In November 2003 the IMF approved US$ 252.75m under the PRGF 
programme giving Kenya approval to withdraw about US$ 36.11m immediately (IMF, Press 
Release (03/201) 2003). Box 7 below provides Anne Kruger’s (First Deputy Managing 
Director and Acting Chair) comments on Kenya’s new financial arrangements. 
 
Interviews with key Government officials noted that there was little possibility that the 
Government would have been able to continue with its duties such as paying salaries and 
planning for development had it not received these funds (interview #55). Like most other 
leaders in Africa, the President quickly took to asserting his new position by appointing a 
                                                                                                                                              
135 A Constitutional Review Commission had been set up in 2001 under the Moi regime to make proposals concerning 
among other things, a multiparty system and the lifting of Presidential term limits. There was a rumour that a member of 
the Commission had leaked the conclusions (not to lift term limits) to the Government which had then put pressure on 
the Commission to change its view on the issue. After the new Government under Kibaki took power, the constitutional 
review process was slowed down amid political wrangling over the Presidential term limits and the multi-party system to 
be used. In December 2005, a referendum on the constitution was made and Kenyans voted an overwhelming No the 







new Minister to the Ministry of Transport and Communications, John Michuki (“Telkom & 
KPLC Next”, 2003). Mr Michuki was a key ally of the President during his election 
campaign and was considered one the President’s close confidants. He was also widely well 
known as the power broker behind the President and in the pre-election days had 
announced that the NARC party was only demanding constitutional changes as a ploy to 
defeat President Moi (Opala, 2003a). Along with a new Minister for Transport and 
Communications, the President made sweeping changes across most presidential appointed 
posts. Like his previous counterpart, Kibaki’s selection of candidates was seen to heavily lean 
on tribal lines and factions, with the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru alliance (GEMA) taking most of 
the key leadership positions in spite of having a coalition Government. Mr Mwiti (an 
Opposition party member) noted that:  
Through these appointments, Kibaki wants to consolidate power so that he does not owe anybody 
anything. What is strange is that the President and his group think they have a superior logic that 
can save Kenya and which other Kenyans don't know. They think there was a golden era that they 
want to take the nation back to. Their hypothesis is that Moi was the problem and the solution lies 
in the Kenyatta presidency. It will not work (Mwiti, reported in “Unease in Narc” April 6th 
2003). 
Nonetheless, the other leaders of the coalition were able to assert their positions and ensured 
they had their friends and allies in some key positions. In the case of telecom, a new 
Permanent Secretary (PS) was appointed whose affiliations were linked to Mr Raila, a key 
leader in the coalition Government and a former KANU Member of Parliament under the 
Moi regime. It was widely speculated that the new Minister would make sweeping changes in 
the telecom sector. In March 2003, Augustine Cheserem, head of Telkom was sacked and 
replaced by Mr Waweru (“Cheserem, Eshiwani sacked”, 2003). Mr Waweru was a former 
engineer of Telkom and came from the same ethnic community as the President. It was 
widely known that engineer Waweru had been lobbying for the job immediately after the 
elections. Mr Waweru made no apologies about his intentions to rectify the problems of 
Telkom. In May 2003, he reduced the number of general managers from seven to two and 







that in the months following, the positions were never advertised but slowly filled with 
appointments made in favour of friends of the new regime (interview #10) 
The changes in the telecom sector also meant that CCK and NCS management were 
changed, with a new board of directors appointed for CCK. Thus, neo-patrimonial linkages 
became part of politics. For example, Minister Michuki, appointed a son of the former 
Cabinet Minister Charles Rubia to a public office simply on account of his father who was a 
former Minister and friend (“Michuki has done it again”, 2004). The public cried folly, with 
the local press running a commentary on the new behaviour of Kibaki’s Ministers (ibid, 
2004). However, Kibaki made no announcements and did not fault or deny the allegations. 
Like the Moi Government, Kibaki’s Government was not concerned with reform changes 
and was instead keen to maintain the status quo by balancing interests of his new coalition 
Government, NARC. As shall be depicted in the following section, the sale of Telkom 
continued to remain an issue of contestation between the Government and the donor 
community. 
6.4 The Telkom sale: two steps backwards, one step forwards 
On assuming power, Kibaki had announced that his Government had every intention to 
continue with the reforms made by the previous regime. In his speech which opened the 
ninth session of Parliament he noted his:  
…commitment towards creating a culture of zero tolerance to corruption in Kenya…. We remind 
ourselves as leaders of our promise to put this nation's economy back on track… Related to the 
issue of good governance in public affairs I would like to emphasise the seriousness with which we 
intend to deal with non-performing parastatals. Most of these have in the past relied on the Treasury 
for funding. This was even when they were capable of making a profit. I want to reiterate that my 
Government has no business in supporting institutions that are a drain on public resources. Any 
parastatal that is not making a profit as required will not be retained by my Government (Kibaki, 







To start the changes in the telecom sector, Mr Michuki announced that the Government was 
still looking for a suitable buyer to improve Telkom’s efficiency and was going to privatise 
some of its core functions (Opala, 2003a). However, given the contradictory messages 
between 2003 and 2005, it was impossible to tell who was running the show as the Minister 
of Communication and his Assistant Minister provided contradictory information. For 
example, in June 2003, the Government, through the Assistant Minister for Transport and 
Communications, announced that the process of privatisation of Telkom had been 
postponed for a further three years saying that the Government would not sell up to 70 
percent of Telkom (“Telkom sale put off”, 2003). In November of the same year, the 
Minister announced that the Telkom sale would soon be re-launched and disclosed that 
instead of the 48 percent Government stake, the Government would sell up to 70 percent of 
the company’s equity (“Government to sell”, 2003). His remarks were made at the African 
Investment Forum being held in South Africa. It was widely believed that they were made to 
pacify industry buyers and the donor community (interview #15).  
In addition, within the same period several draft proposals of the intended sale were leaked 
to the public. For example in 2004, interviewee correspondence via email with staff of 
Telkom revealed that Telkom would be restructured before being privatised through an 
initial public offer (IPO) on the Nairobi Stock Exchange as well as a sale of a proportion of 
the company’s shares to a strategic partner (interview #7). This privatisation proposal was 
similar to another privatisation strategy paper (also in draft form) in which the Government 
noted that it would sell off 51 percent of Telkom with a strategic investor taking 26 percent 
while the Kenyan public through the IPO offering would take 25 percent (NCS, 2004) 
However, in June 2005, the PS of the Ministry of Information and Communication 
announced that the privatisation of Telkom had been pushed back to April 2006 (Irungu, 
2004a). 
The delayed sale also reflected tensions between the company-Telkom and its union.136  Yet, 
in spite of this, an audit done by the Government of Kenya and PKF consulting noted that 
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unless action was taken immediately to improve Telkom’s performance and its financial 
resources, the country’s fixed-line operations and the services which depend on fixed-line 
connections are likely to record minimal operational improvement, hindering the country’s 
economic recovery (Kisero, 2004). A review of the events of the Telkom privatisation 
process discussed above, reveal the Government intended to retain control of Telkom. In 
spite of the reforms promised, the lack of privatisation of Telkom has continued to slow 
down the growth of the sector which is heavily reliant on Telkom. The overarching theme of 
retaining control of Telkom therefore remains a key factor for Kibaki’s Government. 
6.4.1 Telkom’s exclusivity: the land of wasted opportunity?  
During the same period (2002/2003), disagreements over the precise length of exclusivity 
arose from Telkom’s licence which stipulated that if specified roll-out and quality of service 
targets were met, exclusivity could be extended by an additional year (KCA, Part V, 2001). 
Kenya’s schedule of specific commitments took due cognisance of this date and only 
undertook to open markets in fixed-line services in respect to cross border supply and 
commercial presence by the end of 2003. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the RP provision of 
providing exclusivity served Government purposes and legitimised their actions.  
Until the announcement by the Minister of Transport and Communication was published as 
a press release in late 2003, murmurings regarding the extension of the monopoly were best 
described as contradictory. Parliamentary debates suggested that the monopoly would end in 
2003 given the poor service performance of Telkom (Rok, 2003). However, Telkom 
contested this, pointing to its right to consultation and noting that its senior management 
and board of directors had not internally resolved the question of whether to pursue the 
extra year (Okumu, 2004). It was finally resolved that Telkom’s exclusivity would end on 
June 30th 2004 given the extra year (interview #2). However, the question of the legality of 
Telkom’s exclusivity had earlier been raised during Moi’s regime. A Parliamentary 
Committee for Communications in August 2000 (27th) found that the monopoly of Telkom 
was outlawed by the KCA (Parliamentary Committee Proceedings, 2000). As shall be 
discussed in chapter 7, there is no doubt that both the KANU and NARC Governments 







control over the sector was more pressing and the question of legality was shadowed by the 
need to retain control of the sector.  
In an effort to raise revenue for Telkom, pricing structures were changed as a result of tariff 
rebalancing. These were intended to slowly ease Telkom away  from the dependence on 
Government support. The purpose of tariff rebalancing was to remove any subsidies that 
the former KP&TC and now Telkom provided prior to the reforms. For example: national 
calls were reduced from Ksh 28 to Ksh 17.80, a reduction equivalent to 36 percent over the 
five year period of its exclusivity. Local charges which were previously heavily subsidised by 
both international and local services were increased from Ksh 3.50 to Ksh 7.40 for three 
minutes and at the time of writing this chapter in December 2005, had increased to Ksh 10 
for three minutes. In addition, the international tariff was reduced from a high rate of US$ 
3.30 to US$ 1.66 a reduction of 49.7 percent (Telkom, 2005). 
These figures are very high for the average rural income earner who earns less than Ksh 80 a 
day137(UNDP, 2001) and is expected to pay Ksh 10 the price of local calls and as at 
November 1st 2005, the charge stood at a rate of Ksh 10 per three minutes (Telkom, 2005). 
The price of local calls does not include the installation charge which stood at Ksh 2300 as at 
December 2005. This in turn also raised the price of connecting to the internet as charges to 
the internet are charged at the same rate as those of a local call. A person accessing the 
internet in Kenya from home or office therefore pays Telkom for the entire duration of 
being online and at the same time pays the ISP for the cost of service which averages Ksh 
10,000 a year. It is obvious that when compared to the average income earner in the rural 
area, and indeed an average income earner in general, these charges are prohibitive and 
continue to restrict the number of individuals that can access a telephone.  
In mid 2005, in an effort to restructure the telecom sector after several claims of foul-play 
were attributed to interference from the Minister of Communications, the Minister 
reshuffled the MDs of Telkom and CCK and dissolved the board of directors of CCK. In 
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what became a fiasco aired in the international media, the Minister finally reconstituted a 
new board. This reshuffling by mere exchange as well as the sacking of the board provides 
clear evidence of Government control in the sector and over the regulator. The Minister’s 
interference in the sector has also contributed to the perception of interdependence between 
CCK and Telkom. It seems that the more difficult task for the Minister as policy maker and 
as principle shareholder has been the need to retain earnings while, at the same time, appease 
Telkom trade unions. However, it is argued that the Government’s handling of the sale has 
further limited any prospects of huge financial rewards. Three main issues discussed below 
provide evidence for this: bloated staff, corruption and inhibited cash flow.  
Bloated staff 
In an effort to show changes in the sector, the Minister for Communication sought the 
advice of yet another consulting firm. PKF Consulting was commissioned to develop 
another restructuring strategy for Telkom. The report which was leaked to the press in late 
June 2004 noted unsurprisingly that Telkom had a bloated staff which included 3,052 
watchmen, messengers and porters among its payroll of 17,480 staff138 (Kisero, 2004). The 
staffing numbers are very high compared to many other African countries. For example, 
Senegal which has the same number of fixed-line customers as Telkom had only 2000 
employees. The report recommended that 12,281 employees be laid off at a cost of between 
US$ 74 and 200 million and pensions costing between US$146.8 and 300 million (ibid, 
2004). 
Corruption 
The delayed sale and financial losses of Telkom were further heightened by reports between 
2004 and 2005 that Telkom officials had been conniving with Government officials and four 
other sons of powerful politicians in the current and former Government administration in 
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an illegal termination racket139 (Opiyo, 2004; “Probe irregular deal”, 2005; “Telkom can’t go 
on”, 2005). The influence of the syndicate was reported to have been so big that the 
investigative Government departments had been reluctant to intervene. The Minister for 
Transport and Communication reported that the racket had cost Telkom an estimated Ksh 
12O billion (US$ 12m). However, interviews with the staff of CCK, revealed that in August 
2003 one of the Directors of CCK, blamed some Telkom officers for abetting the fraud. His 
report which had linked the fraud to powerful officials in Kibaki’s Government had led to 
his eventual unofficial sacking by the Government.140 The details of the report to date 
remain secret. However, CCK senior officials interviewed noted that even the MD of CCK 
could do nothing about the sacking and had been forced to let the Director take forced leave 
(interview #30). 
Cash strapped 
It is unclear how Telkom as a company operates or what its profit or loss is. In spite of 
being a limited company under the Companies Act (Cap. 486), and therefore required to file 
company returns, Telkom returns are kept confidential. Interview data collected while on 
field work, however reveal that Telkom had a cumulative deficit believed to stand at Ksh 16 
billion (US$ 16m) and the company pension fund was owed a further Ksh 4 billion (US$ 
4m). In an effort to raise funds, the Government in February 2005 announced that it 
planned to offload 11 percent of its shares in the mobile company Safaricom. The move of 
the Government was viewed by industry analysts as a means for Telkom to raise funds for 
capital expenditure, redundancy payments and pay part of its debt (Esipisu, Isaac, 2005). 
6.4.2 Summary 
Nonetheless, the delayed sale has not produced the desired results. Instead, Telkom’s 
revenue has been on a downward trend and its service performance has been low. This is 
acknowledged by many of the players interviewed in the market. Several senior staff 
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managers from Telkom argued that the reasons for lack of efficiency in the market were as a 
result of limited finances to improve ageing networks. In addition they cited operational 
problems such as having switches from different manufacturers with different management 
systems. As one interviewee commented: if there is a fault, we do not know where the problem is. We 
want to be able to trouble-shoot effectively (interview #5). Operational staff at Telkom complained 
that: we have customers at all levels who are very dissatisfied. There are demands from users that we are not 
able to meet. There are inefficiencies in the company. The company is not computerised or automated and this 
allows the potential fraud (interview #35).  
This has implications for the original roll-out targets provided to Telkom for provision of 
telecom services. To date, the ministerial announcements of the sale are best described as 
contradictory. Members of Parliament had suggested that the sale of Telkom would 
commence in 2003 or early 2004 but Telkom noted that their exclusivity licence allowed for 
an extra year in which to meet its obligations should they not be met.141 This now common 
spectacle of discord in the ‘Government-Telkom alliance’ is therefore evidence of mounting 
tensions between the two over future market structure that has left the impending sale in 
doubt. As a result, it is arguable that Kenya is on its way to breach its Schedule of Specific 
Commitments as the re-sale process seems scheduled for mid 2006 and is well behind its 
intended 2003 initial target date.  
Perhaps more significant than the potential GATS violation, is the lack of trust that the 
general public has towards the Government over its failure to adhere to time-frames it 
developed and whether the policies required to attract investment to foster the local market 
and regulatory landscape are in place. In addition, this delay since 2003 implies that the 
Kenyan public continues to pay the cost of being locked out of the ‘knowledge economy’ as 
a result of a slanted liberalisation process. Telkom’s inability to meet the specified goals 
within the last eight (1998-2005) years suggest that the targets may not have been rigorous 
enough or that the mechanisms instituted (such as provision of a regulator) were not 
adequate enough to enforce the targets. The ongoing relationship between Telkom and 
                                                 







CCK attests to this. The majority of the staff of CCK associated in some way with their 
colleagues at Telkom. This co-relationship throws into question the ability of the regulator to 
perform its functions as shall be further discussed in the following sections. Thus, in spite of 
the expiry of Telkom exclusivity in June 2004, 39 licences were issued in 2005. This includes 
licences in local loop, private data network, commercial VSAT, and Internet backbone and 
gateway operators (CCK, 2005). This however did not include VoIP which was only licensed 
to other operators in August 2005. 
While Telkom’s inability to meet the specified targets by 2003 according to the KCA 
suggests that the matter was finally negotiated between CCK, Telkom and the Government, 
questions have been raised over whether the roll-out targets and the mechanisms chosen to 
measure the roll-out targets were rigorous enough. The closed-door nature of the 
negotiations however provides no means by which to test this. As shall become evident in 
the remaining sections of the chapter, a lack of transparency by the Government, and its 
association with Telkom and CCK, as well as administrative concerns on the part of CCK, 
continues to affect other services in the telecom sector.   
6.5 Opening the fixed-line market: the licensing process of Regional Telecommunications 
Operators (RTOs) and the Second National Operator (SNO) (1999-2005) 
As discussed in chapter 5, Kenya’s schedule of specific commitments made limitations on 
local telephone service, long distance telephone service and international long distance 
service subject to the licensing of a SNO. In line with this, the Postal and 
Telecommunications Policy Guidelines (2001) mandated under the KCA, authorised 
Telkom to provide these services for a period of 25 years with a right to exclusive provision 
for the first five years with regional telecommunications operators (RTOs) and a SNO being 
licensed to provide competition with Telkom and help meet the objectives of the KCA. It 
was anticipated that RTOs would immediately be licensed to provide services that covered 
areas outside Nairobi and that a SNO would be licensed immediately after Telkom’s end of 
exclusivity in December 2003. This was set to happen with the partial privatisation of 
Telkom. As has been discussed in the previous section, Telkom’s sale has yet to be 







mandated by CCK as the regulator of the industry. The licensing policy is an integral part of 
the KCA and acts as a major governance mechanism for the regulator in the sector. The 
CCK chose a licensing-based option to determine the new entrants. This option is based on 
a bidding process with three stages: pre-qualification, technical and financial evaluation 
procedure. While the details vary slightly with each applicant, the basic components are 
outlined below: 
• Pre-qualification stage: this includes evidence of network and financial history in the 
specified sector. For example, a mobile licence application requires evidence of more 
than 250,000 network subscribers and a turnover of at least US$ 100 million.  
• Technical stage: this includes an understanding of pricing and consumer needs, the 
feasibility of the offer (eg. a detailed description of the proposed architecture of the 
network) and an analysis of the applicant’s credibility. 
• Financial stage: if deemed successful at the technical stage, no ‘point distinction’ is made 
among the applicants and the process then moves to the financial stage where the 
process converts to (what could be termed) an ‘auction’ format, in that the firm that 
submits the highest amount for the licence is automatically made the winner of the 
process. (CCK, 2003, 2003). 
Thus, based on the above procedure, CCK is obliged to grant a licence to an applicant 
whose bid has scored at least 75 percent based on a scoring matrix at the technical procedure 
stage and has offered the highest financial bid. The rules governing the operation of the 
service to be provided by the applicant are then stipulated in the licensing document as 
provided by CCK.142 
While the process for licensing appears clear on paper, a review of the events in the licensing 
process discussed in the following sections reveal a farcical comedy of delays and errors, 
resplendent with plagiarised bids and what has become pedestrian ministry -regulator 
sparring and power struggles. As is evident from the preceding discussion, policy vacillations 
                                                 








linked to tensions resulting from global market conditions, Government uncertainty about 
retaining a controlling share in Telkom and the restructuring goals of the wider privatisation 
programme resulted in substantial delays to the original proposals. As a result of such 
controversy, outcomes have not fulfilled intended objectives as set out by the KCA under 
Kenya’s Schedule of Specific Commitments. As will be evidenced in the following analysis, 
the licensing process, intentionally steeped in secrecy, facilitated political interference in the 
telecom sector.  
6.5.1 Licensing of Regional Telecommunications Operators (RTOs) 
The licensing of the RTOs is better situated within the concept of the USO of Telkom and 
the context of telecom in Kenya in 2000. In early 2000, Kenya’s virgin telecom market had 
just one fixed-line monopoly operator with over 120,000 registered ‘waiters’ on the waiting 
list. In an attempt to fulfil USO, CCK initiated the process of licensing RTOs. This followed 
a project trial aimed at evaluating the feasibility of introducing rural telecom operators. The 
decision to licence RTOs was justified by the argument that Telkom at the time held a 
monopoly on the provision of regional telecom provision, but needed support if the 
Government was to meet USO as well as fulfil the KCA mandates. The RTOs were 
expected to provide services in the country’s eight provinces.143  The licences would be 
granted for 15 years and would be renewable for a further ten years upon their expiration, as 
stipulated in the KCA. The licences would allow for the provision of local exchange basic 
voice services, inter-exchange basic voice services, and regional long-distance basic voice 
carrier services. The licensing process outlined in the previous section was used to determine 
issuance of the licence.  
The provision of telecom was a highly sought after market and Kenya’s announcement of 
the licensing of RTOs was received with much enthusiasm from the international 
community. Some 64 prospective bidders sought to provide services under the RTOs 
licence (interview #18) However, Telkom made protests to the proposed licence in the 
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middle of the bidding process citing its monopoly on the telecom market (Amoro, 2000). 
While no clear evidence is given for Telkom’s right to interrupt the bidding process, 
interviews with Telkom management at the time suggest that the Government had had a 
change of heart (interview #35). Initially, tendering for eight licences based on the 
administrative boundaries of Kenya was launched in February 2000 with each licence 
covering a specified region in the country with the only other fixed-line competitor being the 
incumbent Telkom. The licences had a USO to provide at least two payphones in the 
smallest administrative unit (sub-location) in five years. However interviews with CCK’s core 
management team reveal that protests from Telkom led to a policy change contrary to the 
KCA, in which each bidder was only allowed two licences instead of the original eight. By 
mid March 2000, further changes were made with CCK announcing that each bidder could 
bid for all eight licences. Breaking with its previously held view of issuing licences in all eight 
districts, CCK retained Telkom’s exclusive coverage of Nairobi (the capital city) along with 
its ability to provide VSAT and international bandwidth services (interview #18). This meant 
Telkom retained the lucrative market of Nairobi which alone generates over 70 percent of 
Telkom’s revenue. The initial bidding process which was opened on March 23rd 2000 
employed a three step tendering process under the licensing policy. The bidders were first 
assessed technically and those qualifying with a score of over 75 percent then proceeded for 
the opening of the financial bids. The highest qualified bidder was then awarded the licence. 
From this process, three consortia were successful: 1)Telefair Telecommunications (K) ltd 
given to cover Central Cost Nyanza, South Rift and Western provinces, 2) Safitel Ltd given a 
coverage of Eastern and North Rift province and 3) Bell-Western Ltd to cover North 
Eastern province (Amoro, 2000). 
The three bidders committed to invest up to US$ 350m and to provide 299,000 lines in a 
fixed-line/wireless network the size of incumbent Telkom outside Nairobi in less than three 
years. Additionally, the consortia committed to pay the Government an upfront  licence fee 
of US$ 37m. This would have provided the Government with the much needed revenue 
given its upheavals with the donor community at the time. As stipulated under the new 
Government directions, no licence was issued for Nairobi city. Despite the exclusion of 







barely served by only 120,000 lines (ITU, 1998) and 15 year licences with a further renewal 
for ten years. Moreover, six months before, Vivendi Telecommunications International and 
a local conglomerate Sameer Group, had committed to pay US$ 55m for a national cellular 
licence to compete with mobile operator Safaricom which had been licensed in 1999. 
Against these parameters, the market for RTOs looked promising.  
However, by the end of 2001, none of the RTOs had paid their licence fees and the telecom 
market was changing with the licensing of mobile operators in the market (as shall be 
discussed later in this chapter). Nonetheless, in the ensuing five years (to December 2005), 
full operations were still to begin. So far, only Bell-Western Limited was issued with a licence 
in October 2003 to operate in the North Eastern Province. This was issued after protracted 
negotiations and even then, under slightly modified entry terms (payment of the licence fee 
in instalments) to accommodate the bidder’s financial difficulties. Bell-Western was expected 
to roll-out 20,939 lines in five years to meet CCK targets (Chepkonga, 2003).  
Various allegations were reported  in the press between 2000 and 2003 with complaints from 
both CCK and the RTOs over the handling of the licensing process and the amount of 
money due for the licences (Akumu, 2000; Amoro, 2000; Kisero, 2001b; “Telkom firms to 
pay”, 2003).While CCK has not come out openly on the issue, interviews with the licensing 
team reveal that the application for the licence was based on speculative bidding on the part 
of the bidders – bidding that was not necessarily supported by a commercial evaluation of 
the market (interviews #30 and 35). By the end of 2005, Bell Western was reported to have 
closed down its operation, citing that the proposed USO was too expensive given market 
changes (interview #12). 
In spite of a change of Government in 2003, and Telkom’s end of exclusivity in mid 2004, 
none of the overtures of the process could cure the changing telecom market. Rural market 
consumers with far lower disposable incomes, restricted technologies and explosive roll-out 
by the mobile industry, meant that no clear path for rural provision of telecom was 
provided. As is evidenced in the following section, the licensing of the SNO which would 
compete in every aspect with Telkom was still to leave Kenya’s largest population, the rural 







6.5.2 The licensing of the Second National Operator (SNO) (1999-2005) 
During Telkom’s exclusivity period, service provision was still below par indicated by 
complaints received by CCK. Seeking to address these concerns, in mid 2003, a paper by the 
Board of the regulator, recommended that Telkom be stripped of its monopoly in the 
provision of the long distance fixed-line by issuing a licence for a SNO (CCK, 2003).  At the 
end of 2003,144 the new Minister for Transport and Communications under the NARC 
Government, issued a statement instructing CCK to commence the licensing of a SNO to 
compete with Telkom (CCK, speeches, 2003). The Government expected to raise a 
minimum bid of US$ 50m as evidenced from the Finance Ministers budget speech in June 
2003 (Mwiraria, 2003). This was not far fetched given that in the context of other African 
countries, large sums had been raised from the SNO licence. For example, in Nigeria, the 
SNO process in 2002 was won by Globalcom with a licence bid of US$ 200m and in 
Tunisia, the process was won by Orascom with a licence bid of US$ 454m (World 
Telecommunications Statistics, 2002). The licensing of the SNO received much publicity in 
2003 given that it was expected to choose any technology it wanted to deploy in its network. 
This was to be a big milestone in Kenya, given the restrictions on infrastructure due to 
Telkom’s exclusivity. More significantly, the SNO would have been expected to utilise the 
new technologies such as VSAT and wireless and therefore reach the rural community 
through less expensive means bringing market prices of telecom down. However, the much 
hailed tendering process was delayed to April 2004.145 It was clear that the Government was 
keen to stay the process until Telkom’s end of exclusivity in June 2004.   
A whiff of impending scandal in the SNO tendering process (which was held behind closed 
doors as was with all the other licensing processes) permeated the pre-bidders conference 
when the Treasury announced that the winning bid would be subject to a reserve price. The 
sudden change of the process, in which not even CCK or the Treasury had any idea of what 
the price would be raised concern throughout the sector. The EastAfrican newspaper quoted 
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the CCK MD as saying: we have avoided discussion on the reserve price even at Government level to avoid 
information leaks that might influence the process (Kirui, as quoted in Munaita, November 1st 
2004a). Interview correspondence on email with CCK staff noted that a committee 
comprising the Government, CCK and bidders’ representatives would agree on a formula 
for determining the reserve price (interview #14 and #23). However, bidders felt this was 
introducing a new condition too late in the process. No committee was convened, leaving 
the decision to the Treasury and CCK. A few weeks later, two bidders, SaskiTel and 
Detecon withdrew from the tender (Munaita, 2004a).  In response, the CCK MD, made no 
mention of the bidding process and only noted that they called this morning to say they will not 
pursue their interest (Kirui, Nation radio online, 11th May 2004). While no formal reasons were 
cited, the inconsistency of the process probably informed their withdrawal. As one 
interviewee noted, the inherent conflict of interest would significantly reduce the chances of 
success, and the lack of transparency of the process called into question whether any successful 
result can possibly be in the public interest (interview #50). Yet the Government remained resolute 
that closed door negotiations would allow it to avoid leaks (Kirui, 2004). It was also argued 
that closed door negotiations would facilitate frank discussion and disclosure of business 
plans as competitors would not have to withhold sensitive information, allowing for a more 
thorough assessment of the bids. With CCK’s compliance secured through its representation 
of the newly established SNO working committee, CCK announced that the consortium 
with the highest financial bid from the technically qualified firms would be subject to 
meeting the reserve price (ibid, 2004).  
Predictably and certainly paving the way for a likely legal challenge to whatever the final 
decision would be, bidders complained that the pre-qualification stage had been marked by 
irregularities. For example, one of the bidding firms had no local partner, a key requirement 
of the licensing process as stipulated in Kenya’s Schedule of Specific Commitments as well 
as the KCA, which had placed a limitation of foreign ownership. One of the bidders also 
complained that in spite of the consortium not having an original bid bond, CCK had 
accepted its financial and technical proposals. With such allegations, it was not surprising 
that Triple A, the premier financier and partner in the Telenor Management Partners 







the new Communications Minister a corruption scandal. Significant to Mr Tuju’s new 
appointment was the merging of the Ministry of Transport and Communication and the 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting into one Ministry - the Ministry of 
Communication. This was done to reflect market changes in the convergence of 
technologies and to pave the way for what was hopefully to be a more clear licensing process 
which would allow one licence to be issued across several types of technologies.  
The court case against Mr Tuju was further propagated by the fact that it was rumoured that 
Mr Tuju had been influenced by the Treasury to lower the price from the reserve of US$ 
80m to US$ 25m (Munaita, 2004b), a contention that CCK denied (interview #23). The 
speculation in the market had been that the SNO licence would draw at least US$ 70m given 
Kenya’s economic conditions. Allegations of interference, undue influence, tampering with 
tender documents and irregularities plagued the tendering process between May and 
October 2004. Finally after much controversy, the court ruled that CCK should consider re-
tendering the process, a move that was supported by the Communications Minister. This 
decision was challenged in court by one of the bidders. Thus by the end of 2005, the SNO 
licensing process had yet to be completed.146  
6.5.3 Summary: resale - a positive commitment negatively implemented 
In many cases, although not all, telecom resellers generally do not own transmission 
infrastructure, but purchase services or bulk discounted minutes from network operators to 
sell to end users at a profit. It is widely considered to be a competition enhancing 
mechanism, facilitating rapid entry of newcomers with minimal investment, reduced risk and 
delays associated with capital intensive telecom infrastructure investments (Larson, 1996). In 
the current scenario, resale also extends to the proposed infrastructure sharing arrangement 
between the incumbent and the eventual RTO and SNO. In respect to Kenya’s GATS 
commitment to introduce resale in both senses, between 2000 and 2003, progress was 
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arguably stunted. As a result, it is arguable that Kenya is potentially in breach of its Fourth 
Protocol undertaking in this regard. Depending on how literally a DSB panel might assess 
these undertakings, the Kenyan Government might presumably argue that they complied 
with the process but have not been able to reach a conclusion on the matter. They might 
also argue that the terms stipulated by the Government for provision of these services were 
not fulfilled.  
Perhaps more significant for consumers than a potential GATS violation, is the rising service 
tariffs, exacerbated by the existing prohibition of other competitors in the sector due to 
problems in the licensing process as discussed above. As shall be discussed in chapter 7, in 
the absence of a SNO and RTOs, the pre-existing possibility of meeting USO seems unlikely 
for Telkom. By mid 2005, Telkom continued to retain its exclusivity on VANS with the 
prohibition of voice services and VoIP to other commercial entrants, a matter discussed later 
in this chapter. The following section provides an analysis of the mobile sector in Kenya. 
Like the PSTN sector, the process of licensing the third mobile operator has been dogged by 
controversy due to Government interference and continues to hinder the process of telecom 
development in the country.  
6.6 Mobile cellular services (1999-2005) 
Under the KCA, Kenya committed to licensing one further cellular operator (beyond the 
existing two) after three years of operation of the existing network operators and subject to 
the fulfilment of the Government’s policy targets (Postal & Telecommunications Policy 
Guidelines, 2001). This undertaking, like the PSTN services, echoed the provisions made in 
Kenya’s schedule of specific commitments which noted that mobile services were to be 
liberalised subject to the provisions made under the GMPCS-MOU. The award process of 
the third cellular licence commencing in 2003 was the biggest legal and regulatory scandal to 
beset the fledging sector at the time, both from a financial and perception of credibility point 
of view. The saga and the way it was handled also fuelled doubt as to the CCK’s and 
Government’s commitment in the telecom sector. The chaos that surrounded the process is 
undoubtedly linked to the blurred boundary lines of power between CCK and the Minister 







of Kenya’s compliance expands and the areas for concern emerge. Detailed discussion below 
of the process is instructive in further assessing GATS compliance, but also serves as a basis 
for examining the provisions of the RP regarding independence within a neo-patrimonial 
state. This analysis is taken up further in chapter 7 where a re-examination of the issues is 
presented. 
6.6.1 The third cellular licensing process 
The licensing process for the first cellular licence was completed without much publicity 
given the Government’s own involvement in establishing a joint venture between Kenya’s 
state-owned Telkom and Britain’s Vodafone. In early 2000 Safaricom Ltd (the joint venture 
between Telkom and Vodafone) was issued with a licence to operate as the first mobile 
operator in Kenya. Prior to the opening of the cellular market, mobile operation was the 
domain of a few elites with restrictive prices from Telkom costing as much as US$ 2000 a 
month. The licensing of Safaricom was therefore seen as timely in a region in which both 
Tanzania and Uganda had liberalised their cellular markets earlier. 
In May 2000, a second cellular service was granted to Kencell Communications now known 
as Celtel.147 The second cellular licence was heavily contested by six bidders including South 
African mobile operator MTN and Orascom from Egypt. The awarding of the two licences 
was highly significant for Kenya under its obligations to the international community, 
particularly the IMF and the World Bank which had stipulated conditions on the opening of 
the market. Moreover, the delayed sale of Telkom had placed Kenya in a difficult position. 
Its need to show credibility in meeting its obligations was therefore paramount. Under the 
World Bank’s SAP, consultants from a US company were provided to work with the 
Ministry of Transport and Communication on licensing issues and develop a plan for mobile 
roll-out. The consultants had recommended a plan of a total of 200,000 users based on their 
experience in other African countries. A second opinion was sought from another 
consultant from the US who proposed the provision of a network capacity of 2 million. A 
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network of 2 million was therefore issued for both Safaricom and Celtel. The combined 
licensing process brought in US$ 55m to Kenya’s Government. By the end of 2002, both 
cellular operators had a combined connection of 1,068,000 users from 15,000 users in 1999 
(Chepkonga, 2003). The licensing of the third mobile operator in 2003 was therefore seen as 
a progressive means to further open the market and lower market prices. 
In January 2003, the CCK Board approved the licensing of the third cellular mobile 
operator. Four main reasons were provided as justification for introducing a third operator. 
First, the board argued that a large customer base would overstretch the network of the two 
companies and compromise on USO targets. Second, a third mobile operator was seen to 
provide a balance on the ongoing expansion of services in areas with no coverage. Third, the 
new entrant would lower access charges due to competition and thus create a larger 
customer base and fourth, the third operator would raise additional revenue for the 
Government through licence fee and taxes and thus create more opportunities for 
employment (interview #13).  
The above views were largely supported by local and international advocacy groups who all 
saw the introduction of a third operator as a means of reducing charges on services provided 
to the public as well as increasing the viability of achieving USO. This was also largely 
supported by the ITU and WTO who in the pre-bidders conference gave consent for the 
process noting that the unmet market demand for telephony in Kenya was between 4.7 and 
9.4 million and thus would enhance both qualitative and quantitative demand for economic 
growth (interview #55). The method of entrance was the licensing tendering procedure 
described earlier. All pre-qualified firms indicated that they would partner with the local 
firms in keeping with the Government policy through the KCA. Five firms were pre-
qualified by CCK to tender for the third GSM licence: Econet, Mobile Systems International 
(MSI) Cellular Investment Holdings BV of Netherlands, Kenya Telecommunications 
Investments Group (KTIG)148 and Telsar Solutions (Pty) Limited and Telecel International 
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South Africa (CCK, 2003). The criterion used to short list applicants was based on the 
licensing process noted earlier on in this chapter. 
The licence was awarded to Econet on September 19th 2003 with a bid of US$ 27 million. 
The consortium beat Mobile Systems International (MSI) Cellular Investment Holding BV 
of Netherlands (with Industrial Promotion Services Kenya as local partners) who had also 
qualified at the technical evaluation stage and had made an offer of US$ 11 million for the 
licence. The other two firms were disqualified at the technical stage. It was confirmed by an 
employee of CCK that no real definite reasons are given for the disqualification at the 
technical stage (interview #26). Clearly a lot of the evaluation was based on the subjectivity 
of the board members who spent an entire day debating the bid. I requested to attend the 
meeting as an observer but was denied access. Nor was I given permission to see the actual 
bids submitted. Press journalists also indicated that they faced much resistance in 
documenting and publishing the issue (interview #53 to #55). Once the process was 
deemed technically qualified, no point distinction was made among the applicants. The 
tender process immediately converted to an auction where the firm that submitted the 
highest bid for the licence would automatically win the tender. Four main issues emerged in 
the following weeks and months following the bidding process attesting to the problems 
reminiscent in the SNO and RTOs process. 
First, Econet consortium suffered an acrimonious parting with its key local bidding partner, 
the Kenya National Federation of Cooperatives, which was having problems in funding the 
deal. To begin operations, Econet needed to pay licensing fees of Ksh 2.16 billion (US$ 27 
million) to the Government. The Kenya National Federation held an 82 percent 
shareholding while Econet’s stake stood at ten percent with eight percent held by Corporate 
Africa and Rapsol equally. It should be noted that the local partners were not large scale 
investment companies but rather local savings bodies who require the decisions of their 
members before they can invest.   
Second, Econet’s winning bid was also the subject of disgruntled statements from the 
existing service providers Safaricom and Celtel. In an interview with Safaricom and Celtel 







We should have been asked what we thought of the third mobile operator. As it stands, Econet will 
have a hard task penetrating the market, even in Nairobi and Mombasa where the market is high, 
they will have to invest in a lot of money as we have done. We do not believe that Econet would 
enhance market competition. Instead of having a third Mobile Operator, we should have been asked 
about how we could expand the network to reach untapped areas and therefore fulfil our USO 
(interview #5).  
While this could be read as fear of competition from Safaricom, which also experienced a 
similar process filled with complaints and wrangles in the media over the licensing procedure 
(which raised questions of a lack of impartiality in the technical and financial process) it is 
significant given that issues of USO were paramount as a reason given for the provision of 
all competition in the sector. Econet’s Chief Executive quickly reacted to questions about its 
ability to provide service by noting in his statement that Kenya currently has a market of 
about five million people and Econet expected to secure a third of the market over the next 
five years (Balancing Act, 2004). Further, Econet based their belief on the support of 
Kenyans who they hoped would be more inclined to support a largely Kenyan owned 
company (interview #5). Further statements of protests, were issued by a consortium of 
MPs from the Opposition party KANU and the ruling NARC party who claimed that the 
licence was not granted in a transparent manner and that the US$27 million that Econet was 
insufficient. This they claimed was based on the fact that Safaricom and Celtel had paid 
nearly twice the amount for their licences.  
Third, striking in its similarity to the issues experienced by the SNO evaluation in 2003, 
KTIG, one of the consortia that had participated in the second leg of the tendering process 
began legal proceedings citing lack of transparency and fairness in the tendering process. 
Through its lawyer, Mr James Orengo,149 the consortium argued that the tendering process 
was flawed as both the technical and financial evaluations were not considered together 
given that their financial bid was US$ 55 million (KTIG vs CCK and Econet, HCCC No. 1570 
of 2004). According to interview sources, during the technical process, Mobile Systems 
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emerged as front runner with a scoring of 90 percent while Econet scored 78 percent. The 
litigants, KTIG, scored 62.2 percent nearly 13 percent below the minimum 75 percent mark 
set in the tendering procedure and were thus effectively locked out from proceeding to the 
financial tendering stage (interview #53). In a press interview KTIG claimed that they were 
prompted to disclose their financial plan by stating the value of its monetary bid for the 
licence and that the information may have been a disadvantage (Capitalfm News, Nov 17th 
2004).  
Arguably the court did not find enough evidence to have the process repealed. Clearly there 
is a loophole in the tendering procedure. No documents were availed to the public to read 
and thus blame in the media was assumed to rest with CCK board members responsible for 
approving the tendering procedure. In my interviews with the various board members, it was 
clear that the subject of licensing was a thorny one and was met with much resistance and 
defence of their system. In reaction to the criticism of the licensing process from the public, 
CCK issued a press release in the Standard newspaper noting that the commission would 
not be moved by rising criticism of its licensing procedures (Mugusu, 2004). Details on the 
licensing process for the third GSM was classified and was only available to members of the 
board. Due to confidential agreements, the licensing team could not directly confirm the 
licensing problems but I was left with little doubt that problems do persist in the licensing 
process and that this process needs to be re-evaluated.  
Fourth, on November 10th 2004, Econet was granted its licence. But this was not to last long 
as the Minister for Communications, Mr Tuju nullified the issuance of the licence to Econet 
on 27th November 2004.  This announcement came following a long and arduous battle 
between Econet, the Minister and the regulator over Econet’s raising of only US$ 15m of 
the US$ 27m licence fee. The Minister announced that the consortium has been unable to make 
payments according to set deadlines and all discretionary extensions that may have been accorded to them are 
hereby rescinded (CCK, Press release, November 27th 2004). After various court proceedings 
the Kenya High Court on December 4th 2004 (in what is no doubt to become a subject of 
analysis for many lawyers in the years to come) restored the licence to Econet. In his ruling, 







to Econet by CCK (Econet vs Minister of Communications, HCCC No. 1640 of 2004). After the 
ruling, Econet took the Communications Minister and the acting MD of CCK to court, 
accusing them of contempt and allegedly defaming Econet’s trade mark in a speech made by 
the Minister in parliament and demanded that US$ 75m be paid. The court case was yet to 
be completed as at January 2006. In addition, the payment of the licence fees was yet to be 
resolved. Rumours that Econet had had other problems in other countries in Africa seem to 
suggest that CCK may have made a mistake in the tendering process.  
6.6.2 Summary 
The third cellular licensing debacle, however, much like the unfolding the SNO and RTOs 
process is a cautionary tale of neo-patrimonial behaviour in which the lack of separation 
between Government and regulator as both policy maker and implementers serves the 
purposes of the ruling elite. While not pronouncing on the source of the problem, the court 
did question the role of the Minister in the tendering process (Court of Appeal, 2004).  
While the issue of independence is further discussed in chapter 7, it suffices to note that the 
dualist licensing provisions, in allowing both the CCK and the Minister to make statements 
on behalf of Government, suggest that Kenya is not complying with its undertakings on 
independence as stipulated in the RP. 
The following section analyses the last market limitation placed on the telecom sector 
focusing on the opening up of the internet and the exclusivity given to Telkom’s Jambonet 
for international leased lines. It must however be emphasised that a full discussion of the 
opening of telecom market, more specifically the internet and VSAT application is primarily 
the subject matter of another study. The detail that follows is limited by its summary nature 
and the fact that its outcome is an ongoing process at the time of writing. However, because 
the process also serves as a useful microcosm of the multiple problems with the current 
regulatory regime, the following narrative also serves to illustrate many of the institutional 







6.7 Facilitating competition and interconnection services  
As noted in chapter 4, the RP requires member states to take appropriate measures to 
prevent major suppliers from engaging in or perpetuating three specific anticompetitive 
practices,150 that is, anti-competitive cross subsidisation,151 improper use of information and 
failing to make available on a timely basis, technical and commercially relevant information 
which is necessary to provide their services. The RP also requires incumbents to provide or 
ensure interconnection (the technical term for access)152 by competitors to the incumbent’s 
infrastructure. According to the RP, interconnection is defined as the linking with suppliers 
providing telecom transport networks or services in order to allow the users of one supplier to communicate with 
users of another supplier and to access services provided by another supplier (WTO, 2001 “Negotiating 
guidelines” Clause 2.1).153 In a monopoly environment, this service also extends to the 
leasing of infrastructure or general facilities that would enable other service suppliers to offer 
services to their customers.154 Interconnection principles are arguably a core mandate of the 
RP and the GATS itself as competition is totally precluded in the absence of an effective 
policy that does not curb negative interconnection practices. As interconnection agreements 
are generally commercial arrangements between companies, safeguards ensuring 
interconnection are largely commercial arrangements and require parties involved to 
negotiate suitable terms for service provision.  
                                                 
150 For an assessment of competition in telecom and international trade in light of convergence, see Marcus Fredebeul-Krein 
and Andreas Freytag (1999), “The Case for a More Binding WTO agreement on Regulatory Principles in 
Telecommunications Markets” Telecommunications Policy, 23 p625- 628. 
151 Note that cross-subsidisation is not always anti-competitive but can easily become so in monopoly markets where profits 
from exclusive licences are used to undercut competitors prices in non-exclusive services. In Kenya, prior to tariff 
rebalancing (which has been taking place progressively since the reform), Telkom has had leeway to cross-subsidise with a 
view to meeting its USO.  
152 ‘Access’ may include access to physical infrastructure; local loop; network elements; leased lines; buildings, ducts; 
manholes and masts; location of points to connect; directory information and in the case of cellular services network 
access for the purposes of roaming. For further discussion on interconnection policy see Hank Intven, McCarthey 
Tetrault and Infodev (2000) “Module 3-Interconnection”, Telecommunications Regulation Handbook, Washington, World 
Bank. 
153 See WTO online at http://www.wto.org/wto/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_3.htm  







The KCA mandates that the regulator deal with claims of anti-competitive behaviour in the 
market noting that the commission shall have power to hear and settle disputes between a licensee and a 
subscriber or class of subscribers (KCA, p243). An entire section of the Act is also directed toward 
the issue of interconnection and the provision of fixed-lines (see KCA, 2001 Part VII). The 
discussion that follows is therefore limited to evaluating the process of facilitating 
competition in the telecom sector. 
6.7.1 Telkom and the opening up of the internet (1999-2005) 
By the end of 2000, the telecom sector had contributed over US$ 77m to the exchequer 
through various licences and benefited the Treasury US$ 8m through licences granted to 
mobile companies – Safaricom and Celtel (Chepkonga, 2000). The paging market and 
internet market was open and by the end of 2000 there were 22 paging services and 39 
licensed ISPs (CCK, 2000).  However, establishing an ISP required an initial investment of 
Ksh 750,000 comprising a five year licence of Ksh 500,000 and annual fee of Ksh 250,000. 
The annual fee was later reduced to Ksh 100,000 after ISPs complained that the licence fees 
were too restrictive and reductive for market investment (interview #10).  
While the growth of the internet sector was meteoric, ISPs had little leeway on quality of 
service to the consumer, input costs and therefore limited marketing advantage and means 
for innovation given the restriction on international bandwidth which had to be through 
Telkom’s Internet gateway - Jambonet. While the initial opening up of the internet sector 
was well received, ISPs soon realised that they paid expensive tariffs which were used to 
fund the expensive international circuit operated by Jambonet. The implication of this was 
that local data which could be easily transmitted locally was being routed through the 
international bandwidth circuit first and rerouted. Since Kenya has no international fibre 
optic connection, transmitting via international bandwidth involved two satellite hops in 
order for traffic to reach its destination, which in many cases were just a few kilometres 
across Nairobi. This is a costly exercise for the consumer, the ISP and ultimately the country 
as a whole. More importantly the satellite hops cause latency, which affects the speed and 
quality of transmissions. Thus, without an internet exchange point (IXP), ISPs had to pay 







therefore, that there was discontent with the perceived lack of independence of the regulator 
particularly their decision to license Jambo Telkom to provide internet services. The essence 
of the complaint was that Jambo Telkom was a subsidiary of Telkom who owns Jambonet. 
This move was seen as a further way of strengthening Telkom which still had monopoly in 
the delivery of most services at the expense of the ISPs. It was unclear how much Jambo 
Telkom would be paying for their bandwidth with most ISPs feeling that it was actually 
getting free bandwidth and better digital lines to enable them to acquire customers from the 
ISPs through cheaper and more reliable services. 
6.7.2 Negotiating for a Kenyan Internet Exchange Point (KIXP) 
After various negotiations with Telkom which commenced in August 1999, it was agreed 
that ISPs could transmit Kenyan internet traffic through their own exchange point thereby 
saving bandwidth cost and reduce demands on the international circuit. This led to the 
formation of the Telecommunications Service Providers of Kenya (TESPOK) in 1999, one 
of the first major civil society caucuses from the private sector launched to represent the 
interests of ISPs and other value added telecom services. The solution proposed by 
TESPOK was to establish a Kenyan Internet Exchange Point (KIXP) (interview #4). The 
KIXP was to reduce the time and costs required to send and receive electronic mail locally 
and act like a ‘clearing house’ among ISPs. The KIXP would save Kenyan ISPs more than 
half of what they paid for international bandwidth. While the subject of civil society is not a 
part of this study155, it is noteworthy that TESPOK and other civil society caucuses under 
the auspices of Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet)156 were to influence negotiation of 
the opening of the sector. In March 2004, KICTANet held its first multi-stakeholder 
                                                 
155 See: Etta, F., & Elder, L. (Eds.). (2005). At the Crossroads: ICT Policy Making in EastAfrica. Nairobi, Kampala and Dar es 
Salaam: IDRC and East African Educational Publishers. This book is the first of its kind to compile specific details of the 
ICT civil society groupings and the development towards an ICT policy. The author was in part contributory to the title 
through discussions with Florence Etta. The authors in the book specifically look at ICT issues in relation to civil society 
and do not cover telecom or aspects of the KCA. Where this is done, it is only alluded to.  
156 While the formalization process of KICTANet took place in 2004, its prexitance dates back to early 1990’s with 







meeting for the convening of a national ICT policy157 to replace the current KCA. The 
heavy presence of diverse interest groups of which this author was part, underscored the 
participatory multi-stakeholder nature of the proposed ICT policy process. This was 
followed by a second multi-stakeholder meeting in March 2005. While the KICTANet has 
had its upheavals in pushing Government for changes, it is widely held as responsible for the 
current Draft ICT Policy which was tabled before Parliament in February 2006.  
In early 2000, the KIXP was launched as the first internet exchange point between Morocco 
and South Africa. Almost immediately, Telkom filed a complaint with CCK arguing that the 
KIXP violated Telkom’s exclusive monopoly on the carriage of international traffic. Within 
two weeks, in November 2000, CCK concluded that the KIXP required a licence, and 
ordered that it be shut down as an illegal telecom facility (Akumu, 2001). According to 
interviews with the TESPOK, during the two weeks of KIXP operation, measurements 
indicated that latency was reduced from an average of 1,200-2,000 milliseconds (via satellite) 
to 60-80 milliseconds (via KIXP). Likewise, monthly bandwidth costs for a 64kbit/s circuit 
dropped from US$ 3375 to US$ 200, and for a 512kbit/s circuit from US$ 9546 to US$ 650 
(TESPOK, 2003). The closure was therefore deemed as simply a matter of protecting 
Telkom. After several negotiations that took nearly one year, KIXP received approval from 
CCK in the form of a licence granted in November 2001. The regulators licensing order 
represented a fairly dramatic turn in its decision making, noting that: 
An IXP is not an international gateway but a peering facility that enables ISPs to exchange local 
traffic. The Internet is expanding very fast and since Telkom has demonstrated that it has some 
apparently insurmountable difficulty in rolling out Internet facilities, it would be in the best interest 
of the market to allow other companies to offer IXP services in the country (Board ruling as 
quoted in Akumu, October 9th 2001).  
Nevertheless, CCK requested TESPOK to partner with Telkom. In April 2002, KIXP was 
officially re-launched by the MD of CCK, who had earlier revoked the KIXP (Chepkonga, 
                                                 
157 As noted earlier, see the proposed ICT policy was to include all other technology infrastructures not covered under the 
KCA. For example, the KCA specifically does not include media and broadcasting which is covered under a separate 







2002). By the end of 2005, Kenya had 73 registered ISPs (CCK, 2005). The case of KIXP 
presents yet further evidence of the linkages between the Government, Telkom and CCK. 
As is discussed in the following section, the Government in wanting to maintain its high 
stream of revenue given the failure of the SNO, RTOs and privatisation of Telkom, was 
reluctant to open up the market in spite of the expiry dates. In addition, CCK and Telkom’s 
refusal to open the market were further complicated by changing market technologies most, 
significantly the introduction of VoIP. The developments of this issue and the Kenyan 
Government’s reaction to it discussed in the following section.  
6.7.3 VoIP 
The introduction of VoIP in the market in 2001 caught Telkom and CCK by surprise. In 
2001, CCK issued a statement banning any use of VoIP services and went about 
confiscating any equipment that provided VoIP. While this was seen as a means to protect 
Telkom’s exclusivity, interviews and documents provided by CCK reveal that as early as June 
2002, CCK wrote a recommendation to the Kenyan Government requesting them to legalise 
VoIP. In their management paper dated June 2002, CCK noted that: 
the core distinction the Commission needs to make is that Voice over Internet is an application any 
user, company, or group can download or buy products for their own personal or organisational gain 
therefore an Internet Service Provider cannot be held liable for the actions of their customers. This 
would mean that the Commission would be pushing its responsibility to enforce the licence conditions 
on a commercial interest without due monetary service (CCK, 2002 p.2).  
Nonetheless the report also noted that: 
 the use of Internet telephone services in the country is inevitably hurting Telkom  revenue from 
International calls. VoIP is illegal in Kenya specifically to protect Telkom exclusivity on 
International voice services. However, VoIP calls do not herald the death of conventional telecom at 
the moment because the quality of Internet telephony is still not good enough. Also, the telecom 
infrastructure in the country over which VoIP operates, still needs to be improved. So, people who 







The report concluded recommending that: 
1)VoIP being part of Internet Services such as e-mail, WWW etc, should be allowed and 
encouraged as these services develop into more cost effective means of modern communication, by the 
deletion of the restrictive clause of the Internet Service Provider licence and Internet backbone 
facilities and service licence. 2) The Commission’s policy remains to be technology neutral and new 
innovative technologies that enhance value to the end-users should be facilitated, in the best way 
possible. 3) That the Incumbent Operator, Telkom Kenya Limited, should be encouraged to follow 
ITU Recommendations to deploy more cost effective networks such as IP-based networks as opposed 
to the less efficient Circuit Switched Technologies. (ibid, 2002, p.5).  
In spite of this report, Telkom retained its exclusivity in the market. As has been depicted in 
the analysis so far, political interest over Telkom explains the Government’s reluctance to 
open the market. Confirming this, an editorial covered by the Standard newspaper (Opiyo, 
2005), noted that the opening of Internet telephony was expected to stir the political elite who 
had reaped huge profits form Telkom (ibid, October 10th 2005). In February 2005, Telkom 
disconnected VoIP users who were using VoIP calling cards to make long distance 
international calls. This was in spite of the announcement by the Minister of 
Communications in May 2004158 that the Government would re-issue licences to ISPs to 
provide VoIP services (“Kenya to liberalise” 2005). The CCK only confirmed changes to the 
licensing of ISPs in July 2005. Finally in November 2005, eight ISPS were issued with 
modified licences which allow them to carry multimedia traffic including VoIP (CCK, 2005). 
6.8 Neo-patrimonialism and reforms 
Given the length of this chapter’s discussion, it is apposite to pause and offer a brief 
summary of the status quo within the neo-patrimonial political underpinnings of Kenya 
before proceeding to the discussion in chapter 7. 
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Recall that the de jure fixed-line exclusivity period was extended from December 2003 to 
June 30th 2004. This was agreed with the imperative licensing of the SNO and RTOs. The 
process to date, if instructive in any way, suggests that further delays can be expected and 
that there is no cause for optimism with regard to a definite licence being awarded in early 
2006. In addition, the Government was to enact a Privatisation Bill which had been delayed 
for political reasons as discussed earlier. The Bill and the privatisation of Telkom as well as 
the liberalisation of the sector were therefore seen as key conditions under the loan money 
from the PRGF. However, one other politically significant condition had been fulfilled, the 
establishment of the Kenya Anti Corruption Commission (KACC) in May 2004.  
KACC was, however, established under a fiery political battle. Kibaki’s new Government 
began its term of office with corruption scandals that implicated key Ministers in his 
Cabinet. The IMF and the World Bank issued statements in the same period, noting they 
would cancel Kenya’s withdrawal facility given the corruption accusations. In 2003 a law was 
enacted by Parliament which gave birth to the KACC. However, it was not until May 2004 
that the Commission finally began operating because Parliament dragged its feet in 
approving and rejecting people and was playing politics of patrimonialism in which people 
nominated by certain members of Parliament were either accepted or rejected (see Nation 
newspapers through the Month of May 2004).  At the end of December 2004, with the 
Government in need of funds to finance the payments of public service and its recurrent 
debts, the Kibaki’s Government wrote to the IMF describing the policies that the Kenyan 
Government intended to implement in the context of its request for financial support in 
2005. The Government of Kenya blamed the lack of progress on Structural Adjustment 
Reforms on capacity constraints and a lack of consensus on the objectives and modalities of 









After conducting an audit, the IMF approved SDR 50m (US$ 76.9m) and also approved waivers 
for the nonobservance of continuous and structural performance criteria (IMF, Press Release (04/270) 
20th December 2004). As will be argued in chapter 7, it is not surprising therefore that 
Kibaki’s Government was willing in 2005 to continue its slow progress with reforms. After 
all, they did not receive any penalties and, as shall be discussed, neither did the WTO issue 
any letter for non-compliance with the GATS framework. The Privatisation Bill was finally 
passed in August 2005. The Bill outlined how the Government would off-load its shares in 
state corporations. However, the Finance Minister, Mr David Mwiraria noted that it will be 
selective privatisation because the Government must have control of those parastatals that offer essential 
services (“Members pass privatisation bill”, August 11th 2005). Defending the lack of 
privatisation of Telkom, he noted, Telkom Kenya employs 18,000 workers yet it has rolled out 
340,000 lines compared with mobile phone providers Safaricom and Celtel with a combined workforce of 
2,500 workers and 3 million subscribers. This he said was as a result of efficient management which 
privatisation aims at instilling in public institutions (Mwiraria, speaking to Capitalfm radio on 
August 11th 2005).  
Nonetheless, four years after gaining power, Kibaki’s record does not provide a clear case of 







corruption.159. It was not surprising therefore that the head of the IMF announced that the 
IMF was reviewing its aid flow to Kenya with a view to freezing it due to corruption that has 
infiltrated the new Government (Irungu, 2006). Thus between 2002 and 2005 many of the 
Government reforms that had been proposed under the Moi Government had been delayed. 
Blame for the delay has been laid on pressure from many of the conflicting interests in the 
NARC coalition and among top officials in the public service (Ndegwa, 2003). More 
significantly blame has been directed toward the neo-patrimonial nature of Kibaki’s rule in 
which he is concerned with establishing himself and NARC politically and therefore cannot use appointment 
strategies entirely for purposes of efficiency” (Kjaer, 2004, p.406). From the foregoing analysis, it 
seems that neo-patrimonial politics, imbued in Kenya’s policy process, was in part to blame 
for the sector’s outcomes. Further discussion on this is provided in chapter 7. 
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter set itself one primary task, to assess the implementation of Kenya’s Schedule of 
Specific Commitments as indicated through the KCA drawing on the 3 themes in the 
framework developed in chapter 2, namely: patrimonialism, co-dependency and 
flexibility/transaction costs.  The argument advanced was based on the study’s hypothesis 
that the reform process has merely been instrumentalised to get more aid to fund the 
Government’s needs at the expense of reforms.  
It is now possible to summarise the patterns of implementation of the GATS telecom 
reform process over the last eight years (1998-2005). On a generous, though largely 
unconvincing interpretation, it could be argued that technically there has been a GATS 
compliance in that the Minister has announced the liberalisation of the SNO, RTOs and 
third mobile operator as well as the privatisation of Telkom and that the process was begun 
and has had setbacks. That said, to the extent that the above processes comply with the 
dates specified in Kenya’s schedule of commitments, there is a clear breach on Kenya’s part. 
Nonetheless the failure to introduce full competition in the telecom sector does have 
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implications for the policy credibility that future liberalisation plans will carry. The legacies of 
past reform failures in Kenya reviewed in chapter 5 therefore continue to influence the 
dynamics of present efforts at reform. The realities on the ground therefore confirm 
arguments made by several African analysts critical of the reforms (van de Walle, 2001; 
Mkandiwire & Soludo, 2003) showing that the policy environment has changed less than is 
commonly argued.  
As was evidenced in this chapter, African states manipulate the ‘rules of the playing field in 
the GATS’ to their advantage. The GATS thus becomes a part of the process that 
entrenches neo-patrimonial politics in African nations. A state therefore may be more 
reluctant to open its borders where there is a fledging or weak domestic industry that it 
wishes to protect. This, as this chapter showed, is the case in the Kenyan telecom operator – 
Telkom, which not only provides income and employment in the country, but, acts as an 
important political power tool in Kenyan politics. The only way therefore to limit companies 
and countries entering one’s border is to refrain or limit scheduling commitments in a 
particular sector which may hinder the liberalisation process. Kenya’s Schedule of Specific 
Commitments therefore afforded this opportunity. Given the data and analysis in chapters 4 
to 6, the following chapter takes a holistic approach to the discussions, locating the issues 
within the three themes of the study (patrimonialism, co-dependency and transaction costs) 







7  C h a p t e r  s e v e n  
UNDERSTANDING TELECOM REFORM THROUGH THE 
LENS OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATONAL CONTEXTS: 
NEO-PATRIMONIAL STATES AND THE GATS 
What do we mean by an ‘information society’? We mean one in which 
human capacity is expanded, built up, nourished and liberated, by 
giving people access to the tools and technologies they need, with the 
education and training to use them effectively. The hurdle here is 
more political than financial. The costs of connectivity, computers 
and mobile telephones can be brought down. These assets -- these 
bridges to a better life -- can be made universally affordable and 




The purpose of this chapter is to draw together the study’s findings developed in chapters 4 
to 6. Specifically, the chapter locates the discussion within the framework developed in 
chapter 2 and discusses the imbued nature of neo-patrimonialism and how the Kenyan 
Government interacted with the proposed liberalisation of the telecom sector under the 
GATS framework. 
Following the analysis in chapters 4 to 6, it is evident through a review of Kenya’s 
compliance with its GATS commitments that any apparent lag in meeting deadlines and 
achieving full compliance is attributable to specific domestic concerns in the Kenyan neo-
patrimonial context. It has been asserted in this study that the very act of undertaking such 
commitments was to ensure ex post behaviour that may appear more rational to pursue after 
a commitment not to act in a certain way has been made. Yet, these commitments did not 
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stop the Government from going against its commitments. For example, as evidenced in 
this study, in order to maximise returns for the further sale of state equity in Telkom, policy 
was designed to protect and advance the interests of the monopoly incumbent rather than 
promoting competition within the telecom sector. While it could be argued that this was 
possible because of the flexibility inherent in the GATS, one fact needs to be highlighted - 
the flexibility identified in the GATS framework and specifically the RP, does not 
compromise that commitment. There is a clear distinction between engaging in opportunist 
behaviour (for example, extending monopoly) contrary to an undertaking not to do so 
(liberalising the domestic Kenyan market), and utilising the ‘flexible space’ that inheres in the 
implementation of a ‘vaguely precise’ agreement which holds the signatory to specified 
guidelines and time-frames. In fact, as was argued in chapter 2, the usage of the flexible 
space is precisely what facilitates the development of this tension.  
This ‘flexible space’ which allowed developing countries to negotiate their scheduling of 
specific commitments nonetheless came with the need to provide credibility in order to 
borrow money from the World Bank and the IMF. The lack of credibility, it was argued, 
stemmed from the fact that African governments had exhibited trends of non-reform and 
poor governance in spite of funding during the 1970s and 1980s. The creation of the WTO 
and the linkage between the IMF and the World Bank as was discussed in chapters 2 and 4 
thus created the adjustment regime which gave rise to forms of various conditionalities such 
as the SAP. And it is within the ambit of the ‘aid-trade’ relationship that it was argued that 
countries such as Kenya had no choice but to accede to the GATS framework. One central 
theme therefore emerges from the analysis: the tension exhibited between gaining credibility 
in the international arena and retaining domestic preferences. This chapter analyses this 
tension as evidenced through the themes of patrimonialism, co-dependency and flexibility/ 
(the transaction cost) discussed in the framework of the study in chapter 2. 
7.1 The Question of credibility: the GATS instruments 
While solutions may diverge, there is apparent consensus among critics of the Fourth 
Protocol and the RP as to their perceived weaknesses (Bronckers & Larouche 1997; 







competition provisions and the interconnection principle, the voluntary and imprecise 
nature of the specific commitments which Suave describes as selective a la carte, approach to 
making rule-making, (Suave, 1995 p.132), the ability to file extended exemptions; the potential 
to free ride on other’s assurances of market access; to erect disguised and sanctioned barriers 
through numbering, licensing and USO policies; the failure to specify sufficient regulatory 
independence from government and the opportunity to phase in changes and thus protect 
monopolies for extended periods. These weaknesses are claimed to frustrate the GATS in 
achieving its market access goals and which in the Kenyan case seem to be merited.  
Others critique the nature rather than the form of these undertakings as consisting of 
binding liberalising measures or regulatory freeze (ibid, 1995 p.143) that has already been 
adopted at the national or regional level. Whist this is true for many developed countries, 
there is less validity in this assertion for most emergent markets more so those in Africa at 
the cusp of regulatory reform in telecom. It has been conceded in this study however, that at 
least in the case of Kenya the commitments while not entirely at a standstill, are no more than 
expressions of intended domestic policy reform (Drake & Noam, 1998 p.54). Hence these 
undertakings echoed policy that was not yet to be adopted, but a process that was evolving.  
The schedule of specific commitments does, however, create a fixed (and arguably stricter) 
timetable for realisation. In Kenya’s case this meant ensuring that time-frames were more or 
less followed. However this was not achieved. The assessment of Kenya’s telecom reform 
process confirms the weakness of the GATS in the control of domestic markets. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the RP and the GATS do not spur members particularly from 
developing countries, to act with greater precision. Indeed, the very essence of the PRSP and 
PRGF procedures laid out by the World Bank and the IMF is to ensure conditionalities are 
met. However, the PRSP is simply a working paper. There is as yet no evidence that actual 
compliance is checked against work done. Moreover, because the PRSP is a paper prepared 
at Government level, there is no opportunity for other stakeholders to participate in the 
process. 
Instead, the aid system which has become institutionalised in Kenya over the years has 







show compliance and in turn receive aid. This, it is argued, is because the PRSP does not ask 
for detail on the specific nature of how reform is being undertaken. While there is some 
coordination between the Government and the IMF and the World Bank assessment teams, 
this it is argued, is merely a paper exercise rather than actual on the ground checks and 
balances. Interviews with private sector participants in the telecom sector noted that in 
Kenya, only Government stakeholders were present at the meetings. A look at Kenya’s 
PRSP evidences that the papers concentrate mainly on balance-of-payments details and 
Government budgeting processes. While the letter of intent and the policy framework paper 
were put in place to strengthen the credible commitment of African countries, it is argued 
that these procedures are imperfect. Indeed evidence of the imperfect nature of the 
conditionality process imposed by the donor community is reflected in the number of times 
the IMF and the World Bank have had to cancel disbursements to encourage 
implementation. As was reviewed in the previous chapters, the Privatisation Bill and the 
presupposed sale of Telkom provide two examples in which the international community 
explicitly made conditions on aid for reforms. Thus, in spite of the monitoring process 
which in the period of the telecom reform process (1999 to date) has taken place two times, 
the IMF and the World Bank confirmed Kenya’s commitment to the reform process and 
proceeded to disburse the sums of money needed for Government expenditure.  
It is therefore difficult to deny purchase of the concerns that the GATS framework does not 
provide a clear commitment for telecom development. In addition, although not a subject 
matter for this study, the testing of WTO’s dispute mechanism seems to suggest that this 
would be a lengthy protracted process,  leaving the status quo to be maintained. Second, the 
nature of interconnection which is based on the perceived interests of a company also 
mitigates against a floodgate of litigation to test the parameters and scope of the agreement. 
By this, it is suggested that even when there may be a clear breach of a licence condition or 
treaty provision, the nature of telecom and the need to remain interconnected to the 
network or to obtain network facilities in the face of a potentially protracted legal battle 
might prompt a continuation of the status quo. Supporting this argument, Bronckers has 
also indirectly questioned the efficacy of the DSB by querying the value of the competition 







enforced. On the other hand, he also tacitly acknowledges that the inclusion of a 
competition-safeguard clause in the RP is a positive development as the GATS Annex and 
Fourth Protocol do not contain a comparable obligation.  In this way, while competition law 
principles may differ from one region to another, members can at least demand the 
enforcement of those obligations through the DSB (Bronckers, 1999).  
Nonetheless, as premised in the introductory chapter of this study, the GATS framework 
provides a guideline of the structure of the telecom sector. It is specifically because member 
states have differing domestic goals and trade objectives that a guide is needed to manage 
and allow for these differences while establishing a minimum common standard. It is for this 
reason that the proponents of the RP argue that the principles are sufficiently broad to allow for 
diverse rules and practises but sufficiently specific to hold government accountable for the fundamentals of 
market-orientated regulation (Bronckers 1999 p.562-3). Hence the nature of independence may 
vary in its degree of separation of government; as long as the regulator remains at arms 
length (Samarajiva, 2000), that the structure of USO conditions and policy and who should 
be obligated to carry it out should be decided on a national level, and that the licensing 
criteria for the provision of services should be capable of local tailoring. As Mukerji points 
out: 
 the challenge of participating in the international economic order for economic liberalisation had to 
be balanced out with the requirements of ensuring equitable socio-economic development, in which the 
role of government was as important as the role of the market (2000 p.36-36).  
Yet is it strongly argued in this study that the above is only merited in governments whose 
leadership and democratic process portray clear evidence of abiding by fair standards. 
Indeed, as long as a floor of agreed standards and mutually acceptable guidelines are in place, 
which accord with principles of administrative fairness, domestic governments should have 
the leeway to craft policies that best give expression to broader macroeconomic and social 
goals while adhering to a firm timetable for implementation. But this is not the case in neo-
patrimonial states such as Kenya, where evidence of corruption, nepotism, tribalism, state 








In the case of Kenya, it is submitted that the GATS framework facilitated the opportunity to 
portray credible commitments at the international level while still allowing it the flexibility to 
dictate the process of telecom reform domestically. In this way, the GATS framework plays 
a significant ‘insurance policy’ role in that the commitment to keep a sector open and subject 
to multilateral dispute settlement provides investors with certainty and predictability that 
domestic liberalisation alone cannot offer. Even Suave, a critic of the RP notes that in the 
absence of liberalisation, guaranteeing the conditions of access by offering a standstill 
undertaking on current practises can provide important security benefits for foreign service 
providers and, it is added, contribute to establishing policy credibility (Suave, 1995). This 
predictability and credibility, as has been previously submitted, is based on the historical 
relationship between African states and the IFIs. 
Moreover, it was also argued that the very need to provide flexibility in the GATS 
framework in the form of scheduling a commitment was based on the need of the WTO to 
achieve a critical mass of signatories and hence enhance its own credibility in the wider 
global political economy. Similarly while acknowledging that a horizontal approach (that is, 
applicable to all service sectors) to market openness may allow for a more coherent 
perspective on the relationship between trade, competition and regulatory policy, Blouin 
(1999) concludes that the sectoral approach offers many more benefits. The most important 
of these is the recognition that including the specifics of competition policy and domestic 
regulation in multilateral trade agreements, at the horizontal level, would be viewed as an 
unacceptable encroachment on national sovereignty. This would, in turn, serve to undermine 
the very legitimacy of the international trade regime.    
One further tension requires definition before proceeding. As highlighted in chapter 1, there 
are many who view the WTO and its agreements as adverse reflections of globalisation 
limiting the sovereign power of the nation-state. While this debate is not discussed here, it is 
contested that trade agreements can indeed result in what Lodge and Striton (2001 p.10) calls 
loss of boundary control and negatively constrain national governments’ ability to act locally. It is 
also conceded that a certain amount of voluntary constraint or pre-commitment is adopted 







arena. This pre-commitment does not necessarily translate into a constraint on the sovereign 
power of the nation-state. This study contends that while there is merit in these concerns, in 
the case of GATS and specifically telecom, this concern is not warranted provided the 
requisite capacity is present. As shall be discussed in part three of this chapter, this is not the 
case for African states such as Kenya. Indeed, as noted in chapter 4, textual support exists in 
the GATS agreement itself to manage the pressure placed on national governments which is 
produced by pitting international trade demands against domestic policy. Article II of the 
GATS specifically authorises measures inconsistent with MFN, subject to certain conditions. 
Article XIX on specific commitments explicitly directs that negotiations shall take place with 
due respect for national policy objectives, and will include flexibility for opening fewer sectors, liberalising 
fewer types of transactions (GATS, Article XIX). This is the source of concessions granted to 
developing countries in opening fewer sectors by requiring only that market access be 
progressively extended in line with their development situation. The Annex also specifically 
recognises this tension within the developing country context and authorises reasonable 
conditions to be placed on access to, and use of, those public telecom networks and services 
necessary to strengthen {their} domestic infrastructure and increase {their} participation in international 
trade in telecom services (GATS, Annex). 
Evidence from the Kenyan telecom reform process, however, suggests that one should not 
be too optimistic about the leeway these provisions grant, particularly where countries may 
not have the capacity or the political will to use them appropriately. Nonetheless it should 
not be forgotten that the flexibility of the GATS is responsible for shaping the context in 
which the GATS was negotiated and has a bearing on a state’s adoption of the instruments 
in the first place and on their compliance with its provisions. Moreover, the emphasis on 
increasing participation of Developing countries (WTO, 1994 Article IV) and its restatement 
principle in the Doha negotiation round (WTO, 2001) cannot be overlooked. This flexibility 
has in the case of developing countries been negotiated and continues to do so under the 
ambit of ‘Aid for Trade’. Current rounds reflect a clear intention to preserve this flexibility in 







Finally, summarising the essential argument made in this study on the issue of credibility and 
the GATS, the accession to the array of GATS telecom instruments reflects a credible 
commitment not to arbitrarily alter the terms of an investor in the local market and, further, 
a commitment to ensure that existing regulations inconsistent with market access ideals are 
changed over time. Whatever the strengths and weakness of utilising the WTO’s DSB, it 
does suggest that an enforcement mechanism with which, at least notionally, countries who 
violate their commitments will have to compensate suppliers that suffer a loss as a result. 
The accession itself, notwithstanding questions regarding its compliance requirements based 
on the extent to which they draw on or include strong or weak credibility enhancing tools, 
increases the credibility of Kenya’s signalled intent to liberalise its domestic telecom market 
and, in doing so, its relationship with the international monetary community.  
7.2 Applying credibility in the Kenyan context 
It bears repeating that Kenya planned its Schedule of Specific Commitments with its 
domestic telecom policy intentions in mind. From the detailed account of the formulation 
and evolution of telecom policy in Kenya, it is apparent that on one hand macro economic 
policy commits the country to liberalisation and privatisation, and on the other, to ensure 
affordable telecom access to the people of Kenya. This inevitably requires an environment 
attractive to foreign capital and investment. It is also trite that telecom reform requires 
significant private sector investment if development goals are to be met (Melody, 1999b). 
Yet, because of inequalities in the distribution of essential services as health and education, a 
‘redress initiative’ - the ‘development imperative’ – was injected into all economic sectors in 
Kenya. Telecom was no exception. The provision of this ‘development imperative’ through 
the KCA was therefore not negotiable. For purposes of reinforcement the objectives of the 
KCA bear repeating: 
 The overall Government objective for the sector is to optimise its contribution to the development of 
the Kenyan economy as a whole by ensuring the availability of efficient, reliable and affordable 







While it is uncommon for legislation to carry such an extensive enunciation of aims and 
objectives, it is important to understand this ‘development imperative’ and the influence of 
the historical context from which it emerged, as well as the enormous political and financial 
stakes at issue. Both are apparent in the discussion in chapters 5 and 6. Singh (1999) in his 
book titled ‘Leapfrogging Development’ argues that the motivations for telecom reform in 
developing countries is largely to do with a country’s economic conditions and changes in 
ideas and technology, and will, therefore inform the degree to which it is valued as 
government priority. In Kenya’s case both reasons seem to have affected the impetus for the 
reform of the telecom sector.  
Measures to promote the realisation of the KCA’s objectives, for example, USO, arguably 
present an inherent clash with the fundamental underpinnings of the GATS – open markets 
and non-discrimination. However, it is argued that the ‘development priority’ is also located 
within the ambit of the GATS which provides an expression of these ideals in order to 
attract a critical mass of signatories and support legitimacy of those signatories domestically. 
Thus, while the GATS seeks to provide a process and method for liberalisation (noting that 
for developing countries this would eliminate existing barriers such as monopoly, lack of 
infrastructure and finance through competition and therefore redress the issues of telecom 
distribution) based on signing the protocol, it was evident that within each country various 
divergent policies that seek to address economic development would exist. The RP accepts 
the right of any member to define its USO. It was recognised that applying competition in 
the Kenyan market, for instance, could not be immediately implemented. It is for this reason 
that the GATS positive listing approach of the schedule of specific commitments 
accommodates these domestic imperatives. This is because it acknowledges that scheduling 
commitments can potentially surrender some degree of control at home that are not so much 
concerned with economic protection as with aspects of political autonomy and cultural identity (Arup, 2000 
p.99). It thus allows for the right to exclude certain services and also to impose measures and 
limitations on those scheduled commitments to ensure the integrity of the domestic goals 







Thus, because telecom was recognised as such an important domestic political issue, linked 
to imperative redress initiatives such as USO, redistribution and even employment policies, 
for Kenya to have been denied this flexibility to prescribe the content of the regulatory 
principles it undertook, with due regard for transparency and competitive neutrality, would 
have completely undermined its domestic reform agenda as well as the express recognition 
of these ideals in the GATS, noted above. Nonetheless, as argued in the previous section, 
the flexibility in the GATS did not preclude non-observance. The USO provisions in the 
GATS are not considered divergent to the GATS agreements and are neither considered as 
anti-competitive per se, provided that they are administered in a transparent, competitive 
and non-discriminatory manner and were to ensure that they did not create difficulties in 
telecom provision by investors. Further evidence of the flexibility inherent in the GATS is 
drawn from the telecom and financial service negotiations which reflect how developing 
countries have been able to withstand pressures to open up their markets entirely. Indeed, 
some countries like Botswana elected not to participate at all in the negotiations. In certain 
cases members were able to take binding WTO commitments at lower levels than their 
existing, domestic level of liberalisation in the sector. For example, South Africa scheduled a 
foreign cap in the telecom sector of 30 percent but allowed a foreign cap of 49 percent in its 
initial liberalisation process.   
Thus, the GATS commitments had the very effect intended by the Kenyan Government – 
to provide sufficient leeway for domestic policy preferences. Neo-patrimonial leaders such as 
Moi and Kibaki could not have resisted the pressure to reform had they not had the 
assistance of the inherent structure of the WTO framework and its financial mechanisms 
through the IMF and the World Bank.  This discussion is further borne out below through 
an analysis of the patterns of implementation evidenced in Kenya’s telecom sector. 
7.3 The art of mischief:  regulation and independence 
As has been observed through the study, the main characteristic of the telecom reform 
process has been the attempt by political leaders to derive political advantage by controlling 







the Moi and Kibaki Government exhibited strong control of all key institutions, namely 
Telkom, CCK and NCS. Further detail on the issue requires elaboration as discussed below. 
In keeping with the RP, Part VII of the KCA (KCA, 1998) also established the NCS, the aim 
of which as stated earlier was to advise Government, particularly the then Ministry of 
Transport and Communication on policy. Like CCK and Telkom, there was also political 
wrangling over who would head the post and in late 2001 a Commission Secretary was 
elected. Six other policy analysts with specialisations in economics, engineering, telecom, and 
broadcasting were brought on board gradually. In abiding by the GATS, therefore, the KCA 
had separated KP& TC into the three sectors, policy, operations and regulation. But 
effective telecom services, as the literature suggests in chapter 3 requires a clear separation of 
all three institutions. On paper, it is possible to confirm that Kenya implemented the above 
process. However, given Melody’s (1997b) three tiered model, it is obvious that the actual 
issues of separation and resource capacities were not in place. Interviews with staff of both 
the NCS and CCK provide evidence of conflict and political manipulation where 
appointments were concerned. While the NCS and CCK appear to be fulfilling their roles 
and while there is no evidence of duplication, there is confusion over who does what. The 
majority of the staff of CCK were of the opinion that the NCS should be subsumed into a 
department of CCK. Clear separation of roles is further complicated by the fact that CCK 
revenues pay NCS (interview #21). Separation of roles is also further complicated by the fact 
that CCK has also been mandated with a policy role. Moreover, contrary to Melody’s 
(1997b) structure which requires the policy maker to have expertise and knowledge of the 
sector; the NCS is often overshadowed by the more experienced staff of CCK who have 
been in the sector.161  
Of all the three main players (Government, through the Ministry of communication, CCK 
and NCS), NCS has a clear policy role mandated by the KCA. Nonetheless, interviews with 
staff members of the CCK showed that CCK has been a key player in the making of policy 
while simultaneously implementing policy. For example, part of CCK’s mandates as stated in 
                                                 







its website is to conduct a review of the market structure in the telecom sector and 
exchanges views on policy and the regulatory environment with the NCS, predominantly 
through the office of the MD of CCK (“Role of CCK”, 2005). Employees of CCK were of 
the opinion that they made and implemented policy while NCS was simply there to 
legitimise what they had created. The implementation function is thus carried out not only 
by CCK, but GITS and the E-Directorate in their separate roles and functions. Table 3 
(adapted from Bowman-Ngaruiya & Waema, 2005) below illustrates the policy roles. It 
should be noted however that the KCA does not specifically specify a policy role for CCK. 
However, in practice, CCK does carry out several policy functions as has been discussed. 
 
The dualist relationships of the newly created institutions in the telecom sector have 
therefore had several implications for regulation and the ability of the sector to function 
effectively. While the demarcations between all institutions more so Telkom and CCK have 
been imbued due to the historical separation of KP&TC as has been discussed in chapter 5, 
this does not detract from the fact that the regulator is to ensure appropriate behaviour as 







(2002) explain the outcome of effective regulation as an analysis that must explain how 
institutions are embedded within a network of social relations (p 681), that is, how various parties 
interact within the regulated space.162.Complaints in the media attest to the negative 
perception of CCK by the public due to the historical relationships between Telkom and 
CCK (Shaw, 1999). In addition, 60 percent of the ISPs interviewed felt that they did not see 
the regulator as having regulatory oversight over Telkom. This is not farfetched. Evidence of 
the problems experienced by CCK in performing the various tasks of regulation was clearly 
manifest through the licensing process of the third mobile operator and regional service 
providers discussed in chapter 6.  Moreover, as was depicted, these appointments had 
implications for the way all three organisations functioned. Confusion over dual roles as well 
as political interests and preferences therefore undermined the process. In addition, it 
appears that regulatory functions were also undermined by the Government’s dualist role of 
policy maker and service provider. 
The dualist relationships between CCK and the Minister appear to have been encouraged 
rather than discouraged. In terms of the KCA, the Minister as opposed to the regulator had 
the power to invite and grant applications for major licences. For the first three years of 
operation this was further compounded by the fact that there were two ministries that had 
dual roles where the sector was concerned. It was not until February 2004 amid complaints 
and political wrangles over corruption in the telecom sector, that the President, following a 
major cabinet reshuffle established a new ministry with responsibility for both the telecom 
and broadcasting sector. One implication flows from this discussion and has roots in the 
literature discussed in chapter 2 that the institutions in the telecom reform process were not 
meant to be independent from the outset and were politically manoeuvred to the contrary.   
To establish the telecom reform process within political preferences, the Moi Government 
ensured that the political instrument of policy was interpreted in their favour. This is not 
surprising given that neo-patrimonial states are defined by Presidential rule which 
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overshadows even the judiciary and legislature. The following discussion located within the 
legal ambit of the KCA serves to show what happened. In order to control policy, Part V of 
the KCA (quoted in chapter 6) was intentionally ignored and was subsequently overlooked 
by the Kibaki Government in 2003. The former Moi regime simply refused to bring the 
Act’s mandates into operation – a provision that was not legally viable.  
The powers conferred on the executive in respect of Part VII of the Act (the repeal of KP 
&TC) were subsidiary to the main legislation and are also very exact in two respects. First, 
the powers conferred on the executive specifically mention the Minister of Finance. Second, 
the powers thereby conferred only relate to the vesting of assets and liabilities of the former 
KP&TC. The Minister had no general power to override other provisions of the KCA or to 
determine at which date any of its other provisions were to come into force. Indeed all other 
parts of the Act necessarily and automatically came into being once the Act received 
Presidential assent and was published in the Kenya Gazette. Part I of the KCA provided for 
the cessation of the exclusive privilege of the former KP&TC to provide telephone and 
telegraph services within the country on commencement of the provision (KCA, 1998). As 
interpreted by the High Court of Kenya, this section came into operation when the KCA 
became law (KCA, 1998). Moreover, the telephone and telegraph service licences operated 
under Sections 59.I and 70 of the KP&TC (now repealed) extended over the whole of the 
Republic of Kenya and were not limited to geographic scope to particular regions.  
From this it seems evident that the KCA gave the executive no powers of creation or 
deletion in respect of communications. Parliament seems to have taken extraordinary care 
not to allow the executive much leeway in the operation of the sector. But even so, the 
executive created an industry structure replete with monopolies. When vesting day was 
announced, the exclusive licence of Telkom was extended for a period of 5 years for a single 
region Nairobi. The Minister’s action was nowhere envisaged in the KCA. In fact, it directly 
contravened Part V of the Act.  Thus the five year ‘exclusivity’ granted to Telkom in 1999 
was a violation of the KCA. Court cases (HCCC No. 1 of 2004) and media reports (Kisero, 
2001a) attest to this. For example, ISPs had long argued that they ought to be able to be able 







gateway operated by Telkom. During the Month of July 2004, the Communications Appeals 
Tribunal delivered a landmark decision on a case bought against CCK by Fastlane Limited, a 
conglomerate of ISPs (HCCC No. 1 of 2004). The ISPs argued that CCK had no basis for 
its decision not to grant Fastlane Limited a VSAT licence. The ISPs also claimed that the 
Minister had no legal power to make specific directions to CCK in regards to policy. The 
CCK for its part argued that there was no legal prohibition against granting Telkom 
exclusivity over the provision of such services. The Tribunal agreed with the ISPs and ruled 
against CCK. It was declared that the five year exclusivity granted to Telkom by CCK was 
ultra vires the KCA. The Tribunal further observed that CCK was mistaken in its 
indiscriminate acceptance of the KANU (Moi) Government’s policy guidelines on telecom. 
The Tribunal further stated in its ruling that although Government policy guidelines were 
strong recommendations they did not constitute law. However, it also stated that Government policy 
guidelines could not be ignored except at a great peril (HCCC No. 1 of 2004). Evidently the 
Moi and Kibaki Governments were keen to ensure a variation to the law through 
administrative fiat. In what eventually turned out to be a norm rather than an exception, as 
has been observed in the preceding chapters, the regulator was tasked with assessing and 
evaluating licence bids and making recommendations to the Minister but could not 
ultimately award the licence. Its role was limited to merely issuing the licence on approval by 
the Minister. However, only in the case of restricted licences such as VANS and PSTN 
could the regulator take a decision and even then only after due consultation with the 
Minister.  
Indeed, two main advantages could be argued for the choice of licensing as a policy tool in 
the telecom reform process. First, where there are limitations of licences to be granted, the 
process offers equal opportunities to all those interested in securing the licence. This is the 
case with most telecom and broadcasting licences where frequencies and spectrum 
management issues are not only dependant on local availability but on regional and 
international allocations. Second, the licensing process largely presents an opportunity for 
the Government to earn revenue upfront from an initial licence fee paid by the winning 
bidder. Sums of up to US$ 55 million (the highest paid in so far for a licence) provides a 







Kenyan Government was keen on reaping huge sums from the licensing prices and thus 
charged exorbitant rates for licences.  However, it is argued that the licensing process 
presented several issues for regulation which were in part allowed by the Kenyan 
Government through its structuring of the KCA in order to maintain their interests and 
provided a means to slow the reform process without actually seeming to reject the process. 
First, given the lack of specificity over who decides over the licensing process, several claims 
and counter claims were made over licensing of all categories. In fact, in all cases, the 
licensing process was announced during telecom public meetings where reporters were keen 
to find out what was going on in the telecom sector. Political rhetoric was used as a means 
of pacifying the Kenyan public and the international community who assumed that an 
announcement was equal to actual implementation of the process. One respondent from the 
media department confirmed that more often than not, CCK was caught in a ‘catch 22’ 
situation as it could not confirm or deny political announcements on CCK’s supposed 
actions or plans (interview #4). It is not surprising therefore that in 2004 Econet sued the 
Government of Kenya (specifically the Minister of Information and Communication) for 
allegedly cancelling their licence illegally.163 The case is still pending as at the end of 
December 2005 with the court currently grappling with preliminary objections. It is clear 
that the independence of CCK is put to question as most of the Ministers tended to see 
CCK as an entity reporting to themselves. It is also clear that Ministers felt that CCK was a 
Government entity and therefore had no right to act on their own.  
Second, the process is open to subjectivity, controversy, litigation and other forms of 
disruptions. Much ink has been used in this study to describe and critique the various 
complaints that arose in the process. The issues of subjectivity begin from the application of 
the shortlist criteria and continue throughout the entire process, as discussed in the 
preceding chapters. This is not a unique case and is common also in other Kenyan 
Government offices where applications for tenders and projects are based more on the 
                                                 
163 The CCK was also enjoined in the suit, lest they attempted to give effect to the Ministers wrongful order. Interviews with 
CCK management nevertheless confirm that they were not in any case going to do so since they had awarded the licence 







ability to convince the tender team rather than any actual proof of ability to meet stated 
criteria (interview #23 and #47). Thus what takes place in the tender space leaves room for 
individual preferences. As with all subjectivity issues, space for controversy and questioning 
is created. The lack of clear lines on the part of the application process and the lack of 
transparency of the process on the part of CCK, opens the possibility for litigation. As 
argued by Shihanya (2000, p 602) in a licence renewal or cancellation there should be substantial 
procedural equity. A licence cancellation or approval should therefore not take place until all 
parties have been heard and the issue made satisfactory to all. Questions of natural justice 
thus arise.  
For example, during the licensing process of the third mobile operator, KTIG filed a case 
against CCK (KTIG vs. CCK) and enjoined Econet, over the licensing of the third mobile 
operator process claiming that they were wrongfully rejected from the tender process by 
CCK (HCCC No. 1570 of 2004). They alleged that CCK irregularly and unprocedurally 
disqualified them given that they had a higher financial bid than Econet (Econet had bid 
US$ 27m while KTIG bid US$ 55m). According to CCK, KTIG failed to obtain the 75 
percent threshold required at the technical stage and therefore CCK argued the financial bid 
was a non-issue. Nonetheless, legal experts interviewed suggest that the technical and 
financial evaluations should have been looked at as a whole. This constitutes the substance 
of the suit. It was argued that anyone apart from the judge hearing the case could only 
explore at the risk of committing the offence of sub judice. (interview #12, #30 and #40).  
The RP states that where a licence is required, if period of time taken to reach a decision is 
denied, reasons for, must be provided on request. This requirement is both valuable from 
the point of view of administrative fairness and to create certainty for investors. 
Nonetheless, the extent to which licensing criteria needs to be made available remains 
unclear. It is presumed that a guide as to approximate weighting of factors in licence awards 
would suffice, although this in principle is yet to be tested in a legal forum. 
Third, it is argued that the licensing process often attracts speculators whose intention is not 
to roll-out networks but to eventually sell the licence for quick financial gains not related to 







easily get away with providing untrue technical jargon; thus, a submitted proposal may not 
accurately reflect the applicant’s experience. Cases of bidders having submitted successful 
applications only to sell their share to other firms and thus gain from the application process 
have also been rampant. An example of this is the case of the Commercial Trunked Radio 
Operators. In a bid to improve the efficiency and frequency utilisation of the numerous 
private 2-way radio operators, CCK in 2001 embarked on yet another licensing process. This 
aimed to introduce the migration of the numerous individual 2-way radio networks to shared 
commercial trunked radio networks, on Very High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High 
Frequency (UHF) bands in order to facilitate efficiency. Unfortunately, none of the winning 
bidders came forward to pay the over US$ 5m that had been bid as initial licence fees. The 
regulator blamed this behaviour on speculative bidding on the part of the applicants 
(interview #14). Such problems seriously call into question the ability of the licensing team 
involved in assessing the tender documents.  
Fourth and following on from the above, the licensing process often leads to very high 
financial bids, which – if paid –  give rise to very high service tariffs that are deemed 
necessary to recoup the heavy investments including payment of licence fees. This is 
evidenced by the case of the incumbent mobile operators – Safaricom and Celtel – who 
defend their service charges on the basis of trying to recoup the licensing fees paid to the 
Government. In addition, the issue of high fees has been linked to the Government’s need 
to raise revenue. Those interviewed from both the private and Government sectors, as well 
as those involved in writing the tender documents, confirmed that the criteria for the 
tendering process of the third GSM was largely influenced by demands of the Kibaki 
Government, which needed to meet obligations that pertained to the new free education 
policy. Given the potential high sums of money that can be earned from this sector, the 
Government’s expectations on the sale of a licence have been high. However, bidding at 
different times often results in different financial offers, which leads, in turn, to uneven and 
inconsistent market entry terms for different players. It is thought that the non-penalisation 
of Econet is due to the quoted amount on the second winning bid (US$ 11m), which was 







tariffs and the Government using the licensing process to raise revenue is further illuminated 
through the prolonged sale of Telkom discussed in the previous chapter. 
Finally, the Kenyan licensing process is viewed as legitimising rent-seeking behaviours. While 
this has not been fully determined, complaints made by the public as well as reports from 
the KACA and the IMF and the World Bank indicate that the issue warrants further 
investigation. If financial applications based on an auction process are the sole determinants 
of success, this would seem to negate the licensing procedure, as decisions are made based 
on a government’s expected financial gain rather than on the applicants’ ability to provide 
services. In Australia, licensing of an applicant is done through an application based on the 
Terms of Reference, with 60 percent assigned to technical considerations and 40 percent to 
financial considerations. While an applicant has to pass the technical stage to be considered 
for the financial stage, the entire process is seen as one entity, rather than as two separate 
entities as is the case in the Kenyan licensing process. 
Towards the end of 2005, in what can be described as a giant leap and which is to be 
implemented in mid 2006, CCK simplified the licensing regime under a technologically 
neutral framework. Prior to this new policy, all categories of telecom such as mobile, ISP, 
Internet, VSAT, radio communications, required a separate licence. As evidenced in this 
study, this resulted in a protracted and unclear process. The new licensing format, with only 
three categories - network facilities, applications and content will therefore apply to all 
categories in the industry. However, interviews with informants in the sector suggest that 
this process is still imbued with loopholes that will allow for political interference (interview 
#26). For instance, licences would be granted on a first come first served basis on 
demonstrated conditionality to roll-out the infrastructure needed.  
The type of problems described above again call into question the regulator’s ability to 
enforce rules. While there is substantive literature on how rules should be established to 
regulate firms in a competitive communications market, there is comparatively little literature 
on how to enforce such rules (Baldwin & Cave, 1999). The inability to enforce rules is, 
however, not unique to Kenya; it is cited by the Federal Communications Commission 







monitoring in policy implementation studies would suggest the need for a formative 
evaluation process, in which monitoring is used to inform policy makers and stakeholders 
(Hall, 2005). On the question of monitoring, CCK respondents provided three main reasons 
for the lack of good enforcement: 1) the lack of actual statistics; 2) lack of technical know-
how in drafting documents; and 3) lack of equipment and other infrastructure that are 
needed to ensure that due diligence is maintained (interview #10). 
The above gaps in the monitoring process might be reduced by various tools such as 
database systems and information packages, which are suggested as effective in ensuring that 
monitoring can take place. Studies in the area of knowledge management in Africa (Kerretts, 
1998) attribute the lack of data to the absence of trust, lack of statistics and a lack of proper 
documentation procedures. Implementation studies in policy analysis further underscore the 
fact that the development of performance evaluation must be understood in the context of 
the need to control public finances and attain higher levels of value for money, efficiency 
and effectiveness (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Nonetheless, even if rules are enforced, 
questions on the extent to which the regulator is able to retract on legally binding documents 
are raised. What does the regulator do in a case where it is unable to re-issue a licence based 
on the no-show of a winning applicant? What options do regulators have in such cases? 
Such issues need to be addressed in the Kenyan sector. As it stands, the number of licences 
in the market determines the number of new licences that can be issued. While this in itself 
is a problem, the issue is further compounded by the fact that this number includes those 
applicants not in operation – therefore reducing any possibility of enhanced competition in 
the sector.  
While the genesis of the RP and its perceived strengths are discussed in chapter 4, its 
adoption in whole or part by the Kenyan Government was undoubtedly a momentous 
event. It signalled an acceptance by Kenya that there was something distinctive about 
telecom services and it established a blueprint or baseline for the future design of regulatory 
institutions. For Bronckers (1999), this distinctiveness is captured in the fact that with regard 
to telecom, the WTO did not seek the reduction and elimination of government 







On the contrary, they recognised that the reality of a telecom market dominated by large, 
often state-owned incumbents meant that a simple removal of monopoly in favour of one 
company would not ensure effective competition. Instead government involvement and 
oversight of the commercial behaviour of formal monopoly is required and, moreover, the 
RP requires governments to act against anti-competitive behaviour.  
While there have been many critics of the RP, its shortfalls and the enduring thrust of 
dissatisfaction against it can be summarised in Drake and Noam’s (1998 p.54) notion of 
standstill commitments. Namely, that the obligations undertaken merely reflect members’ 
existing or planned domestic liberalisation policies and plans to establish institutions and 
mechanisms necessary for that goal. Agreement with their claim is manifest in the number of 
times that it is noted in this study that Kenya’s schedule of specific commitments reflected 
the Government’s intended design over the KCA. Nonetheless as argued, the GATS 
provides a universally acceptable manner in which to proceed with the liberalisation process 
and at the same time provides a means of compliance. It is already apparent that while on 
the whole Kenya has honoured the time-frame for liberalisation, in many aspects, it has not 
met all goals in a precise manner due to varying pressures domestically. If one considers the 
delays and political conflict and interests besetting Kenya’s fledging telecom sector, the 
importance of the RP as not only a gatekeeper in adhering to WTO policies but a 
timekeeper becomes a tool that cannot be overstated where fulfilment of WTO policies is 
concerned. In Kenya’s case, all telecom services were to be provided under a licence issued 
in terms of the KCA. This was not unique and followed similar telecom policies around the 
world.  
The importance of regulation is further reinforced by the institutionalisation of the reform 
process through the GATS agreements. The importance of this is acknowledged through the 
rapid growth not only of independent regulators in the last ten years but also the increasing 
requirement to establish international agreements as observed through the WTO. Indeed, 
the need for regulation seems not to be in question, the implementation of reforms and the 
establishment of a regulatory body is indicative of this. However, the myriad forms in which 







sometimes even industry result in many manifestations of the ideal that cannot simply be 
measured by structural separation alone. Independence therefore becomes a blurred 
concept. As the ITU notes; ‘independence’ is: a concept that is most refracted through the lens of 
political culture. What one government may consider vital in terms of independence, another may consider 
impractical, unwise or even impossible (ITU, 2002, p.28). The ideal that ‘independence’ is absolute 
seems far from the reality.   
As exemplified from Melody’s (1997b) three tiered model reviewed earlier, separation is 
merely a means to ensure that forms of fair competition are safeguarded in a market where 
uneven competition can take place. Thus, Melody points out that while ‘independence’ does 
not necessarily include the power to make policy it includes the power to implement policy without 
undue interference from politicians, or industry lobbyists (Melody, 1999c p.25). As noted, mindful of 
the difficulties inherent in a transition from monopoly to competitive services, the RP 
requires that an independent regulatory body whose decisions and procedures will be 
impartial and fair will be instituted to ‘police’ the telecom sector. The CCK mandate 
therefore requires that: 
 the Commission shall, in the performance of its duties under the Act and these Regulations, 
promote, develop and enforce fair competition and equality of treatment among all licensees in any 
business or services relating to communications (KCA, 2001, p 239).  
It is acknowledged that the regulator and all institutions created as a result of the reform 
undergo a maturation process. Within this process, and although subtle, manifestations of 
‘capture’ are thought to occur.  This, it was suggested, is manifest in the case of CCK and 
Telkom. As discussed, the term capture refers to the situation in which the regulator proffers 
and becomes an accomplice or instrument of the regulated agencies rather than serving the 
needs of the general public164. In the case of Kenya, CCK employees were in many instances 
perceived as sympathetic to Telkom staff. A case in point is the issue of VoIP, in which 
Telkom was found to have unfairly provided VoIP services without informing other ISPs 
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though it was widely acknowledged by industry players that CCK was aware of the situation 
but allowed it to continue.  
The issue of regulatory capture is not only found in the telecom sector, but is further viewed 
as a behavioural function of organisations within a regulated market. Various theories on 
institutional capture exist, but two seminal accounts stand out for this study. Downs (1967) 
suggests that because organisation shifts occur throughout the life cycle of an organisation 
various bureaucrats with varying interests will dominate and influence the nature and 
function of the organisation. He provides various forms of agency bureaucrats with varying 
forms of influences. His study applied in the case of Kenya could explain how the staff 
members of CCK who were from Telkom had more bias and interests in maintaining the 
status quo than breaking it up. This is not far-fetched given that, as already indicated in this 
study, the split up of the KP&TC was one in which positional ties were re-solidified. While 
structurally separate institutions, there was little else initially to identify CCK and Telkom as 
separate organs. Moreover, interviews with individuals close to the original team deliberating 
on the break up of the KP&TC noted that there was a need to ensure that positions 
remained unchanged. Thus for example, it is alleged that the former head of KP&TC 
needed to be allocated a position equal to or similar to the privileges accorded him while 
working in the KP&TC (interview #11).  Thus, it is not surprising that a role was created for 
the former head of KP&TC in the ATU.  
On the other hand, Bernstein (1955) suggests that regulatory agencies have a life cycle based 
on historical patterns of evolution which may end up in regulatory capture. He suggests 
three stages of the process - gestation, youthful stage and maturity. His model suggests that 
regulation begins from the unknown relying on other elements in the society and slowly 
reaches maturity requiring no need for political or other support from the environment. This 
may well be the process in which Kenya is headed, but it is impossible to determine this at 
the moment. For now, eight years on, the regulation in Kenya continues to be marred by 
political interference.  
Given the above, one may argue that this tool has not been successful, particularly in light of 







is not a simple matter to argue convincingly to the contrary. Yet, it is contended that the 
GATS commitments have had the very effect intended by the Kenyan Government - to 
provide sufficient leeway for domestic political preferences while maintaining its credibility 
standing in the WTO and international aid community.  As has been argued and evidenced 
in this study, the historical nature of neo-patrimonial states such as Kenya suggests that 
patterns of reform and non-reform can be explained within the nature of political 
institutions first and second their interaction with the international community. The 
preceding chapters therefore show that Kenya’s telecom reform process had both a political 
and international dimension and it is both these two conflicting dimensions that dictated the 
process of reform.   
The narrative above suggests that reform processes in countries such as Kenya must be 
understood within historical terms. As pointed out in the literature in chapter 2, state 
capacity has been viewed as a critical component of state autonomy during the reform 
process. The IMF and the World Bank have thus been keen to provide funding under the 
ambit of improving state capacity as was evident even in the telecom reform process. 
Moreover, the DDA and future processes under this round suggest that state capacity will 
continue. The basis of this capacity concern pertains to the acknowledgement that Kenya 
and other developing countries will continue to be included in international decision making 
processes165 but are seldom able to influence either the agenda of these organisations or the 
outcomes of their decisions.166 The extent of this concern between and within developing 
countries varies but as this study has argued, neo-patrimonial states such as Kenya exhibit 
                                                 
165 See new and emerging work on Regionalism by Timothy Shaw with specific reference to countries in the South. For 
example see: Shaw, T. (2000). “New Regionalisms in Africa in the New Millennium: Comparative Perspectives on 
Renaissance, Realisms and/or Regressions”. New Political Economy, Vol. 5 No. 3 p.399-414. Also see: Shaw, T. (2002). 
“From Anarchy to Renaissance in Africa in the New Millennium: New Regionalisms as Responses to Globalisations” in 
Globalisation, the third world state and poverty-alleviation in the twenty-first century p.143-59. 
166 Concerns of this nature pertain not only to the WTO but also other ICT institutional bodies within the GPE such as the 
WSIS (as is suggested in this study) as well as the ITU and The International Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN). While quite different in institutional set and arrangements, they all however are dominated by a few 
industrialised countries and more particularly the USA -reflecting the interests of these countries in policy agenda’s and in 
outcomes of decision-making processes. In addition to these three organisations, a number of other specific global 
governance organisations are relevant to ICT policy and developing countries such as those in Africa. These include: 
UNECA, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Conference on 







poor state capacity as hybrid regimes. In addition, the facets of clientelism evident in Kenya 
as shown through Kenya’s telecom reform process have subverted any form of capacity 
development within the state. Thus the outcome of the state’s capacity to make decisions 
and implement policies can in part be explained by the outcome of political dynamics in 
Kenya and its interaction with the international community.  As evidenced in the telecom 
reform process, a number of constraints exist in Kenya that have an impact on it and other 
developing countries in Africa. These constraints hamper more effective participation (and 
outcomes) and more importantly in Kenya’s case present problems for domestic 
implementation of trade agreements. While a full analysis of the complexities that create 
such an uneven power dynamics is more properly the focus of another study, an attempt to 
explain these issues in the context of the neo-patrimonial literature reviewed in chapter 2 and 
the events of the telecom reform process analysed in chapters 4 to 6 is discussed in the 
following section.  
7.4 Understanding state capacity:  a neo-patrimonial perspective 
7.4.1 Institutions and aid: progress or failure? 
As discussed in chapter 2, to appreciate the development of African institutions such as 
Kenya, it is important to adopt a historical perspective and understand the progressive 
development of African economies within international aid institutions. The implications of 
this can be linked to the perceptions of the historical development of African states as 
reviewed in chapter 2. The discussion therein noted the progression of African states from 
colonial legacies to creating government structures beset by clientelist practises capturing the 
thesis that most African states are hybrid regimes, in which patrimonial practises coexist with 
modern bureaucracies. Through an examination of Kenya’s historical context in chapter 5, it 
was shown that Kenya’s political and economic development is linked to the flow of the 
structural adjustment policies and more recent conditional aid within the privatisation 
programme of the IMF and the World Bank.  
One important question is therefore borne out of this analysis. Namely: does aid 







more appropriately the subject matter of another study, it cannot be ignored here. An 
integral component of Kenya’s and other African states’ economies was the idea that aid was 
temporary. With economic growth, the gaps would be filled and the necessary aid would 
disappear, as the Government would take on project expenses as more resources are 
allocated to the training of civil servants. Thus from independence in the 1960s aid was 
officially meant to train the local population who would eventually replace the foreign 
experts and create or strengthen the services that would one day be housed in capable 
central ministries. In sum, institutional building was a central objective of the aid paradigm. 
However, as observed through the Kenyan telecom reform process, donors have retained 
the final say over all allocation decisions as the Kenyan Government over the years 
persistently showed little effort in creating development. And while in 1965 the Kenyan 
Government had unequivocally taken the position that the state can never become the tool of special 
interests catering for the desires of a minority at the expense of the needs of the majority (RoK, 1965 p.3), 
by the early 1990s the state had shown that there was little capacity to develop public 
institutions. The capacity to develop vested interest, concerned too much with the benefits 
of its office and too little with the performance given to the public enterprises, for example 
Telkom, where there were no checks and balances on the institution or the services 
provided. Theoretically, enterprises are accountable to the public through the ministries that 
control them and who answer, to a certain extent, to Parliament. However, Parliament 
presented a rather haphazard spot check on particular items of administrative performance (RoK, 
1970/1971 p.23). Debate on policy and budgets for specific enterprises was non-existent. 
Together with the reinforced principle of secrecy to arouse concern for national security, the 
enterprises operated almost entirely behind closed doors and depended entirely on self-
criticism away from the public eye.  
By the 1980s as evidenced in this study, Kenya’s aid system had institutionalised itself and 
begun to shape decision making as every Minister of Finance in the subsequent years linked 
aid to the formal planning and budgeting process. Thus in the case of Kenya, the aid regime 
had problematised the issue of institution building by the 1990s. Government inertia, poor 
planning, inadequate monitoring and corruption had worked to render public institutions 







the IMF and the World Bank have therefore been utilised to support the rehabilitation of 
these institutions. Aid it is argued has therefore substituted itself for core development tasks 
as budgeting and planning of development projects became less dependent on the 
Government’s ability to plan and more on its ability to ensure that it was able to distribute 
aid for the core activities of Government. In Kenya foreign aid accounts for more than nine 
percent of public expenditure. In the case of the telecom sector, it was evidenced that 
foreign aid has been used to budget for Telkom’s privatisation process as well as to continue 
paying the large number of workers (18,000) who cannot be supported by the income 
generated by Telkom.  
A key feature of neo-patrimonial states has been the decline of national economic planning 
and budgeting. The World Bank and the IMF programmes thus dominate government 
planning. Nonetheless, as argued earlier, in spite of the PRSP process which aims to monitor 
government progress on meeting specified conditions, these processes have not succeeded. 
The ideal that PRSP are prepared by governments in low income countries through a participatory process 
involving domestic stakeholders and external development partners (IMF, 2005) is not the case in most 
African countries. Instead, the process dominated by World Bank employees and Kenyan 
Government delegates (of whom much secrecy surrounds who actually participates) has 
merely sustained the Government’s dependency on these institutions. In addition, as was 
evidenced through this study, in most cases the IMF and the World Bank write-off poor 
implementation of conditionalities rather than penalising them.  
Neo-patrimonial tendencies have been able to assert themselves with growing rent-seeking 
and moved the Government away from public interest to ethnic politics and factionalism. 
Thirty years on, Okumu’s statement that a political leader in Kenya is provided with unlimited 
opportunities to shape and reshape factional alignments in the party and elsewhere in the system (Okumu, 
1970 p.33) stands true. In the case of the telecom reform process, evidence of ethnic 
preferences were prevalent in the employment of former KP&TC staff as well as the newly 
created telecom institutions. True to his word and in the spirit of Nyayo, which means 
following in the footsteps of his predecessor, Moi carried on and deeply entrenched the 







Kibaki took over, in spite of his assertion of stopping tribal politics, he nonetheless 
continued in the same patronage system, electing his friends to positions of power regardless 
of merit.  
The inevitable result of this evolution is the reinforcement of non-development tendencies 
within local policy making. The responsibility of aid in this system of evolution, while only 
partial is clear. The gap between aid donor objectives and neo-patrimonial states behaviour 
therefore needs to be accounted for. Recalling discussions in chapter 2, specifically work by 
Easterly (2002) on the role of IFIs, it seems that IFIs are keen to ensure that they retain their 
own legitimacy as an institution in which African economies provide the best candidates for 
implementing their broad SAPs. As is evidenced in the Kenyan case, despite donor rhetoric 
about the importance of conditionalities, it appears that the quality of political change and 
economic reform has not mattered much for the donors as long as the Kenyan Government 
plays the ‘culture of approval game’ in which a process based on paper work confirms that 
they have abided by or are intending to abide by the conditions. 
Nonetheless, I do wish to emphasise that aid is indeed also responsible for a large 
proportion of the development work in Kenya and Africa. But as argued, aid’s complicity in 
the current institutional devastation can clearly be linked to its role in sustaining weak 
governments in power while at the same time emasculating their development institutions. 
7.4.2 Resource constraints 
It is clear that a general lack of human and financial resources within developing countries 
such as Kenya lies at the heart of any discourse seeking to explain sub-optimal outcomes in 
participation in the global telecom governance structures like the WTO.167 There are a 
number of ways to consider this, first, that the emergence of a global matrix in which 
organisations and nations work together has created far more complex governance functions 
than those that existed at the bilateral level. Nevertheless, historical reasons will suggest that 
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(2002). Louder Voices: Strengthening Developing Country Participation in International ICT Decision-Making. London: The 







representation at international fora is based on the dominance of western states, specifically 
G8 countries,168 whose governments and corporations already exercise a disproportionate 
influence over global economic affairs. In such circumstances, one can safely assume 
inevitable disparities in relative capacities to participate equally in rule development, agenda 
setting and decision making.  Participation in meetings such as the WTO requires and 
assumes state representation in all meetings. As a result, membership to the WTO is defined 
in terms of state units as represented by national delegations with each state considered as 
having equal rights in regards to the terms of participation. Equally, attendance to 
conferences is through state delegation and all procedural activities such as proposal 
submissions and technical meetings are done through state delegations. As such developing 
countries have always had a less than satisfactory representation at such meetings.  
The problems of developing countries such as Kenya are therefore more acute: even if 
historical, economic and political factors are variable, the capacity problems faced by 
developing countries cannot be eradicated by addressing domestic institutional deficiencies 
alone. Various resource impediments remain.169 For example, Kenya does not have the 
technical expertise either in Government or in the private sector to understand WTO 
technical matters prevalent in GATS and GATT. To date the NCWTO which was formed 
in 1995 to assist the Government in implementing WTO issues has had several problems, 
key of which is Government support for the programme. As noted by the report on the 
proceedings of the Kenyan WTO workshop held in September 2000, Kenya lacks technical 
and financial capacity to make serious proposals at the WTO and other multilateral fora (Ikiara, 2000 
p.4). The report further noted that: 
                                                 
168 The G8 refers to the "group of eight", the eight most advanced industrialised countries, measured by economic output. 
The current membership of the G8 includes the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the 
United States. The heads of state of G8 countries and the President of the European Commission gather for summit style 
meetings annually. Hosting of the Summit rotates among G8 members. China has also recently been invited to attend 
these meetings. The purpose of the Summits is to develop and implement strategies for reform and co- ordinate policy on 
issues of international importance. Stated purposes of the G8 also include influencing the International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank, other industrialised countries, and other global organisations. Summit agenda themes include 
macroeconomic policy, nuclear safety, environmental degradation, drug proliferation, international terrorism and foreign 
investment in developing countries. 







 JITAP170 and WTO Technical Assistance provisions have either not provided the required 
technical training or have not been exploited because of stringent conditions. Budgetary allocations to 
R & D {research and development} in the country are, additionally, very small yet capacity 
building is key to effective participation in the WTO (ibid, p.4).  
The report concludes that as a result of the inherent capacity problems: the commitments and 
bindings that the country has made so far have therefore not been informed by analytical research (ibid, p.4).  
The lack of financial resources to meet the costs of attendance at global fora, including travel 
and associated costs, acquiring and processing information, obtaining the necessary capacity 
to contribute and attempting to have an impact on agendas and decision making, remains 
high. This also often requires addressing the costs of an ‘empty desk’ within already under-
resourced government departments in the member country. Kenya’s Department of Trade 
and Industry, for example, is represented by Kenya’s Permanent Representative who is 
based in Geneva with a staff of four. The Permanent Representative and her team are 
expected to attend most meetings and monitor operational developments in both the GATS 
and the GATT as well as participate in the service negotiation rounds such as the Doha 
rounds. This can be extremely damaging for many African countries which do not have the 
capacity to participate fully in the process. As Helleiner and Oyejide point out the WTO is a 
member driven organisation with no permanent Executive Board. This requires delegates from member 
countries to be actively involved in the day–to-day activities. If they are not, their interests are ignored (1999, 
p.112). And the costs of doing so remain significant. To participate in ‘the continuous 
dialogue’ that makes up the WTO procedures requires at least 45 meetings per year in 
Geneva which places significant pressure on the resources of cash-strapped smaller and 
developing countries (ibid, 1999). This lack of presence is an important inhibitor of 
meaningful participation as lobbying and the positions of developing countries are often 
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Kenya. They are expected to mount awareness campaigns on the Multilateral Trading System in the country. In the 
context of capacity building, the country has also implemented notification requirements, Trade Policy Reviews (which 







fashioned through the presence of a country ambassador or representative in Geneva rather 
than through regional meetings or organisations.  
Again, notwithstanding the evidence of the G21’s caucusing power shown at Cancun in 
2003, this historical lack of presence in Geneva, is also exacerbated by the failure to caucus 
at the regional level or among other developing countries. One interviewee representing the 
African continent at the WTO and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICAAN) global fora noted that it is most difficult to negotiate meetings that require active participation 
both at global and local level. It is one thing to be there but it is another to consolidate support at the local 
level (interview #68). Taken together, the facts and consequences for lack of capacity is 
central to the broader governance debate as it is both germane to addressing the lack of 
meaningful participation by developing countries and because to a large extent, 
notwithstanding financial limitations, curable.  
7.4.3 Governance and participation 
Linked to the development of institutions discussed above, is the context specific nature of 
neo-patrimonial states, which portrays a lack of effective governance structures and 
processes that foster meaningful participation at the domestic level. As argued in chapter 2, 
the development of neo-patrimonial states from colonialism in the 1960s was centred on 
reasserting nationalism. By the 1980s, governance was more about ethnically played politics 
combined with a weakening of the state. As was discussed in the preceding section, this in 
part was attributed to the aid-based financial system. Yet, as noted by the Ndegwa 
Committee assessing public institutions: basic causes of the squeeze are internal and it is within the 
power of Government to introduce corrective measures, which should alleviate the financial crisis and promote 
development (Ndegwa Committee, 1979 p.40). Thus the Government’s responsibility, in light 
of the economic and political problems experienced should have been to define policy and 
appoint management teams that could orient enterprises to adapt to the prevailing economic 
environment.  
By the early 1990s, Moi’s politics had shifted and came to resemble those employed by 







uneven development and were stimulated by newly educated local leadership who defined 
their relationship to followers and potential followers in terms of ethnic identities 
(Holmquist et al 1994). As noted in chapter 6, by the time Moi was leaving, the campaign 
process that drove him out had more to do with him as a person than seeking to remove the 
bad governance structures he had left behind. The NARC party that took over in 2003 
under the President Kibaki and which had been elected based on its commitment to ridding 
the Government of corruption, has done little as evidenced in the telecom reform process in 
the preceding chapters. NARC continues to foster ethnic lines and while Government 
cannot consist of every tribe and dialect, it has to tread carefully on the issue. It seems 
therefore, that any Government appointments or transactions have been and will continue 
to be measured against the ethnic barometer unless ‘we’ are able to move away from 
ethnicity.171  
As evidenced in this study, there are consequences of an ethnic-based economy on national 
programmes that involves the transfer or redistribution of assets. The privatisation 
programme cannot escape the ethnic divide because it ultimately has an effect on the 
distribution of wealth. Thus, one of the problems in Kenya is not that of deficient absorptive 
capacity, savings mobilisation, or even regulation capacity, but more deeply embedded in ethnicity (Adam et 
al 1992 p.337). To the extent that privatisation is seen to redress the imbalance in economic 
power among ethnic groups, it is predominantly as volte-face rejection of patronage. The 
lack of political commitment that has exemplified the reform process such as is the case with 
the telecom sector has occurred because successful planning and implementation would mobilise and 
liberate the masses enabling them to acquire economic and political power, and challenge the dominant class 
(Ominode, 1988 p.211). The pursuit of policies controlling and constraining large business 
and civil society allowing them to develop only if they were aligned with the political 
establishment, diminished Kenyan civil society and capitalists seen as strong in the early 
1970s (Tangari, 1999).  
                                                 








And while this study has not dealt with the broader aspects of the role of civil society, it is 
noted that their role in the policy-making process has only recently begun to emerge largely 
as a result of the WSIS process. This is because the world summit strongly criticised 
development planning without ‘peoples’ and ‘grassroots’ participation. As a result, the first 
formal delegation of civil society representation in the telecom global arena in Kenya can be 
traced to the Africa and Geneva WSIS meetings in 2002172 and 2003 and subsequent 
meetings in 2005. This translated to the mobilisation of civil society in Kenya and in 2004 a 
broader process was initiated with a multi-stakeholder regional workshop organised in July 
2004. Government, private sector and civil society were represented in the meeting. In 
consultation with various other civil society caucuses, TESPOK, KICTANet was formed in 
October 2004. This has had several positive changes in the sector and in policy making, the 
most important of which is the joint production of the Draft ICT policy which was made in 
consultation with KICTANet members.  
Nonetheless, various resource impediments remain as evidenced from interviews with 
participants in Kenya which noted that participation to international fora is still largely based 
on political ties and linkage and those attending such meetings in many cases held political 
linkages to Government politicians. Thus, selection procedures and structures for 
determining who should attend international meetings can be manipulated. Another element 
is the persistent failure of national governments to utilise the skill and talent that exists 
within the telecom sector but resides within the industry, academia or NGOs.  The 
frequency of this concern was articulated in an international survey on capacity development 
and ICT – ‘The “Louder Voices’ (Maclean et al., 2002) - which was conducted in various 
countries including Kenya. The respondents identified the protection of Telkom’s monopoly 
as the reason why policy makers fail to utilise the wider pool of human resources in the 
telecom sector. That is, they fail to draw on advisers who might suggest policy positions 
which deviate from the goal to protect Telkom’s monopoly. This is not far fetched given 
that as was evidenced in this study, all Telkom evaluative consultations were kept secret and 
                                                 







not released to the public. It is thought that this is because suggestions made were contrary 
to Government intentions at the time.  
7.4.4 Addressing participation constraints: Possible approaches 
The participation constraints above suggest that while a framework for inclusiveness of all 
signatories exists on paper, potential problems for equitable participation by all stakeholders 
and GATS signatories remain which are institutionally embedded in the policy-making 
processes of Kenya.  
Domestically, interviews revealed that in the absence of coordinated mechanisms for the 
telecom sector, each international organisation has tended to address its queries to the 
various ministries or departments that they had dealt with in the past. On the other hand, the 
ministries themselves had made no effort to ensure that the new telecom institutions in 
Kenya were understood by the various international organisations. In line with this, the 
various ministries have also been reluctant to let go of the former roles that they held. Where 
meetings have been required it was evident from the reasons provided that there was a lack 
of communication. There is therefore need for a more coordinated effort which seeks to 
channel and coordinate information to and from international meetings.  
The views from various stakeholders in the policy process also confirm that while it is 
obvious that technical and policy capacity require learning over long periods, it is also 
recognised that there is no short cut to this process. Just as important to training and 
development is the need to recognise local capacity in other areas outside Government. It is 
noted that many countries in Africa less frequently utilise the academic institutions within 
their nations for expertise. As noted, the frequency of this concern was articulated in 
Maclean et al., (2002) which argued that most African governments failed to draw on local 
expertise.  
Another concern is the fact that information gained from attendance at meetings is not 
being disseminated thus turning learning into a slow and often unrealised effort. There 







of telecom issues and the understanding of how international issues affect Kenya and 
Africa’s policy making. Efforts to facilitate the awareness of how international policy 
influences decisions made at the domestic level are therefore required. While the issue of 
capacity is being bridged through training provided by the international fora, it is evident 
that this in turn raises questions as to the degree of independence this training provides. Not 
undermining the training and capacity that international institutions provide, it is difficult to 
accept that the advisers, curricula and technical assistance used remains without institutional 
bias.  
As suggested in chapters 2 and 4 and discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, through 
the case of the WTO GATS framework and specifically recent Doha rounds, there are 
tendencies where development assistance gives rise to what Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) term 
‘coercive’ rather than ‘voluntary’ policy transfers, in which the role of international 
consultants usually insisted upon by donor countries most clearly manifests the problem. In 
addition, many of these international institutions do not provide technical assistance on how 
to participate in the international decision making process. There is clearly a limit on what 
these organisations can do to provide training since in many cases this requires funding and 
time from their normal activities. Coupled with this is the fact that lobbying is an issue that is 
not akin to Government policy making. Lobbying is usually seen as an anti-government 
stance that is usually done by Opposition members of Parliament, but even in their case, the 
ability to lobby, and knowledge of how to lobby is limited. This therefore is telling of Kenya 
in general and is not surprising given that the common word on the ground is that Kenyans 
are passive and would not in any way try and throw a stone even when the issue pinched 
their pockets.  
At the international level, Melody (1999c) suggests that ‘best practice’ telecom regulation, 
should also be applied within the global arena. This is because the historical assumptions 
behind telecom and development and the importance of telecom seem to be founded on 
three false assumptions. First, there is the misconception that all countries are uniform in the 
degree of supply and demand of telecom. As such it is falsely assumed that developing 







technologies as those in western countries. This misconception can be discredited based on 
the historically based hierarchical market structure of telecom. For example, access to the 
internet is based on a tier structure controlled mainly by international companies who lease 
or own the internet backbone that determine which countries are linked. And thus while 
there is intense competition for routes in the West, this is not the case in Africa where small 
traffic (users on the net or phone) exist173. Thus, while costs associated with internet access 
in Kenya may be high and it can be argued is as a result of Telkom’s action in tariff 
rebalancing and the profit-oriented nature of the organisation, there are also other historical 
factors that Telkom has had to deal with. Pricing structure can also be explained by the fact 
that Telkom and many other African nations pay much higher costs than other countries for 
access to bandwidth and interconnection. For example, until recently, when an end user in 
Kenya sent email to a correspondent in America, it was the Kenyan ISP that bore the cost of 
the international connectivity from Kenya to America. On the other hand, when an 
American end user sends email to Kenya, the Kenyan ISP also bears the cost of the 
international connectivity, and ultimately the Kenyan end user who bears the brunt by 
paying higher subscription fees. The above example is typical of most PTT organisations of 
developing countries and is linked to the second misconception. PPT organisations 
historically inherited policy models from the ITU that have had a bias towards an expert 
group of engineers who have used various mathematical calculations to determine the costs 
to be paid by each country in the access of telecom. However, in doing so, they have not 
looked at the significant inability of most users in Africa to afford the pricing structures laid 
upon them by the international market.174.  
The third misconception is that the understanding of telecom has been based on the myth 
that supply is the main ‘modus-operandi’ (Melody, 1997b). Consequently, PTT organisations 
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the misconceptions. For further reading see Nicole (eds) (2003) ICT policy: A beginners Handbook , Association of 
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174 There is a growing demand to have the institutionalised pricing structure of telecommunications changed within the ITU. 
See for example Collins (2000) ‘International Accounting Rate Reform: The role of International organisations and 
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have been unable to meet the demands for telecom. In Kenya, the supply myth is observed 
in the objectives of the KCA which seek to provide basic services in telecom. Furthermore, 
Kenya’s position as a receiver and not a supplier of technology inherently makes it a buyer of 
technology which increases costs. Finally, while numerous institutional theories offer an 
explanation for the relative economic and political strengths and weaknesses of countries, 
the uneven power structure of developing countries like Kenya need not be laboured. The 
majority of these uneven power structures are economic in nature and stem from more 
recent policies such as SAPs and the conditional aid of such organisations as the IMF and 
the World Bank. With the establishment of regional trading zones such as the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community 
(ECA), the potential for regional approaches on matters of concern becomes more of a 
reality. Indeed, analysis on viable options for regionalisation is now slowly becoming part 
and parcel of the literature on globalisation (see Shaw, 2000a; 2000b). The utilisation of such 
institutions is therefore encouraged. The EU model offers considerable potential and scope 
for developing similar ‘communities of interest’ to shift the balance of power within 
international organisations. African governments would be served well to emulate such ‘best 
practice’. Thus, agreeing with Melody (1997b), the historical nature of telecom suggests that 
the global market is highly imperfect and in need of regulation to permit fair competition 
and to encourage efficient allocation of resources for countries in Africa.  
Although resolving the constraints reviewed in this section cannot be accomplished here, 
this section’s discussion has served to confirm arguments made within the study that a 
technology cannot be analysed without evaluating how its political and economic structure 
constructs its development. Allied to this argument is that domestic structural institutions are 
a result of their neo-patrimonial systems of governance and its institutionalised aid 
dependency stunts the independent implementation of telecom reform nationally. Here once 
again, attention is drawn to the importance of institutions, and specifically the local 
regulatory authority; CCK.  
It was suggested that the notion of independence in Kenya’s context is constrained by the 







not assumed to suffer a handicap in a way that completely or meaningfully limits it from 
participating in global governance arrangements made by the WTO, concern is raised over 
the manner in which its domestic political economy is thought to adversely affect its local 
institutions in effectively fulfilling obligations within the policy-process.  
However, in the same regard, inclusiveness alone will not produce proportional representational 
universal participation (Dzidonu & Quaynor, 2002, p.3). True participation needs to address the 
institutional imbalances that inhere in these organisations as a result of historical factors and 
the structural nature of the policy process in which these organisations participate in as 
evidenced in this study. The development of telecom and the role this might play in the 
broader economic transformation such as the question of universal access, places the 
problems of participation by developing countries in global governance firmly at the centre 
of resolving how best to approach issues of access, affordability and other issues associated 
with the digital divide. This section has merely sketched the contours of the problem and the 
possible recommendations that could be investigated to address the inadequate participation 
by developing countries in international fora.  
7.5 Conclusion 
For the growing number of people who increasingly question the move to supranational 
regulation of trade and services and its potentially adverse effect on under-developed 
nations, and specifically neo-patrimonial states, the GATS offers a useful tool to consider 
these processes and issues. Drawing on an analysis of Kenya’s GATS implementation 
programme, through the KCA as evidenced in chapters 4 to 6, this chapter argued that the 
GATS, and specifically the RP, provides Kenya with a leverage tool to advance domestic 
political interests, while honouring trade commitments and seeking to prove its policy and 
financial credibility with international investors and monetary institutions. The essence of 
this claim is based on the ability to limit scheduled sectors and services through a positive 








Concern was also raised in the manner in which governments in Africa interact with the aid-
cartel. As argued, this, has sustained Kenya as a neo-patrimonial state in which the donor 
role in the adjustment process has come to be accepted and even institutionalised within the 
telecom process and in which clientelist practises have continued to develop, sustained 
within this donor role. Further concern was also raised on the way in which the political 
economy of neo-patrimonial states is thought to affect its local capacity development, in an 
attempt to protect interests of the political elite (such as retaining Telkom monopoly). These 
constraints highlight the salient factors that necessarily propagate neo-patrimonial relations 
with the international community and indirectly confirm the central claim of the study that 
the GATS commitments had the very effect intended by the Kenyan Government – to 
provide sufficient leeway for domestic policy preferences. Drawing the study to its 
conclusion, the following chapter summarises the arguments by encapsulating the 







8  C o n c l u s i o n  
A MARRIAGE OF CONVIENCE: TELECOM REFORM AND 
THE AID -TRADE RELATIONSHIP IN KENYA 
If your domestic institutions are strong, then you don’t need very strong global institutions. If domestic 
institutions inside countries are weak, it won’t matter how strong your global institutions are. They will 




The principal aim of this study was to understand Kenya’s telecom reform process by 
evaluating how Kenya’s distinct institutional features stemming from its historical political 
landscape and its relationship to the international context shapes the framework and 
outcome of Kenya’s telecom sector. I thus devote this concluding chapter of the study to 
reviewing the objectives, presenting a summary of the research findings; the implications of 
the study; my contribution to the theory and application of policy, and suggestions for 
further research. 
8.1 Revisiting the objectives 
When Kenya signed its schedule of specific commitments in 1994, it was indeed poised to 
introduce substantial changes in its telecom sector. While the term ‘revolution’ is certainly 
hyperbolic, the changes envisaged in 1997 at the enactment of the KCA were far-reaching 
and of significant consequence. The wholly state-owned monopoly was split into three 
sectors establishing Telkom, postal services and a new regulator, CCK. While Telkom is still 
a Government-owned entity, the KCA changes ensured that Telkom could no longer act as 
a lone giant in the telecom sector free from competitors. The value-added service sector that 
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had been burgeoning slowly while under Telkom’s regulatory control burst forth onto the 
landscape with the licensing of competitors in the telecom market, testing the legal limits of 
Telkom’s monopoly and its previous privileges in the sector. The introduction of mobile 
operators in Kenya’s telecom sector saw positive policy developments directed at facilitating 
this ‘revolution’. These changes were not unique to Kenya, but reflected the trends of the 
‘information era’ sweeping across the globe, renovating telecom markets worldwide. This 
was expressed through the adoption of the GATS model premised on the separation of 
supply, policy and regulation sectors. The process as discussed in preceding chapters was 
based on Kenya’s telecom commitments in 1999. However, the adoption of the GATS in 
Kenya as with every country has been unique. This study has sought to document that 
period of Kenya’s telecom reform process which pertains to the GATS treaty and the 
accompanying RP.  
As such this study had three primary goals. First, to further the understanding of telecom 
outcomes in Kenya by evaluating how its political landscape has shaped both the policy and 
implementation of the telecom reform process. To do this, the study applied a framework 
(neo-patrimonialism and NIE) combining both a domestic and international lens. The 
rationale for this study stemmed from its premise stated in chapter 1. Namely: that telecom 
policy making has privileged the role of economics and efficiency within the ambit of 
liberation that has precluded understanding of the distinct nature of policy processes in 
many African states. This study sought to offer a modest contribution to what was argued 
was a lack of theoretical analysis of not only the telecom sector in general, but more 
specifically, the issues that are involved when international telecom policies are applied at the 
domestic level. While it was recognised that the NIE and neo-patrimonial literature draw on 
different analytical theoretical assumptions, it was argued that the reality of the policy 
process pays less attention to the academe’s disciplinary boundaries. The growing 
interdependence of governments with the global world is indeed undeniable and as Keohane 
aptly notes: 
international-level analysis …is neither an alternative to studying domestic politics, nor a mere 







conception of the common external problems, pressures, and challenges…we lack an analytical basis 
for identifying the role played by domestic interests and pressures…Unless the constraints imposed by 
the world political economy allows us to distinguish the effects of common international forces from 
those of distinctive national ones  
Moreover, given that the aim of this study was to explain the empirical (what is) rather than 
the normative (what ought to be), it was argued that the tension proposed in the literature 
between domestic and international contexts does not require a resolution as neither frames 
on their own provide an adequate explanation of the outcomes in the telecom reform 
process in Kenya. To this end, the neo-patrimonial literature was used to shed light on 
Kenya’s unique historical context emanating from both its colonial legacy and its relationship 
with the international arena. NIE on the other hand was utilised for its organising principles 
which focuses on the value of international institutions as institutions that seek to reduce 
uncertainties in the market. This argument was used to locate the narrower thesis that trade 
commitments act as instruments of credibility in the context of telecom liberalisation.  
Second, this study has sought to contribute to the scant literature on telecom reform dealing 
with the interrelations between domestic reforms, GATS commitments and donor funding 
requirements in developing countries, and specifically in Kenya, by detailing the 
developments of the Kenyan sector between 1997 and 2005. The study of Kenya’s telecom 
reform process also provides an opportunity to convey a sense of the challenges that 
domestic telecom reform presents in the distinctive case of a country whose telecom policy 
was shaped as much by its political historical context as it was by international best practice 
influencing the sector’s reform in the global political economy.  
The third goal of the study was to provide a detailed empirical study of the Kenyan telecom 
application of the WTO GATS framework. Previous comprehensive literature on the 
Kenyan telecom sector specifically with reference to the interrelation between international 
policy such as the GATS is scant and those in existence (Muruiki, 2002, 2004, Kane, 2002, 
Etta & Elder 2005), evaluate the growth of the sector without attributing the outcomes to 
international policy commitments such as the GATS framework and the aid and trade 







reform outcomes emanate from the existing relationship with international aid institutions 
and its commitments made in the international arena. 
The goals of this study as reviewed above enable it to add, as suggested through the study’s 
main research aim, a new understanding of how different policy contexts affect the 
application of policy. The depiction of the tensions inherent between international and 
national policy making is illustrated through the selective application of the GATS 
instruments, specifically national treatment and the adoption of the RP. As depicted in the 
study, questions of the degree of independence and regulatory capture arise. This study did 
not proffer an exhaustive review of the theoretical discourse on regulation and regulatory 
capture, as this was not its main goal. However, the study discussed the issues of regulation 
which as was argued is tied to the specific constraints of Kenya’s telecom legislation (viewed 
essentially as part of Kenya’s ‘institutional endowments’) and how these constraints manifest 
themselves both in policy making domestically and internationally as discussed in chapter 7. 
A digest of the argument and findings are summarised below. 
8.2 Argument and findings  
At the outset, the question was posed as to why Kenya acceded to the GATS telecom 
instruments at all. As such, it was argued that the answer to this must be located within 
Kenya’s domestic context. In answer to this, chapters 4 to 6 asserted that Kenya’s accession 
to the GATS telecom instruments must be regarded primarily as an attempt to make the 
domestic policy credible to the international economic community while allowing it to 
maintain neo-patrimonial governance mechanisms at a domestic level. Drawing on the 
analytical framework developed in chapter 2, three central claims were developed to support 
this argument. First, it was argued that political authority in Africa is based on the giving and 
granting of favours under the rubric of what is known as clientelist practises. Neo-
patrimonialism, it was argued, undermines economic policy reform because clientelism is 
based on the extensive use of state resources for political purposes as was evidenced in 







Patterns of reform in the 1960s as discussed in chapter 2, revealed that African regimes have 
sought to protect the interests of a narrow stratum of state elites. Policy outcomes were the 
result of the interaction between clientelist needs of neo-patrimonial states and the dominant 
international paradigms of SAPs and privatisation programmes of the international 
community. The framework explained that African political leaders had come to rely on 
patronage and the distribution of economic rents in order to ensure political stability. 
African political systems became neo-patrimonial, combining patterns of modern 
democracies with an international patrimonial logic. These neo-patrimonial states 
evolutionalised patterns of dyadic exchange, prebendalism, private appropriation of public 
resources and ethnic preferences creating a patrimonial political logic (van de Walle, 2001) 
in which the authority of the state is diverted to enhance the interests of political elites rather 
than the public domain. 
It was argued that following independence, foreign aid helped sustain neo-patrimonial 
regimes by providing resources and technical capacity for development that the state was not 
able to generate on its own. Locating Kenya as a neo-patrimonial state, it was established 
that international institutions began to directly challenge the central mechanisms of neo-
patrimonial rule. As shown through Kenya’s development from its colonial masters, overall 
Government consumption and development expenditures were not declining during the 
1960s and 1970s. However, as growing aid resources were not utilised for development 
objectives but rather for clientelist practises, donors moved to bring about liberalisation and 
real institutional reform in the country. Aid was pegged to the conditionalities of reform. 
The result of this was the second claim, namely: that a co-dependency was created between 
IFIs and African leaders, in which a ‘culture of approval’ based on a paper process, was 
institutionalised. Yet, in spite of this, it was evidenced that instead of pursuing reforms 
African leaders instrumentalised the conditionality system of the reform process for their 
own agendas. It is within this framework that the telecom reform process in Kenya is 
located. 
Drawing on the broad concepts of NIE, it was further argued that outcomes in the telecom 







international framework shaping the adoption of the reform process. The GATS was viewed 
in this study as an institution which emerged to structure exchange between countries, to 
lower the transaction costs associated with trade and investment across national 
borders and to minimise the adverse effects of asymmetrically held information 
between bargaining parties. In effect the risks of opportunistic behaviour an argument 
made by North and Weingast (1990), was therefore addressed. The establishment of the 
KCA is thus an expression of this promise as the KCA addressed the issues of the GATS, 
by separating the policy and regulatory functions. This motivation was interpreted as an 
effort by the Kenyan Government to credibly commit to policy reform, according to 
the ‘rules of the game’ being played in the WTO, and in doing so, still allow it to 
pursue its own political interests within the telecom sector.  
Thus within the nexus of the historical context of Kenya’s neo-patrimonial state and the 
development of the GATS framework, it was argued that Kenya acceded to the GATS 
mainly because of the package deal (Bronckers, 2003 p.548) effect of the GATS. That is, that 
concessions and commitments in one area creates opportunities for obtaining 
concessions in another area. As noted through the discussion in chapter 7, the portrayal 
of committing to telecom reform in a fixed timetable ensures that a ‘stick’ is offered 
alongside a ‘carrot’. The importance of this ‘stick’ and ‘carrot’ relationship, as evidenced 
through chapters 4 to 6, was linked to the need for investment to fund political interests in 
the name of ‘telecom development’.  
8.3 Central finding: a marriage of convenience: international aid, trade and telecom 
reform 
As evidenced in this study, critics of SAPs do have reason to be sceptical about the long-
term success of privatisation conditionalities. While not conclusive, the telecom sector in 
part does suggest that international negotiation between the Kenyan Government and IFIs 
provided both entities with the means for self-preservation, but did not accomplish the 
outward goals of either entity. Unfortunately, the losers on the whole are the Kenyan people 
who continue to suffer at the hands of Kenyan leaders reluctant to introduce reforms. Thus, 







money for its development prospects, the results do suggest that the disbursements do not 
interfere with the neo-patrimonial strategy of prolonged delays nor do they curtail or stop 
such behaviour. Instead, they are used as an excuse not to continue with the privatisation 
process. It is thus both ironic and tragic that IFIs and African leaders over the years have 
failed to execute their one true mandate: supporting and assisting African societies in 
reforms.  
In addition, as discussed in chapter 7, the overall findings of the study on the telecom sector, 
do suggest that the GATS framework allows Kenya to achieve optimum results, in so far as 
the interests of political leaders are concerned and at the same time constrains the effective 
application of telecom reform in Kenya. This has allowed Kenya to incrementally introduce 
policy changes in the sector at the Government’s discretion, yet at the same time provide it 
with sufficient predictability to inspire confidence and enhance its credibility internationally. 
Specifically, the analysis in chapters 4 to 7 reveals that the two presidential regimes, Moi and 
Kibaki, were able to instrumentalise the telecom reform process and use it to their 
advantage. 
Three main trends in this process were evidenced. First, the Government made attempts to 
recentralise power in order to more carefully manage the reform process. Understanding the 
challenge posed by telecom reform, Moi and Kibaki were keen to maintain discretionary 
control over state resources, a key cornerstone of patrimonial power. This was expressed in 
three ways. First, the Presidents ensured they retained power in the choosing and appointing 
of the new heads of the telecom reform. This was done within ethnic tribal lines which is a 
key feature of African neo-patrimonial logic as discussed in chapter 2. During Moi’s 
presidency, most heads in the telecom sector came from the President’s tribal grouping - 
Kalenjin. During Kibaki’s presidency in 2003, this was changed to members from the 
Kikuyu community and other key tribal groupings within the key ‘Mount Kenya Alliance’ 
grouping, discussed in chapter 6. In addition, Ministers responsible for the telecom sector 
like all other sectors were presidentially appointed within ethnic lines. 
Second, Moi and Kibaki used these larger Presidential powers through the newly appointed 







of institutions as directed by the RP, CCK’s powers were diverted to the Minister for 
Communications who received his commands from the President’s office. The third trend 
has been to reassert Presidential control over key forms of rent seeking. As discussed in 
chapter 7, the licensing process which is controlled by the Minister has pulled the reform 
process out of the proper channels of the licensing process and ensured it remains clouded 
in secrecy and political manoeuvring at the expense of the process itself. In addition, the 
protracted delays and problems of the entire sector as discussed in chapter 5 provide further 
evidence of how Presidential control has been asserted over the sector.  
Yet the creation of these processes in which Presidential control is dominant has mollified 
donors by giving the impression of Government commitment to reform. By removing the 
reform process from regular channels, Presidents Moi and Kibaki have been able to argue 
that doing so was in the interest of ensuring that the reform process would take place as 
agreed. This resulted in the creation of committees and subcommittees within the 
Presidential office which report to the President over such matters as the telecom reform 
process. It is argued that these structures have provided the Presidents with useful insulation 
against donor pressures. During the entire reform process, more than three Ministers have 
held the portfolio of Minister of Communications. In addition as was discussed in chapter 5, 
heads of telecom institutions have been reshuffled in and out depending on the needs of the 
Minister or the President.  
The second trend in the instrumentalisation of the telecom reform process has been the 
attempt by Moi and Kibaki to derive political advantage from the reform process. This 
centralisation of Presidential power was reengineered in the guise of economic liberalisation 
and was supported by the World Bank and the IMF. This political advantage was based on 
the ability to use the telecom reform process as a means to argue for more funding and more 
sympathy from the Kenyan public. Thus, both Moi and Kibaki could argue that they were 
actually implementing the reform process yet at the same time were able to slow down the 
process to their advantage.  
Finally, the third trend in the instrumentalisation of the telecom reform process in Kenya 







providing the direction central to the country’s development. While this study has not 
focused on the wider effects of this process, the analysis presented in chapters 4 to 7 
suggests that Government expenditure and planning is dictated by such processes as the 
PRSP which facilitates the process of receiving funds from the IMF and World Bank. The 
findings suggest that Kenyan leaders consider aid and ethno-politics as part of a complex 
incentive structure when engaging in the reform process. As was discussed in chapter 7, the 
complex aid system dominated by IFIs provides both Kenyan leaders and IFIs with a means 
of self-preservation.  
In regards to the ‘new broom’ thesis discussed in chapter 2, in which it is thought that a new 
leader is more likely to implement reforms, evidence from this study suggests that this is not 
the case. Kibaki’s Government continues to face several corruption scandals and has to date, 
not provided any conclusive evidence (where reforms are concerned), that his Government 
is any different to its predecessor. 
In sum, the findings in this study suggest that differences in the telecom reform process in 
Kenya cannot therefore solely be imputed to technical factors. Evidence from this study 
suggests that fiscal considerations have played a key role in this process. As the crisis 
unfolded in the 1970s, the fiscal implications of policies became key factors in the 
willingness of states such as Kenya to maintain or change them. Thus, the reticence to 
undertake privatisation reform has, to a considerable extent, been overcome by the lure of 
revenues from the sale of public enterprises such as Telkom. This has meant that not much 
has been done about the need to develop better management practices in Telkom but rather 
much time has been taken over the Government’s indecision to determine how much 
money it can recoup from the sale. External public funding has thus resulted in the growing 
role for donor agencies in the day to day decision making process. As discussed in chapter 6, 
the inevitable evolution of this process has therefore been the reinforcement of non-
development tendencies.   
In concluding, the findings in this study of the telecom reform process in Kenya provides 
evidence of what van de Walle has termed the partial reform syndrome (2001 p.60) in which 







the process of reform over the last eight years. The outcomes in the telecom sector in Kenya 
can thus be understood as a result of the Kenyan Government reluctantly being forced to 
liberalise by external agents. This has resulted in the manipulation of the process by the 
Kenyan Government for political ends such as the provision of rent-seeking incentives, 
ethnic preferences and centralised hybrid regimes. This study thus shows that international 
undertakings are indeed mediated through domestic politics which provides local agents with 
the ability to manoeuvre the ‘rules’ for their own ‘game’. This confirms the premise made at 
the beginning of the study, namely: that domestic institutions and patterns of politics will 
continue to function as highly critical filters of global forces (Pempel, 1998 p.219). 
8.4 Contribution to the theorising of telecom outcomes 
The analytical framework used to analyse Kenya’s telecom reform process, suggests the need 
to revisit the study of telecom and the wider field of ICT policy in Africa. Based on evidence 
from this study, trends in policy outcomes from a domestic or international perspective as 
suggested in chapter 1 can be challenged as discussed below. 
First, evidence from this study shows that there is no need to belabour the point that the 
state is not a black box. As such, states while benevolent remain necessarily entrenched. 
While they must still implement restructuring processes, they will do so according to their 
prerogatives. Milner drives this point home noting that domestic politics and international 
relations are intricately bound because a nation’s international position affects its internal 
politics and economics. Conversely, a nation’s domestic situation impacts its foreign 
relations (Milner, 1997). Drawing on neo-patrimonial theory, this study was able to provide a 
microscopic assessment of how a country’s political and economic development influences 
the actions of agents. As was evidenced, Kenya’s flexibility to prescribe the content of the 
GATS through the Schedules of Specific Commitments accommodates these domestic 
imperatives because it acknowledges that scheduling commitments engages with the inherent 
tensions of the nation-state and international institutional control. In this respect, Arup 
(2000, p.99) in discussing the limits and potentials of the WTO agreement, notes that 
scheduling commitments has the potential to surrender a government’s control of the 







autonomy and cultural identity. In Kenya’s case, the commitments accorded it the right to 
exclude services that served the purposes of Kenya’s domestic development goals as well as 
safeguarding political control within the sector. Nonetheless, it is precisely because of the 
varying levels of development, that telecom policy must also fall squarely within the 
domestic domain. The complexities inherent in designing an effective policy are too context 
specific to be determined at multi-lateral level. To do so would seriously compromise the 
pursuit of national goals at the domestic level.  
This study also presents confirmation that international organisations cannot be abstracted 
from the GPE and the study of telecom policy. Institutions in the GPE must therefore be 
viewed as actors in their own right influencing domestic outcomes. NIE provides a window 
in which to do this. Specifically it provides a means to take into account institutions as 
critical constraints on economic performance. In North’s (1995 p.17) words, NIE: 
..builds on, modifies, and extends neo-classical theory to permit it to come to grips and deal with an 
entire range of issues ….What it retains and builds on is the fundamental assumption of scarcity 
and hence competition – the basis of the choice theoretical approach that underlies microeconomics. 
What it abandons is instrumental rationality – the assumption of neo-classical economics that has 
made it an institution-free theory.  
Drawing on NIE, the view that international institutions are rational arenas in which states 
convene to pursue their own interests, is therefore challenged based on evidence from this 
study. While it was not the aim of this study to provide an in-depth analysis of the WTO or 
the merits or demerits of the GATS, evidence from this study indicates that the GATS 
framework has proffered a liberalisation model at the expense of other models which has in 
turn influenced the construction and implementation of policy at domestic level. While the 
compromise of the GATS has served to allow participation of other states, specifically 
developing countries, the GATS cannot be viewed as neutral. This confirms North’s 
argument (ibid, 1995 p.20) that: institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially 
efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining 
power to create new rules. Indeed, as noted in this study, there is apparent consensus among the 







analysis of telecom policy development has remained techno-centric and where analysis has 
moved beyond this realm, remained state-centred. This study therefore, in part, corrects this 
anomaly. 
8.5 Implications for telecom reform  
In analysing the GATS framework and having noted the reasons for Kenya’s accession to 
the GATS in the first place, I note that the drive to want to ‘catch up’ with the rest of the 
world in this ever changing telecom market is heightened. Nevertheless, such catching up 
should not be done blindly. The use of case studies from other countries, as well as 
suggested ideologies and frameworks presented in the international arena, ignore the fact 
that Africa’s telecom landscape first and foremost lacks access to basic telecom services. The 
implications of this are that Africa needs policy where the drive is to meet targets of USO. 
The drive for reform should be grounded on this and not on trying to follow market 
oriented models whose sole aim is profitability. Indeed, it has been shown through this study 
that privatisation is not the sole determinant of competitive and efficient markets, but rather 
that sound management systems from both the government and the regulator are required if 
competition and efficiency are to be achieved, a position also echoed by Melody (1999c). 
Policy reform choices that advocate better and wider use of sound management practices 
should therefore be considered a priority over technological advancement.   
Two final thoughts emerge with respect to the GATS and Kenya’s telecom sector. First, it is 
important to note that both the GATS and its telecom instruments are at relatively early 
stages of operation. The fourth protocol is still largely inchoate. In addition to that, the 
GATS framework agreement is a fledging instrument. Many of the GATS rules are not 
complete, and are largely untested. Service negotiations, especially in telecom have been 
delayed and are relatively novel in the overall framework. Through the process, many gaps in 
the instruments will be identified and will need to be addressed. Some of the rules will need 
to be improved. Certainly, more rounds of negotiations are taking place. It is also worth 
reflecting again that the GATS has been negotiated as part of a multilateral treaty and, to that 







study there is a correlation between telecom and the overall development of a nation, the 
significance of this treaty cannot be underestimated whatever its flaws.  
Second, as outlined in this study, Kenya’s telecom industry faces a formidable task as it seeks 
to open its fixed-line market for competition. The proposed changes in the sector for mid 
2006 suggest that the country’s social and economic development agenda is pressing, 
necessitating investment from the international arena. Whether its current vision to achieve 
this is sufficient will depend on many internal and external factors, but foreign and domestic 
investment is unlikely to flow if regulatory and management design matters are left 
unresolved. That said, it is difficult to avoid the temptation to conclude on a positive note. 
Despite obvious problems with market structure and policy design, Kenya’s telecom sector 
still remains lucrative within the East African region and the rest of Africa. The growth of 
the mobile sector is indicative of the unmet demand and forecast short-term indicators 
suggest a substantial increase from the current figure of 5 million to 7 million by the end of 
December 2006 (Wandera, 2005). Attention will also soon have to turn away from the 
fixation of monopoly legacy and the problems of the past and begin to examine how to 
evolve regulation to foster long-term sustainable competition. This degree of focus may be a 
distance away from the current issue set in Kenya, but given Kenya’s new ICT policy 
framework that is currently before Parliament, it can never be too early to begin to look 
forward.  
Finally, this study has made much of Kenya’s compliance with the GATS, claims have been 
advanced and while some have been proved to a greater extent than others, the story of the 
telecom reform process in Kenya between 1997 and 2005 has been told. The rest is for 
another study. Factual errors may well emerge, as will contested interpretations of those 
facts. It is hoped that this study will serve as a springboard for future studies, both 







telecom and the future of the wider ICT policy development176 then it would have served its 
purpose. 
8.6 Implications for policy making 
Finally, the implication of the partial reform syndrome evidenced in this study, is that the 
perpetuation of austerity for an extended period of time and the manner in which the 
adjustment process has been managed has served to weaken bureaucratic rationality and 
reinforce patrimonial tendencies thus weakening the capacity of the state. This has meant 
that state resources are simply inadequate and have been further eroded by poor 
management and maintenance of budgets.  
While the study has not provided discussion on the disempowerment of the central state 
bureaucratic apparatus of Kenya, the point to make here is that over time the 
underinvestment in state capacity by state elites has strengthened the relative power of neo-
patrimonial interests within the state. This presents a concern for policy making. Moreover, 
the sum result is that Kenya’s dependence on foreign aid continues to weaken the state even 
further as development planning and priorities are mapped within the aid structure. The 
adjustment regime that started in Kenya in the 1980s as discussed in chapter 5 can thus be 
viewed as a failure in the sense that it has allowed the Kenyan government to exaggerate the 
impact of the adjustment and enabled it to deflect its failure in managing programmes onto 
external agents such as the World Bank and the IMF.  
Despite the clear impact of aid and reforms, in what direction is the aid system likely to 
evolve in the future? The GATS framework suggests that for the telecom sector, the ‘aid and 
trade’ relationship will continue. The question remains as to whether the Kenyan 
government and donor institutions can build a system of aid that directly promotes the 
emergence of development and which eliminates such political problems. In the West, there 
is clear indication of ‘donor fatigue’ and, while NGOs may continue with development 
projects, their traditional view of aid as small and independent projects reduces the 
                                                 








likelihood of their influence in national planning. It appears that the impulse for reform must 
come from ‘us’ Africans. ‘We’ are the main beneficiaries of the aid system and therefore 
should have the greatest incentive to push for change both from a political and a governance 
perspective. While the current wave of democratisation taking place in Kenya is yet to 
confirm its capacity to control its future, there is hope in thinking that as more Kenyans 
begin to challenge the neo-patrimonial logic of governance, institutional structures imbued 
by a patrimonial logic will eventually disappear.  
8.7 Suggestions for further research 
In regards to the GATS framework, there are many future areas for research stemming from 
the operation of the GATS. Various rounds continue to be negotiated under the Doha 
Agenda, which implies that Kenya will continue to change and alter its GATS commitments 
in line with both technological changes and international best practice. In addition, this study 
provides a starting point from which to analyse Kenya’s eventual adoption of the proposed 
ICT policy. Three areas however in particular should be considered for further research: 
global governance structures and telecom commitments, USO, and regulation. 
First, the global-political nature of the sector has greatly changed, giving rise to the non-
differentiation of private, international and non-governmental organisations (see Shaw, 
2003). And while this study has not analysed these relationships, many non-governmental 
agencies are now involved in providing telecom assistance pegged to international deals with 
private sector agencies. Although, in the short term, this might seem reasonable, the long-
term effects are debatable (given the nature of new and changing policies such as open 
standards/software),177 and may be undesirable for policy. This is because in most cases 
governments are by then tied to a policy option for a given number of years.  
Second, issues of USO and the implementation of a knowledge infrastructure are further 
heightened by the trends in the mobile telecom industry, where figures of use currently 
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exceed fixed-line telephony (Hamilton, 2003).  Associated with such findings, is the fact that 
new ways of thinking and new forms of technology need to be considered in order not only 
to provide USO, but also to provide access to the Internet and to the various Value Added 
Services that result from this connection. It would be wise to revisit definitions of USO, 
because definitions require change and flexibility with the current advancements in the 
sector as evidenced in this study. Third, as noted through the discussion in chapter 7, 
regulatory issues for analysis have arisen in this study. How can regulatory institutions 
overcome ‘regulatory capture’? As is evidenced in this study, it is possible to have a 
regulatory agency but still not conform to regulatory principles. These issues need to be 
further analysed. A comparison between countries may serve as a useful starting point in this 
endeavour. 
Finally, the wider implications for policy from this study for Africa and other developing 
nations lie in the fact that telecom policy options and decision making processes influence 
the degree to which a nation can call itself an information/knowledge society. In this regard, 
policy analysts need to move African telecom research away from the current predominance 
of ‘telecom outcome/output’ research to robust, in-depth qualitative work, which begins to 
unpack the complexities of telecom policy making (Kerretts, 2004) as set out in this study. 
Such studies may serve to enlighten policy makers on the impact and influence of domestic 
political context and how best to overcome negative undesirable aspects of policy-making as 
evidenced in this study. 
8.8 Closing remarks 
Finally, the real insight of this study is that it largely confirms the difficulty in eliminating 
clientelist practises simply by changing policy regimes or by liberalising a sector. Granted, 
while the prospects of rent-seeking become harder with liberalisation, state agents seem to 
find ways to restore discretion over the reform process. Unless the liberalisation process is 
accompanied by political changes that increase the checks and balances on executive abuses 
of influence, rent-seeking activities will prove extremely resilient and the objectives of 
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